Authoritarian Legacies and Good Democracy in South Europe

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*First draft. Comments very welcome*This paper is a revised draft of a previous work grounded on a research conducted with Katherine Hite. In that previous work this author has been analyzing the Southern European cases that provide now the focus of this paper.

This paper tries to understand the complex forces that influence the quality of democracy in countries such as those of Southern Europe that experienced authoritarian regimes. In the way authoritarian regimes have been conceptualized and analyzed the influence of Juan Linz is especially strong and gratefully recognized. In the first part of the paper, I shall define what is a "good" democracy, discuss salient authoritarian legacies, and suggest links between such legacies and authoritarian hindrances to good democracy. In the second one, I propose a comparative analysis among the cases signaling the most important legacies, the differences and similarities among the cases, and the possible processes in which authoritarian legacies fade away.

What is democracy?

The analysis of the quality of democracy – that is, an empirical scrutiny of what 'good' democracy is about – requires not only that we have a definition of democracy, but also that we establish a clear notion of the quality. The minimal definition of democracy (Dahl 1971) suggests that such regime has at least universal, adult suffrage; recurring, free, competitive and fair elections; more than one political party; and more than one source of information. In addition, democratic institutions, existing rights and also the decision making process should not be constrained by non-elected elites or external powers (Schmitter and Karl, 1993, 45-6). Among the countries that meet these minimal criteria, further empirical analysis is still necessary to detect the degree to which they have achieved the two main objectives of an ideal democracy – freedom and equality.

Thus, the analysis of a 'good democracy' should theoretically set aside those regimes that are to varying degrees deficient in principal democratic features. Amongst them are hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002), whose failure to ensure free and fair electoral competition and a minimum level of civil rights keeps them below the minimum threshold to be classified as democratic. Likewise, the *defective democracies* (Merkel and Croissant 2000) should also be left out of the analysis. This category includes 'exclusive' democracies, which offer only limited guaranties for political rights; 'dominated' democracies, in which powerful groups use their influence to condition and limit the autonomy of elected leaders; and 'illiberal' democracies, which offer only partial guarantees of civil rights. In reality, the last three models may also be seen as institutional hybrids, and thus fall short of the minimum threshold specified above.

Deficient democracy is a recurrent expression used to depict East European regimes, but it often bears a different meaning. These are regimes that have just overcome the minimal democratic threshold, but still experience problems of consolidation. By displaying minimal

requirements for democracy, they differ from hybrid regime (see above) and can be included in the analysis here.

Delegative democracy, sometimes referred to as a *populist democracy*, also fit well within the scope of this analysis, having overcome the necessary threshold. These regimes are usually based on a majority system, and host relatively 'clean elections'; parties, parliament, and the press are usually free to express their criticisms, and the courts block unconstitutional policies(O'Donnell 1994, 55-69). In practice, however, citizens of these democracies, which O'Donnell finds, for example, in Latin America, 'delegate others to make decisions on their behalf', such that they no longer have the opportunity to check and evaluate performance of their officials once they are elected. Other bodies of government, even those meant for this purpose, neglect or fail to carry out their watchdog functions and, consequently, the rule of law is only partially or minimally respected (O'Donnell 1994, 60-62).

The second step in evaluating 'good' and 'bad' democracies requires a clear definition of 'quality'. The use of the term in the industrial and marketing sectors suggests three different meanings of quality. First, quality is defined by the established procedural aspects associated with each product; a 'quality' product is the result of an exact, controlled process carried out according to precise, recurring methods and timing. Here the emphasis is on the *procedure*. Second, quality consists of the structural characteristics of a product, be it the design, materials, or functioning of the good, or other details that it features. Here, the emphasis is on the *contents*. Finally, the quality of a product or service is indirectly derived from the satisfaction expressed by the customer, by their requesting again the same product or service, regardless of either how it is produced or what the actual contents are, or how the consumer goes about acquiring the product or service. The three different notions of quality are thus grounded either in procedures, contents, or results. Each has different implications for the empirical research. Importantly, even with all the adjustments demanded by the complexity of the 'object' under examination – i.e., democracy - it is still necessary to keep these conceptualizations of quality in mind as we elaborate definitions and models of democratic quality.

What is the 'quality'?

Starting from the definition above, and from the prevailing notions of quality, a quality or 'good' democracy may be considered to be one presenting a stable institutional structure that realizes the liberty and equality of citizens through the legitimate and correct functioning of its institutions and mechanisms. A good democracy is thus first and foremost a broadly legitimated regime that completely satisfies citizens ('quality' in terms of 'result'). When institutions have the full backing of civil society, they can pursue the values of the democratic regime. If, in contrast, the institutions must postpone their objectives and expend energy and resources on consolidating and maintaining their legitimacy, crossing over even the minimum threshold for democracy becomes a remarkable feat. Second, a good democracy is one in which the citizens, associations, and communities enjoy liberty and equality ('quality' in terms of 'contents'). Third, in a good democracy the citizens themselves have the power to check and evaluate whether the government pursues the objectives of liberty and equality according to the rule of law. They monitor the efficiency of the application of the laws in force, the efficacy of the decisions made by government, and the political responsibility and accountability of elected officials in relation to the demands expressed by civil society ('quality' in terms of 'procedure').

With the above in mind, five possible dimensions can be indicated here, along which good democracies may vary. The first two are procedural dimensions. Although related to the contents, these dimensions mainly concern the rules. The first procedural dimension is the

of the change of regime, while the institutions disappear; or behavior may persist because of inertia when either beliefs, institutions, or both, have disappeared. Of course, the higher the number of dimensions that persist, the stronger the legacies, and the slower and more difficult the fading away.

Second, as suggested by the above definition, there are two fundamental kinds of legacies: a. those that refer to values, institutions and behavior introduced by the authoritarian regime; and b. those that reinforce, strengthen, or entrench previous values and existing institutions by setting up new institutions, agencies or organizations and creating or reproducing subsequent behavioral habits. The second kind of legacy is well-embedded in political culture and is usually stronger and more persistent. As authoritarian regimes are often the institutional transposition of conservative coalitions (Linz 1964), this second kind of legacy is a more recurrent one. There are also more innovative regimes in terms of institutions, and they are usually regimes with totalitarian features, such as Italian fascism. From an empirical perspective, in order to be considered an authoritarian legacy, the second, more historically embedded kind of legacy has to have been clearly supported by the decisions and policies of the immediately preceding authoritarian regime.

Third, a legacy always implies continuity with a previously existing phenomenon. In broader terms, a legacy could also be considered a reaction to that previous phenomenon. For example, state-crafters of the democratizing regime clearly perceive the need to differentiate the new regime from the previous one, and this specific reaction, while discontinuous, is also a form of legacy. A good example can be found in the Italian Constitutional Charter. As suggested by the debates in the committee that drafted it, several of the proposals and decisions represented attempts to shape governmental institutions as an extreme counter to the fascist regime. One key outcome in this regard was the enormous role of parliament vis-a-vis the cabinet, resulting in decisional inefficacy once the strongly dominant role of the Christian Democratic party ended in the mid-1950s. As suggested by Bermeo (1992) and more recently by Pridham (2000), such a reaction may be more appropriately labeled "political learning". For the sake of clarity, we tend toward the narrower meaning of the term of legacy. This means that legacies chiefly involve continuities from the past, though it is difficult to disentangle analytically political learning processes from legacies.

We argue that authoritarian legacies are located in both formal-legal institutions and, perhaps just as importantly for our cases, in those interstices linking civil society's engagement with political society and the state, including cultural practices and “lived” experiences (Dirks et. al., 1996). Thus, in addition to discussing authoritarian enclaves that continue to pervade formal political institutions, we will examine the influence of authoritarian legacies on both organized and unorganized interests or identities in political and civil society. We will encourage the exploration of authoritarian legacies in what Anthony Giddens terms the "structuration" or routinization of everyday life, as reflected through political consciousness, discourse, and practice (1984).

We emphasize this latter exploration of authoritarian legacies and structuration because it may be here where authoritarian legacies are the deepest and most enduring, at the level of personal autonomy as a civil and political right and as a fundamental condition for democratic citizenship and the rule of law (O'Donnell 1998, Held 1997, Giddens 1984).

Remnants and memories of these regimes present an interesting set of paradoxes. On the one hand, memories of repressive patterns and action continue to inhibit political discourse, political participation, and individual notions of political efficacy, associability, and trust. On the other hand, for the cases of Portugal and Spain, memories of the military regimes also evoke associations with a desire for order, efficiency and predictability, often in the economic as well as political arenas. For the three Southern European cases, partially positive attitudes toward the authoritarian pasts still fluctuate above 40%.

To varying degrees, authoritarian regimes have overseen the restructuring of labor-state or capital-labor-state relationships, as well as the restructuring of the political representation of labor. In Italy and Portugal, authoritarian regimes created corporatist arrangements,

Authoritarian legacies as "silencers" are difficult to operationalize, yet they are harbors of a structural violence that weighs heavily (though unequally) on the polity and society (Habermas 1986). Preferences for stability and order over debate and dissent reflect a lingering fear of polarization under previous democratic regimes and of brutal state response to conflict. Moreover, as Maravall (1981) has suggested for the Spanish case, it is quite rational for citizens to turn away from politics in the wake of political abuses.

Possible links and determining factors

We cannot assume that every authoritarian legacy limits democratic expression. On the contrary, there are legacies such as that of efficiency or the building of an effective civil service that are positively related to a "good" democracy. Not every legacy impedes a good democracy. Thus, our key question is: When do authoritarian legacies constrain or impede the best expressions of democracy?

We will argue that the influence of authoritarian legacies on the quality of democracy depends upon three basic dimensions, or sites, for strategic action: 1) the durability of the previous authoritarian regime; 2) the innovation of that regime; and 3) the mode of transition from authoritarianism.

By *innovation* under authoritarianism, we mean both the degree of transformation and institutionalization of authoritarian rules, patterns, relationships and norms, often symbolized by a new constitution (Aguero 1998), by the setting up of new institutions, but also by the degree of strengthening or weakening of particular organized interests or identities (Hagopian 1995). In this paper, we will explore the range of authoritarian "exacerbations" and "breaks" with the past in terms of the relationships among the state, political parties and other organized political and social interests, and civil society.

By *mode of transition*, we mean the ways in which the transition from authoritarian rule privileged particular incumbents and/or challengers, altered (or left in place) authoritarian institutional rules and procedures, influenced political elite appeals to their constituencies (Munck and Leff 1997; Linz and Stepan 1996; Karl and Schmitter 1991), and/or were characterized by some degree of violence that made discontinuity more probable. Here we will highlight prerogatives for the military and other authoritarian incumbents, pact making, rules governing elections and political parties, and the roles and positioning of organized and unorganized civil society interests in the transition process. We argue that continuous or discontinuous modes of transition mediate whether and how authoritarian legacies endure.

By *durability*, we mean the span of time of the authoritarian regime. If a regime is innovative, then the span of time is less relevant. If, on the other hand, the regime is not innovative, then the regime must be in power for at least fifteen to twenty years, that is, for at least a generation, to be a salient dimension. While we do not examine this here, we are conscious of the importance of exploring transformations in the sites of traditional political socialization under authoritarian regimes, including family, church, and educational institutions, which become the primary referents for political socialization in the absence of a public sphere. We argue that the intensity of authoritarian legacies in the post-transition period depends in good part on the enduring shock and penetration of authoritarian rules, norms, and practices in the private sphere as well as the public sphere.

There are also important connections between innovation and the mode of transition. If the transition is discontinuous, institutional innovation may be less salient, as the new

political elite transforms authoritarian institutions. If the transition is continuous, then authoritarian regime innovation is much more relevant, for path dependency is essentially established.

Our task now becomes to relate key variables of regime innovation, duration and mode of transition to the quality of democracy in the post-transition period. We focus on how such legacies have affected the new democratic institutions as well as the modes of political incorporation. That is, we chiefly examine and analyze political parties, including internal party organization and the relationships between parties and interests (see Morlino 1998). We will also explore a range of indicators regarding citizens' assessments of their democracies and specific political institutions, as well as their sense of efficacy and investment in their governments' decision-making processes regarding the economy and other key issues. Moreover, we will explore the state and reach of political discourse and of discursive practices as indicators of the parameters and constraints on a democratic public sphere (Arendt 1958). When possible, we will examine the links between contemporary political organization and action and authoritarian legacies, including strategies for ameliorating or working with the constraints particular authoritarian legacies have represented.

One difficulty stems from including the exacerbation of historical patterns of egregious social domination as authoritarian legacies, for while we can recognize such patterns as far from democratic, this may be more appropriately framed as a classic question of social inequality and its relationship to political institutions and practices. It raises a basic question regarding the relationship between "irreconciliation" of authoritarian legacies, on the one hand, and structural inequality, on the other.

This suggests that we should focus on the ways in which the most notorious legacies for each case are present in the post-authoritarian regime politics. Such legacies may include but are not limited to historical patterns of social domination. We argue that authoritarian ideologies or mentalities (Linz 1964) and leaders' decisions mark the beginning of the creation of norms or formal rules and institutions that may continue in post-authoritarian settings and, therefore, that reconciling authoritarian legacies rests with the managing and manipulation of legacies between elite and citizenry.

Figure 2 is an attempt to list some of the main legacies that authoritarian regimes may transmit to democracies, focusing attention on the quality of the new regimes. We suggest a rough distinction among regime institutions and rules, elite actors, social groups, political culture and the mass level. For each domain, we suggest legacies that constrain the achievement of a "good" democracy. Thus, for example, a statist authoritarian tradition is largely present in the new democracies of Southern Europe (Morlino 1998), resulting in low political interest and participation. Poor or no rule of law may have already existed in the countries' pasts. In Giolittian Italy at the beginning of this century, there was a saying: "For friends what they want, for enemies the law". Yet the Italian authoritarian regime strengthened such uncertainty regarding due process, and it thus persists as a key legacy that makes the guarantee of equal political and civil rights for all citizens far more difficult.

(Figure 2 about here)

To flesh out our notion of authoritarian legacies and their influence on the quality of democracy in post-authoritarian regimes, we will examine and compare the Southern Europe an cases: Italy, Spain, Portugal. We excluded Greece, for the Greek authoritarian experience between 1967 and 1973 is neither long enough nor institutionally innovative or meaningful enough to be considered here. Political leader Constantinos Karamanlis, who re-established democracy in July 1973, was already a prominent politician during the previous limited democracy, and he immediately moved to hold the military accountable. Trials,

condemnation, and convictions were conducted in the months immediately following democratic reestablishment. The symbolic and real impact of the Greek court decisions were very effective. We will thus start with Southern Europe, beginning with Italy, whose experience and long number of years elapsed since the transition provide a meaningful field for research regarding both authoritarian legacies and their fading away.

A few comparative considerations

In this paper, we have attempted to identify authoritarian legacies that are hindrances to the quality of democracy. Before entering into a comparative discussion of such legacies, we will review the contextual dimensions that influence and condition the authoritarian legacies in each country. Figure 3 lays out the presence and the salience of these dimensions. We use a capital X when we judge the stronger salience of the dimension and a small x when it is less salient but nonetheless present. An empty cell indicates the absence of any saliency of the dimension.

(Figure 3 about here)

The "durability" dimension is particularly relevant for Portugal and Spain, and as anticipated at the beginning of the paper, it is more relevant when it is accompanied by institutional innovation, as is the case in Portugal.

Regarding institutional innovation -- the chief aspect of innovation we consider -- again, Portugal stands out as highly innovative regimes. Curiously, for this case, there was a recurring reference to Italian fascism, that is, to the third case where there was strong innovation. Spain was also fairly innovative regimes, though to a lesser extent in comparative terms. In both cases, again, durability works to enhance the strength of the relative innovation.

Finally, for Spain the modes of transition are continuous. And again, as expected, this was an important dimension when we account for the presence of authoritarian legacies. On the whole, based on our dimensions, we expected to have a stronger, more salient set of legacies in Spain, with Portugal and Italy on a second tier. Such expectations are confirmed by our empirical analyses, as we will see below.

Regarding specific, expected authoritarian legacies themselves (see Figure 2 at the outset), we discern legacies both in the formal rules of governance and in dramatic, explicit assertions of power by unequivocal authoritarian actors. But legacies are also less easy to detect – and even more difficult to measure – in the day-to-day political patterns and daily routines that condition democratic representation and participation. In point of fact, authoritarian legacies pervade most societies, and in spite of the difficulties, attempts to identify them have to be pursued: particular authoritarian legacies become serious hindrances to democracies when agents give legacies unchallenged or unchecked expression, visibility, or power. For clarity's sake, Figure 4 is a way of summarizing our analysis.

(Figure 4 about here)

As can be seen, when we compare Figures 2 and 4, the dimension concerning *gleichschaltung*, or the leveling of cultural/social/economic differences, is not present. This is so because in none of the cases was this kind of phenomenon – a characteristics of totalitarian regimes -- empirically evident. For many years the Franco regime attempted to suppress the ethnic, language, and cultural differences in Catalunia and the Basque Countries, particularly. The only real result was to fuel and further radicalize the violent factions within

Basque nationalist demands for independence (see also Aguilar 2001).

However, the key conclusion we can draw from the connection between the analyses summarized in fig. 3 and fig. 4 is in the intertwining between modes of transition, institutional innovation and durability, on the one hand, and the three dimensions of legacies. Italy and Spain present their own different characteristics. In Italy a few important constraints are present in spite of the discontinuity of transition. The main reason is that in many ways the Fascist institutional innovation was very persistent and prominent as it partially regarded the very building of a more modern state. In Spain the strength of the three influencing dimensions is attenuated by the moment of transition and the immediate insertion of the Spanish democracy within the European democratic area. The case where there is a discontinous transition is Portugal, and such a discontinuity partially soften the strong authoritarian innovation and the longest duration of all authoritarianisms.

Regarding more specifically regime institutions and norms, Italy is the country where authoritarian legal rules remain present in the post-authoritarian period. We also find the legacy of a large public sector of the economy in Italy and Portugal. During Portugal's 1974-82 transition there was massive nationalization of the economy, later transformed radically by Cavaco Silva in the late 1980s. Italy possessed resilient, large public sectors that have been shrunk in part only recently.

Undoubtedly, the lack of full civilian control of the army over a sustained period is one of the most important legacies. This is the case of Portugal for virtually a decade after the establishment of a different regime.

The poor efficiency of police, so relevant for the guarantee of civil rights, also emerges as an important legacy (see Pereira and Ungar 2003). While poor efficiency of the police has been a constant throughout modern Latin America, it is clear that the military regimes exacerbated this legacy. The rightist radical groups are strongly relevant and influential in the Italian political arena.

If we simply consider elite accountability in terms of the possibility of alternation and incumbency, then in different ways, Italy, Spain, and Portugal showed no or low accountability. In Italy, there was no real possibility of alternation until the breakdown of Christian Democracy in the early 1990s. In Spain, there was a long period of socialist dominance given a not fully "clean" right, stigmatized by the Franco regime. And in Portugal, there was an even longer period of no alternation until the mid-1990s.

The third set of legacies concern cultural levels. These legacies are deeper and more pervasive and refer to the basic problems of the modes of incorporation, or the ways citizens have been involved and socialized into politics. By statism, we refer to the constant, continuous reference to public institutions, as well as to people's expectations that the state will initiate and be responsible for every aspect of their lives. Statism has been highly related to the lengthy authoritarian experiences of Southern Europe. Passivity, conformism, and cynicism represent the single set of attitudes toward politics that is most widespread throughout the seven countries under analysis. These two aspects together – statism on the one hand, and passivity, on the other – make accountability much more difficult to achieve. Accountability assumes the existence of an active civil society.

Of course, these two aspects were also well-embedded in the pre-authoritarian regime political cultures of all these countries. Nevertheless, the authoritarian experiences exacerbated these dimensions.

In survey studies, we find widespread non-democratic attitudes across the three Southern European countries. This is so in different ways and to a different extent in each of the cases. In Italy, for example, such attitudes have been present for years, including well into the 1990s. Italian radical right parties were present until the late 1980s-early 1990s (Morlino 1996).

All five aspects converge to represent political cultures less than conducive to civic democracy (see also Hite and Cesarini 2004).

On the whole, this analysis confirms that both the contextual dimensions and the content of legacies show how numerous the constraints were and still partially are to a good democracy in Italy for a lengthy period.

Our main conclusion must be that there is no necessary consistency between contextual dimensions and legacies themselves.

Throughout our analysis, we faced analytical challenges that were very difficult to disentangle. We wish to emphasize at least two of them. First, as we have pointed out, authoritarian legacies are often related to pre-authoritarian experiences. It is impossible, for example, to analyze the beliefs, attitudes and behavior at the mass level in Spain developed under authoritarianism without considering the Second Spanish Republic and Civil War in Spain. This may also account for positive assessments of the authoritarian past during the present democratic regimes.

Second, on several occasions, for all seven countries, it was very difficult to separate analytically the influence of authoritarian legacies from the influence of political learning on democratization processes. Such was the case of Italy in the first year after the war, but this is also relevant for the Spanish case, given the contexts of severe repression under authoritarianism.

The problem of the fading away of legacies is largely open. First, the fading away itself cannot be taken for granted. The kinds of attitudes and beliefs at the mass level that we raise in Figure 4 may continue, even when the elapsed time would suggest their disappearance. Such attitudes and beliefs continue not because of fascism, Salazarism, Francoism, and the various military experiences, but rather because of new features of modernity. Passivity, conformism, cynicism, and alienation are features that are both shared and reproduced in contemporary democracies as well as authoritarian regimes. In Italy, this same passivity, indifference, and negative feelings toward politics are perpetuated because they are part of specific cultural traditions and are reproduced by the anti-politics of the new millennium. Similar mechanisms can be envisaged in other countries, including Spain. On the other hand, the statism that was characteristic of some authoritarian regimes and that is not reproduced by dominant contemporary cultural and economic paradigms tends, then, to disappear.

Ultimately, we cannot be sure that the fading away of the legacies discussed above is always positive. It cannot be taken for granted that the moderation and low radicalism that have been fundamental components of Spanish democratic consolidation are not inextricably related to the indifference and passivity that have been ever-present tendencies within these complex political cultures. The fading away of the latter may imply the disappearance of the former. However, it is well known that those who have no memories of the past lose their identities and are condemned to make the same mistakes (see, among others, Bendix 1984). Thus, when we emphasize that some legacies, although hindrances to a "better" democracy, were helpful or very helpful for democratic consolidation, one could conclude that is wiser to maintain those legacies or -- even better -- strong memories of them.

Fig. 1: A Few Dimensions of a 'Good' Democracy

Rule of law

- The rule of law: are state and society consistently subject to the law?
- Civilian control of the military and police: are the military and police forces under civilian control?
- Minimizing corruption: are public officials free from corruption?

Representative and Accountable Government

- Is government accountable to the people and their representatives?
- Free and fair elections: do elections give the people control over governments and their policies?
- Democratic role of political parties: does the party system assist the working of democracy?
- Government effectiveness and accountability: is government accountable to the people and their representatives?
- Is government accountable to other elected institutions
- The media and open government: do the media operate in a way that sustains democratic values?

Government Responsiveness and Participation

- Government responsiveness: is government responsive to the concerns of its citizens?
- Political participation: is there full citizen participation in public life?

Citizenship, and Rights

- Civil and political rights: are civil and political rights equally guaranteed for all?
- Economic and social rights: are economic and social rights equally guaranteed for all?

Democracy Beyond the State

- International dimensions of democracy: are the country's external relations conducted in accordance with democratic norms?

Adapted from David Beetham, (1994), pp. 25-43.

Fig. 2: Authoritarian Legacies as Constraints to a 'Good' Democracy

Dimension
Legacy

Regime institutions
And norms

Authoritarian legal rules
Poor or no rule of law
Barely independent judiciary
Large public sector of economy (not in Southern Cone)

Elite actors

High military prerogatives
Poor or no efficiency of police
Radical rightist groups
No party elite accountability
Social groups/institutions

Gleichschaltung*

Culture &
Mass level
Statism (not in the Southern Cone)
Passivity/conformism/cynicism
Fear/alienation from politics
Non democratic attitudes
Rightist radical party/ies

*This term is intended to refer to the extreme leveling of cultural/social differences, a policy carried out by the Nazi regime.

Figure 3: Dimensions Influencing Authoritarian Legacies, per Country

Countries

Factors
Italy
Spain
Portugal
Durability
X
X
X
Institutional innovation
X
X
X
Continuous transition

X

Fig. 4: Authoritarian Legacies as Constraints to a 'Good' Democracy, per country

Dimensions
Legacy
It
Sp
Pt
Regime institutions
And norms
Authoritarian legal rulesXPoor or no rule of lawBarely independent judiciaryLarge public sector of economyXX

Elite actorsHigh military prerogativesXPoor or no efficiency of policeRadical rightist groupsXNo party elite accountabilityXXX

Culture &
Mass levelStatism XXXPassivity/conformism/cynicismXXXFear/alienation from politicsNon democratic attitudesXXXRightist radical party/iesX

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