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Second Order Elections and Electoral Cycles in Democratic Portugal, 1975-2004

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Abstract
This paper explores the relationships between legislative, local and European voting behaviour in Portugal, 1975-2004. The evolution of the party system and of aggregate levels of volatility are compared across different types of elections. At the individual level, social and political anchors of partisanship are compared across elections of different types. Theories on electoral cycles are tested by comparing aggregate electoral results across different types of elections in different periods of the
electoral cycle, using as the baseline the winners in each previous legislative election. The main conclusion is that relations between second-order and first-order elections reflect not only short term, but also long term effects.

**Key words**
Second-order elections; electoral cycles; European elections; local government elections; electoral volatility; Portugal

**Note on Contributor**
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INTRODUCTION: MAIN OBJECTIVES OF THE PAPER

The aim of this paper is to explore the relations between legislative, local and European elections in Portugal during the democratic period. In the next section, we will make a brief introduction to the Portuguese political system. Considering the relative importance of the different bodies for its functioning, we would argue that local, regional and European elections are second-order national elections, while legislative contests are of the first-order type. We use the definition of first-order and second-order national elections that is now standard in the literature (Reif, 1985b; and Reif and Schmitt, 1980; see also Marsh and Franklin, 1996; Marsh, 1998; and Norris, 1997). First order elections are those where there is much at stake, that is, the control of national executive power. This means that in parliamentary systems, legislative elections are first-order, as are elections for the head of state in presidential regimes. On the contrary, second-order national elections have no direct impact on the control of national executive power.

The relationship between parliamentary and presidential elections in semi-presidential systems is more problematic. For example, in describing the French 5th Republic, also a semi-presidential system, Reif considered that both presidential and legislative elections are first-order, except in certain circumstances (Reif, 1985b; see also Marsh, 1998). However, semi-presidential systems are in reality quite varied. In some of them -France, Finland, Poland, and Lithuania- the role of the president is very
strong; namely she/he has the power to propose legislation, call for referendums and preside over the council of ministers (this is where the president is the head of government, at least under some circumstances, not co-habitation). While in other systems—Austria, Bulgaria, Iceland, Ireland, Slovenia, Romania and Portugal after its 1982 constitutional revision—the president has only very limited control over the executive power (Freire and Magalhães, 2002, pp. 71-91, and Appendix C). So, in the latter cases we cannot say that presidential and legislative election results are of equal importance for the functioning of the political system, because they are not.

Parliamentary elections are clearly more important. So, we must conclude that Reif’s classification is neither very suitable for the Portuguese case, nor for other weak, semi-presidential systems. Moreover, at least in Portugal, the rationale of the competition and the actors contesting presidential elections has not always been the same as in the legislative elections, namely in terms of the left-right divide (see Freire, 2004). Because of all this we will concentrate the analysis mainly on the comparisons between legislative versus local and EP elections.

But how are first and second-order elections related in Portugal? The first objective of the paper is to compare the evolution of the party system and aggregate levels of electoral volatility (total and inter-bloc) across different types of elections. Due to the well known limitations of aggregate measures of volatility, we will compare the individual levels of social and ideological anchors of partisanship across different types of elections (local and European versus legislative) – an individual level surrogate for inter-bloc volatility.

The second objective of the paper is to test theories on electoral cycles, comparing aggregate electoral returns across legislative, local and EP elections in
different periods of the national electoral cycle, and using as the baseline the winners in each previous legislative election. The hypothesis to be tested here is whether second-order elections have a singular character or whether they are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent towards the national government.

In the beginning of each section of the paper the literature on second-order elections will be reviewed, and the paper’s contribution to what we already know about these type of elections and their relations with first-order ones will be defined. But there are three major methodological contributions of the paper to which we can refer in advance. Empirical studies on second-order elections in the European context have usually compared legislative and EP elections, and have usually lacked a longitudinal perspective. Using only Portuguese electoral data (1975-2004), we intend to overcome some of these two shortcomings of prior studies, extending comparisons to more types of second-order elections and introducing a long-run perspective. The latter is used in order to see if there is any structural influence of national legislative contests on second-order elections, namely in terms of trends in the party system format.

The third specific contribution of the paper is the use of a single country, with very similar electoral systems in the different types of elections (except for the presidential ones) – see below-, which will allow us to test all hypotheses in a systematic way, while controlling for other institutional, cultural, social and political factors that can get in the way of clear comparisons between first and second-order elections.

In addition, looking at second order elections can add to our knowledge and understanding of the Portuguese political and party systems. First, we can understand what is the effective role of second order elections in the function of the political
system. In what ways do these types of elections in Portugal reflect specific logics (local or European)? And what is the role of national factors in Portuguese second-order elections? Are they merely “barometer elections” (Anderson and Ward, 1996)? Second, we know that since 1987 there is a majoritarian drive in legislative elections (and in the national political system as a whole) (Bruneau et al, 2001; Lopes and Freire, 2002, pp. 179-183). But is this trend also present in second-order elections? In other words, is there any long-term impact of first-order elections on second-order ones? Third, can analysing second-order elections tell us anything about the sophistication of the Portuguese voters? For example, as elsewhere in Europe, do Portuguese voters use second-order elections to send signs to national governments? And what is the role of ideological factors in first and second-order elections? We will try to answer all these questions in the following sections.1 But first, let us begin with some contextual information.

THE ROLE OF ELECTIONS IN THE PORTUGUESE POLITICAL SYSTEM

Prior to Portugal’s relatively bloodless Revolution of Carnations on April 25, 1974, free and fair elections with universal suffrage and a competitive party system were unheard of in the nation. Portugal’s transition to democracy was initiated by a coup led by junior military officers, who committed themselves to holding free and fair, popular elections one year from the date of coup. The Portuguese Constituent Assembly elections were held on schedule on April 25, 1975, and these were followed by the first free constitutional legislative elections one year later, on April 25, 1976.

Portugal’s political system is semi-presidential (Duverger, 1980), and thus the only two institutions with national electoral legitimacy and a responsibility for forming
government are the President of the Republic (PR) and the National Assembly. The Head of State is the directly-elected president, but this officeholder must share power with a Head of Government (prime minister) who is responsible to the National Assembly. Although the president had more significant powers from 1976 to 1982, leading to an unclear “presidential-parliamentary” balance of power, the 1982 revision of the Constitution substantially reduced some of these powers, thereby making the system more “premier-presidential” (Shugart and Carey, 1992, Ch. 2). The presidential term is 5 years with a maximum of two terms. Since its transition to democracy began in 1974, Portugal has had six presidential elections, only one of which required a second-round runoff.

The legislative branch, the National Assembly, is unicameral and composed of 230 members elected in 22 multi-member constituencies (we present the electoral systems used in all four types of elections below). Deputies’ terms are a four year maximum. National legislative elections ultimately determine which party will form the Government, who will become prime minister, and thus who will share executive power with the president. These are clearly the most important elections in the political system.

Less important elections (in terms of their contribution to the functioning of the national political system) also take place in Portugal at the local, regional and European levels. Local and regional elections under democratic rules only began in 1976, following the promulgation of Portugal’s new Constitution. The document provided for 3 distinct levels of local governance (autarquias locais) according to their respective territorial delimitations—the ward (freguesia), the county-level municipality (concelho), and the special administrative regions of the Azores and Madeira. In this paper, we will
refer only to local elections, because regional elections are not held in the whole country.

European Parliament (EP) elections only began in Portugal and Spain in June 1987, following those countries’ accession to the European Community in 1986. Voters have gone to the polls 5 times for EP elections, and their importance for national politics is the same as elsewhere in the EU. That is, they are of secondary importance in the functioning of the political system, both in terms of the constitutional order and (usually) in terms of their political consequences. (For the dates, electoral results and other details of all elections, including presidential, analysed in this article, see Table 1. (Table 1, list of all elections and dates around here)

**ELECTORAL SYSTEMS IN DIFFERENT PORTUGUESE ELECTIONS**

Electoral systems across different types of Portuguese elections are quite similar, except for the presidential contests (see Lopes and Freire, 2002, Part II). The latter are fought under a run-off majority system. Personalization is a central feature of presidential elections, although candidates usually receive partisan support. This system forces political parties to coalesce, and works against those parties that are not able to enter into larger coalitions, namely anti-system parties. This is an additional reason not to include presidential elections in the analysis that follows.

All other elections (legislative, regional, local and EP) are fought under the d’Hondt system of proportional representation (PR), and voters are not permitted to express preferences for particular candidates (closed lists). During the democratic period, the only significant change in the legislative elections’ electoral system was the reduction in the number of MPs from the 1991 election on, from 250 to 230. This latter
change resulted in a minor reduction of the average district magnitude, from 11.4 seats/district between 1975 and 1987, to 10.5 from 1991 onwards. This system benefits large parties the most (those receiving more than 20% of the vote), is relatively fair to medium-sized parties (those with 9%-20% of the vote), and can even allow for the entrance of very small parties (those with around 1.5% to 3% of the vote) due to the very large district magnitude of the Lisbon and Porto constituencies (48 and 38 seats, respectively, in the 2002 legislative elections).

EP elections are fought in a single constituency (24 seats: 1987-89 and 2004; 25 seats: 1994-99). Thus, on the one hand, the difference between EP and legislative electoral systems in terms of benefits/punishments for small (8% of the vote or less) and medium-sized parties (9%-20% of the vote) is contradictory: if we consider only the two largest districts in elections for the national parliament (around 48 and 38 seats), the legislative electoral system can be said to be more fair; if we consider average district magnitude for legislative elections (1975-87: 11.4; 1991-02: 10.5), the reverse is true. On the other hand, it clearly can be said that the EP electoral system benefits small and medium-sized parties the most because fewer resources are needed for electoral campaigns in a single district.

Local elections are fought in 308 municipalities. In Portuguese local elections there are two types of contests: first, at the municipal level, for the executive and for the assembly; second, at the ward level, for the assembly – from which the ward’s executive emanates. We consider only the most important of local elections, i.e., those for the municipal executive (Câmara Municipal). These elections are fought in medium/small districts – the average district magnitude in the 1997 elections was 6.56 seats – and so the system works against smaller parties. Furthermore, a large amount of resources
human, financial, and organizational) are needed to campaign in all 308 units, and this is yet another feature that works against smaller parties—especially those that lack a strong, organizational structure at the national level. Another singularity of local elections for the municipal executive is that they are highly personalized. This is due to the fact that although people vote in closed lists, campaigns revolve around the mayoral candidates.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS

Portuguese democratic politics have been dominated by four parties (see Figure 1; for details, see Bruneau, 1997): the centre-left Socialist Party (PS: Partido Socialista); the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSD: Partido Social Democrata); the PCP (Partido Comunista Português), an orthodox communist party; and the CDS-PP (Centro Democrático Social-Partido Popular), a right-wing party. In the transition towards democracy in Portugal, the PCP was the only major party opposed to the liberal democratic model.

Additionally, micro parties both from the left and from the right have persisted in Portuguese politics, and are displayed in Figure 1 under the labels of “others left” and “others right.” The two major parties (PS and PSD) have always controlled government, be it in a single party format (PS: 1976-77; 1995-2002; PSD: 1985-1995) or in coalition (PS-CDS: 1977-1978; PSD-CDS-PPM: 1979-83; PS-PSD: 1983-85; PSD-CDS-PP: 2002-present date) (see Table 1).

(Figure 1, Evolution of the Party System in Legislative Elections, around here)
Note that only in 1979 and 1980 was there a relevant pre-electoral coalition\(^4\) in legislative elections: AD, *Aliança Democrática*, which joined PSD, CDS and PPM in a single slate, except in the two islands of Azores and Madeira, where each of the three parties ran on their own. However, in order to trace the evolution of each one of the four major parties, and to compare the performance of large and medium/small-size parties across different types of elections, we decomposed the votes in the coalition according to the following rules: First, we calculated the average vote percentage of each party (PSD, CDS, and PPM) in the elections before (1976) and after (1983) the coalition period. Second, we summed these three averages and determined the proportion of this total vote for each party of the coalition. Third, we used this proportion to determine the vote percentage of each party in 1979 and 1980, by multiplying the proportion mentioned above by the coalition’s total vote in each election. These procedures were used with the data presented in Figures 1 and 2, and Tables 2 and 3. A similar procedure was used in local elections, but since coalitions were not usually country wide, we could measure each party’s strength in every election, and use this information to decompose the votes in pre-electoral coalitions. In EP elections similar procedures were also used. Note that in the 2004 EP elections, the calculations to decompose the votes in the PSD-(CDS-)PP coalition (*Força Portugal*) considered only the prior EP electoral results (1999), because when this article was being written the 2004 EP election was the latest one.\(^5\)

Between 1976 and 1985, governments were mainly of a coalition type and never completed their terms (see Table 1). The 1985 general election was a critical one that initiated a huge transformation of Portuguese electoral politics, eventually ending the
above mentioned cabinet instability. A new party instigated by the former president Ramalho Eanes (1976-86), PRD: *Partido Renovador Democrático*, fought that election, achieved 17.9% of the vote and reduced the PS to 20.8%, its worst result ever in legislative elections. However, the Socialists began recovering slowly in the next election (1987), and the PRD declined to about 5%, practically disappearing in the next election (1991).

The 1985 critical election is associated with five major features, some of which only began to reveal themselves in the 1987 realignment election. Among these five major features, perhaps the most fundamental one is the concentration of the vote in the two major parties: from 1975 to 1985 the sum of the vote percentages in the two major parties (PS and PSD) was only twice slightly above 60%, but since the 1987 election onwards, the latter figure was always above 70%, and usually well above. The latter phenomenon fundamentally altered the Portuguese party system in legislative elections in a majoritarian direction.

Following theories on second-order elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Marsh, 1998; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996a and 1996b; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996), the first thing to be tested is if small (“others left” and “others right”) and medium-size (PCP and CDS) parties have always performed better in Portuguese second-order elections (local and EP) than in first-order ones (legislative). The second question is whether the trend towards bipolarization in first-order elections is also present in second-order elections.

(Table 2 around here, Political Parties’ Average Vote Percentages by Decade in First-Order and Second-Order Elections)
Because before 1987 the party system in legislative elections was rather more fragmented, and EP elections only began in 1987, to compare averages for the whole period in EP (1980s-2000s) and legislative elections, we consider only the 1980s-2000s period also for the latter contests – the corresponding values are shown in parenthesis in Table 2 (last column). Looking at Table 2 we can clearly see that the two largest parties (PS and PSD) almost always performed better in first-order elections than in second-order ones. The only exception is in the 1980s, when the average vote percentage of the two major parties was smaller in legislative elections than in local elections. This exception is due to the fact that the new party, PRD, was not as successful in local elections, and at the national level the success of this party was at the cost of the PS’ share. So, large parties usually performed better in first-order elections, as expected. However, the difference is not very impressive for the comparison between local and legislative elections. For the whole period (1975-2004) the two largest parties averaged 69.2% of the vote for legislative elections, and 68.1% for local elections. As mentioned before, to make a proper comparison between European and legislative elections, we should only consider the 1980s-2000s average vote for the latter: 72.3; so, in this latter case the difference is rather more relevant than in the case of local elections. The not very impressive difference between the performance of larger parties in legislative vis-à-vis local elections is probably due to the fact that the electoral system in local elections works more in favour of the larger parties, due to a much lower average district magnitude vis-à-vis legislative elections. Moreover, the resources needed to campaign in around 300 counties also tends to produce the same bias. From this perspective, the slight difference in larger parties’ performance in legislative vis-à-vis local elections actually become more relevant.
Medium-sized (PCP and CDS) parties always performed better in second-order than in first-order elections, although in the 2000s the differences between EP and legislative elections are very small (see Table 2). In the case of medium-sized parties, the differences for the whole period are specially relevant when we consider the contrast between legislative (21,7) and local (25,4) elections; comparing legislative (19,4) and European (21,6) elections the difference is much lower. So, the latter differences in vote percentages are not particularly impressive, but they are also in the expected direction.

The smaller parties (“others left and right”) only perform better in European (6,6 for the whole period) than in legislative elections (4,0 for 1980s-2000s). When we compare legislative (4,7 for 1970s-2000s) with local elections (2,9) the reverse is true. These differences are probably due to the electoral systems associated with each type of second-order election (average district magnitude is much lower in local elections than in EP contests, so the latter are less unfair to tiny parties), but also to the differences in the resources (human, financial and organizational) needed to fight local and EP elections. Many more resources are needed for contesting local elections (308 constituencies in 2001) than in EP elections (one constituency), and this works against smaller parties. Finally, the two largest districts in legislative elections facilitate the entrance of smaller parties in a way that the local contests’ electoral system does not.

In terms of parties’ performance across different types of elections -averages for decades and the whole period-, we tested for statistical significance (t-test for paired samples; error margin lower than 10%) and the differences only revealed not significant in two cases. First, in the comparison between larger parties’ vote in legislative and local elections (p = 0.330). Second, in the comparison between medium-sized parties’ vote in legislative and European elections (p = 0.122).
We also investigated if the performance of political parties in different types of elections revealed any meaningful differences across the right-left division (data not shown, but that can be made available by the author upon request). That is, we wanted to see if the performance of the two medium-size parties (PCP and CDS) followed a similar pattern in EP and local elections compared to legislative ones. To do this we compared each of these two political parties’ results across different types of elections that took place in proximal dates, as we did in Table 2 for their joint vote percentages.

Comparing EP and legislative elections, we found that the CDS usually performs better than the PCP in the former than in the latter contests. The only exceptions are the 1999 (EP versus legislative) and 2000s elections (EP 2004 versus legislative 2002), where PCP performed better than CDS. On the contrary, comparing local and legislative elections, we found that PCP usually performs better than CDS in the former than in the latter contests. The only exception is the 1989 local elections (compared to the 1987 legislative ones), where CDS performed better than PCP. The better performance of PCP in local elections might be due to two major factors: first, the existence of strong PCP electoral fiefs in the Southern areas (both urban and rural); second, the strength of its party organization (Lopes and Freire, 2002). Explaining the better performance of CDS in EP elections is more difficult, specially because there have only been five EP elections to date. However, poorer PCP performance might be due to a stronger anti-EU stance than the CDS. But this hypothesis needs comparative data to be tested.

(Figure 2, Effective Number of Parties in Portuguese Elections, 1975-2004: around here)

So, in terms of the performance of different types of Portuguese political parties, theories about first and second-order elections usually receive empirical support. But did the developments in the party system that occurred for legislative elections also take
place in second-order elections (local and EP)? Figure 2 shows the trends in the “effective number of electoral parties” (legislative, local and EP elections) in Portuguese democratic elections. The “effective number of parties” measure is taken from Laakso and Taagepera (1979), and elaborated using official Portuguese electoral data.

Comparing first-order (legislative) with second-order (local and EP) elections in terms of the trends in the effective number of electoral parties (Figure 2), we can see that there is a clear synchronicity. In all three types of elections there is a majoritarian drive, with the reduction in the effective number of parties; moreover, what seems to be a very slight trend reversal in recent legislative elections (1999-2002) is also followed in recent European contests (1999-2004) (see Figure 2). Furthermore, we can see that second-order elections seem to be losing their distinctive character vis-à-vis the first-order ones. In all the elections between 1999 and 2004, the effective number of parties in all three types of elections shows only very slight differences. Whether this is an indicator of a new era in Portuguese politics is unclear. Still, there seems to be some contamination from the first-order elections towards the second-order ones, a feature not predicted by second-order elections theory. This might mean that first-order elections are more important, in terms of financial state resources, mass media visibility and organizational structure. So, if some parties lose their weight at the national level, this will tend to contaminate other levels of power (local and European). Additionally, in a political system dominated by four major parties like the Portuguese, when the above mentioned phenomena occurs in two of the four major parties, such decline then translates into a reduction in the number of effective electoral parties.8
LEVELS OF ELECTORAL VOLATILITY AND SOCIAL AND IDEOLOGICAL ANCHORS OF PARTISANSHIP ACROSS DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS

In this section it will be tested if electors are more likely to change their vote options in elections with less importance (local and European) than in the most important ones (legislative). This hypothesis will be tested both with aggregate and individual level data.

At the aggregate level, the concepts of total and inter bloc electoral volatility will be used (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, pp. 17-52 and 313-314). Considering that second-order elections might be used by voters to express their discontent to the government in place, and considering that these elections have no direct consequences for national government formation, it is possible that voters feel more free to change their vote options in second-order elections than in first-order ones. We expect that this might happen both in terms of vote swings within the same ideological quadrant (intra bloc volatility) and between the left-right boundary (inter bloc volatility). Note that the sum of intra and inter bloc volatility gives us total volatility.

Let us begin by presenting the operational definitions. First, total electoral volatility (TV) can be expressed as:

\[ TV = \frac{|P_i V| + |P_j V| + |P_k V| + |P_l V| + \cdots + |P_n V|}{2} \]

where \( P_i V \) represents the change – in absolute terms – in the aggregate vote for party \( i \) between two consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 20, italicized as in the original).

Note that \( P_i V \) to \( P_n V \) represents all parties competing and receiving votes in at least one of the two consecutive elections. Following Bartolini and Mair (1990: 20), we measured each party vote as a percentage of the total valid vote. The index is divided by
two “on the assumption that accumulated net gains are equal to accumulated net losses”
and also to make the index’s interpretation more intuitive: as it is it ranges from 0 to
100, instead of from 0 to 200 if it were not divided by 2.

Bartolini and Mair have already discussed in detail some of the methodological
issues involved with the creation of this and other volatility indices (1990, pp. 20-22),
but we can summarize by saying that such indices can only be considered very crude
measures of electoral change. First, because we can have a large amount of voting shifts
that cancel each other out at the individual level and so are not detected by the aggregate
measures. Second, because even completely stable elections at the individual level can
be associated with aggregate electoral volatility due to abstention and electoral turnover.

In any case, let us move on to the inter bloc volatility (BV) formula, which can
be expressed as:

\[
BV = \frac{\left| P(iV + jV + kV) \right| + \left| P(lV + mV + nV) \right|}{2}
\]

Where \( P(iV + jV + kV) \) represents the net change - in absolute terms – in the aggregate
vote for parties i, j, and k, all of which come from the same bloc, between two
consecutive elections (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 22, italics as in the original).

The constitutive logic of the measure is the same as for TV, only now it is applied to
blocs of parties and not to parties taken individually (Bartolini and Mair, 1990, p. 22).
we applied the BV formula to measure electoral shifts between the left and right blocs
of Portuguese parties in two consecutive elections, as is the case with Bartolini and Mair
(1990, pp. 22-47 and 313-314). Since this political cleavage is linked both to the class
and religious cleavage in Portugal, BV can also be taken as a measure of change across
both class and religious cleavage boundaries.

(Figure 3. Total Volatility in Different Types of Elections - around here)
(Figure 4: Inter-bloc Volatility in Different Types of Elections - around here)
Figures 3 and 4 show that neither hypothesis receive empirical support with aggregate level indicators. Total Volatility (TV) is usually larger in legislative elections than in both local and EP elections, sometimes very much larger (1985, 1987 and 1995) – Figure 3. The only minor exceptions are the 1980 and the 1999 legislative elections where TV is practically *ex aequo* in legislative and local elections (1980); or much lower in legislative than in EP elections (1999). As for inter bloc volatility (BV), Figure 4, it can be said that the findings are also negative, although here the picture is a bit more mixed. The legislative elections of 1987 and 1995 had levels of BV much higher than those ever found in Local and EP during the whole democratic period. Plus, except in 1980, 1985 and 1999, legislative elections always displayed higher levels of BV than local elections – only three in ten cases. In the case of EP elections, the picture is more mixed. The 1989 and 1999 EP elections showed greater BV than the 1991 and 1999 legislative elections, but if we compare the former EP elections with the 1987 and 1995 legislative contests, the picture is completely reversed.

How should these mainly negative findings be interpreted? Two major kinds of explanations are possible, and these are not necessarily contradictory. The first one is more analytical. Only small segments of the electorate are using second-order elections to express their discontent with the existing national government in place. The others segments of the electorate usually vote “sincerely” in second-order elections, i.e., for those parties they prefer the most without any tactical and/or protestative considerations (about the “sincere vote” in second-order elections, see Ejik and Franklin, 1996b; Eijk, Franklin, and Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). On the contrary, tactical considerations may be much greater in first-order elections among larger parts of the electorate, and so the result is usually higher volatility in first-order elections.
The second type of explanation is methodological. Aggregate volatility is only a very crude measure of electoral change, in that it may sometimes represent very understated values for shifts in individual-level political preferences. As it was said before, if there are many vote shifts that cancel each other out – for example, an equal share of the electorate moving from left to right and from right to left, this volatility is not revealed by the aggregate measure of inter bloc volatility, and this is probably the case in local elections, where many vote shifts from left to right and vice versa are canceling each other out.

Because of the limitations in aggregate measures of volatility, the best way to estimate electoral change is with individual level data and panel designs (Heath et al., 1991, pp. 10-31). In Portugal, there was no National Election Study until very recently (2002 legislative elections), and even for these elections no panel design was used. Panel surveys have always been scarce in Portugal, but so have academic surveys on electoral behaviour. However, using Eurobarometer data from the 1989 (EB 31.1) and 1994 (EB 41.1) European Election Studies (for details about these studies, see Eijk and Franklin, 1996a), survey material from the autonomous (vis-à-vis the Eurobarometer) European Election Studies of 1999 and 2004, the European Value Study 1999/2000 (third wave), and from the 2002 Portuguese NES survey9, the relative anchors of partisanship across different types of elections can be compared. It will be tested if the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are weaker in second-order elections than in first-order ones, thus indicating a greater probability of vote shifts between left and right in second-order elections.

(Table 3a: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in European Parliament (EP) and Legislative elections, 1987-1994 – OLS regressions, around here)
(Table 3b: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in Local, European Parliament (EP), and Legislative elections, 1999-2002 – OLS regressions, around here)
Table 3b clearly indicates that the social and ideological determinants of the vote have a stronger impact in first-order elections than in second-order ones-- adjusted $R^2$ is 0.299 and 0.419 respectively for local and legislative elections. This result is all the more relevant if we keep in mind that both aggregate measures of volatility revealed that the 2002 Legislative elections were more volatile than the 2001 local elections (see Figures 4 and 5). But we know from prior studies (Campbell, 1960, and 1993; Eijk and Franklin, 1996c) that one of the major determinants of the different outcomes in first and second-order elections is turnout. Thus, the differences in the relative strength in the anchors of partisanship across elections might be due to differential turnout; those participating in second-order elections might be more sophisticated voters and their behaviour might be less determined by cleavages and ideology. So, the regression equation for the legislative elections was re-run including only those respondents who voted in both 2002 and 2001. The result clearly strengthens the argument (adjusted $R^2 = 0.415$). Ideological and social anchors of partisanship are more important in first-order elections.

Comparing the vote in legislative (1987 and 1991) and European (1989 and 1994) elections using the Eurobarometer data, we can see again that the social and ideological anchors of partisanship are always more important in first-order elections than in second-order ones--adjusted $R^2$ are 0.552 and 0.423 versus 0.504 and 0.381, respectively (Table 3a). These differences are less dramatic than those found between Local (2001) and Legislative (2002) elections, but they are very important because the 1987 election was a highly volatile one, both in terms of TV and BV, and most of all the aggregated measures revealed much higher values for the legislative than for EP.
elections. However, the regression equations for legislative elections were re-run including only those who voted in both elections: EP and legislative. The evidence shows that the picture stayed the same in the 1987 (0.554), but not in the 1991 election (0.381), which now is about equal to the 1994 EP election. So, only in the latter case do the differences in the strength of the anchors of partisanship seem to be due to differential turnout.

Vis-à-vis our previous article on this subject (Freire, 2004), in the present paper we are now able to add survey data comparing the 1999 elections, legislative (voting intention) and European (past vote); and comparing the 2004 EP elections (past vote) with voting intention in parliamentary elections (2004) – Table 3b. Contrary to the previous analysis, the data for 1999 and 2004 reveal that in both years there was a higher social and ideological anchoring of the vote in European than in legislative elections, even without considering differential turnout.

In our previous article (Freire, 2004, p. ??) we concluded the following: “despite our analysis of only a limited set of elections, the individual level evidence allows us to conclude that people are more prone to change their vote across party blocs in second-order elections than in first-order ones. However, sometimes these differences between first-order and second-order elections might be due to differential turnout.” However, the analysis of new 1999 and 2004 survey data force us to change our previous conclusions. Now, we must conclude that the individual level evidence allows us to infer that sometimes people are more prone to change their vote across party/ideological blocs in second-order elections than in first-order ones; in other occasions, the reverse is true. So, we must conclude that the phenomena is mainly dependent on the political conjuncture.
ELECTORAL CYCLES AND DIFFERENT TYPES OF ELECTIONS

The hypothesis to be tested in this section is if second-order elections have a singular character or if they are used by electors as a way to express content or discontent with national government (Tufte, 1975; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Anderson and Ward, 1996; Shugart and Carey, 1992; Oppenhuis, Eijk and Franklin, 1996; Eijk, Franklin and Oppenhuis, 1996; Marsh, 1998). This will be done by comparing aggregate electoral results across legislative, local and EP elections in different periods of the electoral cycle, using as the baseline the winners in each previous (or concurrent) legislative election (Table 4).

Before proceeding with the analysis three major issues must be clarified. First, how can the dependent variable be measured? The dependent variable is the change in vote percentage for the party (or parties) that control the national government between the prior first-order elections (legislative) and the subsequent (or concurrent) second-order election (local or European) (a similar strategy as that used by Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; for a different approach in the US context, see Tufte, 1975).

Second, it is necessary to decide how to define and classify the different parts of the electoral cycle. The notion of electoral cycle is related to the idea that during any national government’s existence there are popularity cycles with differential political consequences depending on the time elapsed between the first-order and the second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975; Anderson and Ward, 1996; Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Some authors use continuous measures for the electoral cycle variable (Marsh, 1998). Since there are very few cases, we used a discrete variable with
three categories: the “honeymoon” period, i.e., until twelve months after the prior legislative election; the “midterm” period, i.e., from thirteen to thirty-six months after the prior legislative election; the “later term” period, i.e., from thirty-seven to forty-eight months after the prior legislative election. Remember that in Portugal normal national government terms are four years (forty-eight months), except if for any (special) reason the president calls for early elections.

The third major issue to be solved before moving on to empirical tests relates to the expected political consequences for national governments in second-order elections that take place during different phases of the national electoral cycle, in terms of citizens’ electoral behaviour. For the “midterm” period there is a large consensus in the literature, with most of the authors considering that governmental parties will tend to lose vote share in second-order elections (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975; Anderson and Ward, 1997; Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). In terms of the honeymoon period (sometimes concurrent elections), some authors defend that national governments will receive greater or near identical support in second-order elections as they did in prior first-order ones (Marsh, 1998; Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b; Tufte, 1975). Others defend that since second-order elections that take place during the honeymoon period have hardly any consequences for national governments, voters will tend to cast “sincere votes” (Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Therefore, larger parties in government and opposition will tend to lose vote share to smaller parties in multiparty systems. Finally, the later term period is for some authors a period of a certain recovery in national government popularity, and so parties controlling national cabinets will tend to lose less votes than in midterm.
elections (Reif and Schmitt, 1980; Reif, 1985a and 1985b). However, others defend that since second-order elections tend to better fulfill their function as markers of public opinion support for government the closer they fall to the next first-order election (later term), voters will tend to cast more “protest votes” in those periods (Eijk, Franklin, Oppenhuis, 1996; Oppenhuis, Eijk, and Franklin, 1996). Therefore, according to these authors, parties in control of government will also tend to lose votes in second-order elections if they take place in the later term of the national cycle.

Table 4: Electoral Cycles in democratic Portugal, 1976-2004: change in national government vote support in second order elections, and popularity trends

Setting aside the honeymoon periods, we can see that the party (or parties) controlling national government always lose electoral support (in terms of share of the vote) from the first-order elections to the subsequent second-order ones (Table 4). From the late eighties through the mid-nineties these losses have always been very high, greater than 15 percentage points; in the 2004 EP elections very high losses for national government were back again (-15.6). Midterm losses are always higher than later term losses, as expected. However, since there is only one case for second-order elections in the later term, it is not possible to derive any conclusions from this data. The same is true for the honeymoon period, where there are only three cases, so here too it is not possible to derive any conclusions. From the few cases there are in the honeymoon period, a kind of “bandwagon effect” seems to be in place for 1979 and 1985, but in the other election (1987) the “sincere vote effect” seems to be in place.

Does the decline in a government’s popularity correlate with the decline in vote share in the second-order elections? The measure of government’s popularity is the national government’s level of popularity in the month of the second-order election (see
notes in Table 4), similar to the one used by Tufte (1975). Note that we only have survey data on governments’ popularity from 1986 to 2004 (see Sources in Table 5).

In the present study, government popularity is an index calculated from the responses to a question on government’s performance evaluation, calculated according to the following formulas. For the period 1986-2001: \( \left( \frac{\% \text{ of responses “very good” and “good”} \times 2 + \% \text{ of responses “more or less”} \times 1 + \% \text{ of responses “bad” or “very bad”} \times 0}{3} \right) \). For the period 2002-2004, due to a change in the commercial polling unit associated with the Expresso newspaper (see sources in Table 4), and in the survey question asked, the formula is: \( \left( \frac{\% \text{ of responses “positive evaluation”} \times 2 + \% \text{ of responses “indifferent” and “don’t know/no answer”} \times 1 + \% \text{ of responses “negative evaluation”} \times 0}{3} \right) \). For each period of the electoral cycle (honeymoon, midterm and later term) we present the loss (or gain) in vote percentage in the second-order election of the winner in the prior legislative election (first order), i.e., vote percentage in the second-order election minus vote in the first-order election.

As we might suspect with so few cases to analyze, the correlation between this measure and electoral performance is not statistically significant, but its value is relevant and in the expected direction (0.340). Additionally, if we exclude the 2001 outlier, the correlation is 0.708 and statistically significant \((p = 0.075)\). This finding gives empirically support in the Portuguese case to what seems to be a widely accepted conclusion in the literature about second-order (Europe) and midterm elections (US), i.e., that a national government’s popularity does explain changes in support from first-order to second-order elections; namely the higher the government’s popularity during the month of the second-order elections, the lower their losses in those elections.
But losses in national governments’ support in second-order elections are also dependent on national economic conditions. However, only in the cases of GDP growth and household final consumption expenditure are the relationships relevant and in the expected direction: the greater the annual growth in GDP (0.747) or household final consumption expenditure annual growth (0.736), the lower the losses. Both these correlations are statistically significant: $p = 0.013$ and $p = 0.037$, respectively. In the cases of the annual growth in inflation (0.120) and unemployment (-0.039), none of the correlations is statistically significant, and in the former case it is even in the wrong direction. All these data clearly indicate that the outcomes in second-order elections are, at least partially, affected by national factors, even though they are local or European ones.

CONCLUSIONS
Since Portugal uses very similar electoral systems in the different types of elections (except for the presidential ones), we can compare voting behaviour trends while controlling for other institutional, cultural, social and political factors that can make cross-national comparisons somewhat more difficult. While there are limitations in the analysis of the Portuguese case due to the limited number of data points in certain analyses, and also to some scarcity of voter survey data, specially for local elections, we believe that it nevertheless provides an interesting test for many of the theoretical claims made in the literature on second-order elections.

First, as expected from theories of second-order elections, small and medium-sized parties perform better in second-order elections than in first-order ones. Medium-sized parties perform better in all second-order elections, but the differences are larger.
and statistically significant only when we compare local and legislative elections. Small-sized parties only perform better in EP elections than in legislative ones, but not in local electoral races. Finally, larger parties do perform better in first-order than in second-order elections, but the differences are larger in the case of the comparison between legislative and European elections; moreover, only in this case are the differences statistically significant. Sometimes the differences between parties’ performance in different types of elections are not very impressive. We believe that these relatively minor differences are partly due to some institutional contingencies: average district magnitude differences and resource requirements for electoral campaigns. In terms of district magnitude, legislative elections are those which might benefit smaller (and medium sized) parties the most, largely because of the huge Lisbon and Porto districts. However, in EP elections the single district is not small (25 seats) specially compared to the average district magnitude in legislative elections (10,5). The same can not be said about local elections, where districts are usually rather small. Moreover, in terms of resources (human, financial, etc.) needed for the electoral campaigns, EP elections are those that benefit smaller and medium-sized parties the most, followed by legislative – 20 constituencies – and local elections – 308 constituencies. So, institutional constraints can clearly explain why small parties perform better in EP elections than in legislative ones, but not in local contests. However, the performance of medium-sized parties is not explained by institutional constraints: better performances are found in local elections. So, in the latter case this phenomena might be due to political parties’ electoral fiefs, specially strong in the case of PCP – recall that this is the medium size party that usually performs better in local
elections. In any case we believe that these issues are worth a closer look with comparative case designs and with more case studies.

Portugal emerges as a very interesting case because the changes in party system format that occurred in first-order elections were mirrored in second-order elections. Since 1987, there is a majoritarian drive in legislative elections, such that the party system exhibits a clear trend towards greater bipolarization. Despite a slight time lag, the same trend is present in second-order contests. One outcome of this trend towards bipolarization in both first-order and second-order elections is that it erodes the specificities of second-order elections: the expected better performance of small and medium-sized parties in the latter type of electoral contests.

Other findings about electoral change in first-order and second-order elections resulted rather mixed. At the aggregate level, electoral volatility (TV or BV) was almost always greater in first-order than in second-order elections, contrary to our expectations. However, individual level data revealed that, depending on the political conjuncture and, most likely, on the relative weight of pressures for tactical voting, voters are sometimes more prone to cross the left-right boundary in second-order elections than in first-order ones, as expected, although this is sometimes due to differential turnout; in other occasions and circumstances, the reverse is true (as the data for 1999 and 2004 revealed). The article concludes that the differences found between the aggregate and the individual level are probably due to the limitations in the aggregate measures of volatility. However, since we do not have many surveys to test these questions, that it is a line of inquiry worthy of pursuing further, with other comparative and case studies.

In Portugal, as elsewhere, second-order elections are used by voters to express their discontent with national governments. Furthermore, losses in national
governments’ electoral support between first and second-order elections are dependent not only on a government’s popularity, but also on national economic conditions.

Portuguese electoral data revealed that the influence of national factors in second-order elections is not only evident in the short term but also in the long term—i.e. in terms of changes in the party system. Also, the increasing similarity between first and second-order elections, namely in terms of aggregate party system developments, means that the second-order elections model might be losing some of its heuristic value in Portugal.

However, this does not mean that local and supranational factors are not also important in local and EP elections, respectively, but that national factors have an important, persistent and structural impact on second-order elections.

Bibliographic References


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1 The present study does not compare electoral participation across first and second–order elections. This type of analysis for the Portuguese case can be found in Freire and Magalhães, 2002; Freire and Baum, 2002; and Lobo, 2003.

2 However, it should be noted that the range of district magnitudes is very high. For further details, see Lopes and Freire, 2002, specially pp. 135-143.

3 PPM, Partido Popular Monárquico, is a micro, right-wing party that advocates a monarchic regime.

4 There were other pre-electoral coalitions, but we counted them as singular parties. FRS (Fronte Republicana e Socialista) in 1980, which included the PS and other micro parties: UEDS and ASDI. However, we counted this coalition as PS/FRS. The PCP have always run in coalition since 1979: APU (Aliança Povo Unido, 1979-85), a coalition with the micro party MDP/CDE; CDU (Coligação Democrática Unitária, 1987-02), a coalition with the tiny party PEV and independents. In both cases, we counted the coalitions with the Communists as single forces: PCP-APU and PCP-CDU.

5 All these procedures for decomposing votes in pre-electoral coalitions were also used for the calculations needed to compute the “effective number of electoral parties” (Figure 2), and the indices of volatility (Figure 3 and 4).

6 The PRD stands apart as a special case. In legislative elections, although it was a medium size party in 1985, it soon became a small party in 1987, and then disappeared from 1991 onwards. Second-order elections after 1985 only took place when the party was already in decline (EP:1987 and 1989; local: 1989) and so the party never succeeded there as it had in the first-order contests of 1985. Moreover, as a new party it lacked a strong organizational structure, which is especially necessary in local elections.

7 In terms of the performance of political parties across different types of elections, the differences between the present paper and its earlier version (Freire, 2004) are due to two factors: first, the inclusion of the 2004 European elections in this article; second, when comparing legislative and EP elections in the present paper we only considered the period 1980s-2000s for the former. In terms of results, the differences in the performance of political parties across different types of elections, between the present paper and that of Freire (2004), are only in terms of strength of the relationships (stronger in the present paper and that of Freire (2004), are only in terms of strength of the relationships (stronger in the present
paper) and their statistical significance (more significant results in the present paper: see note 3 in Freire, 2004).

1 We compared also the effective number of electoral parties in legislative (and local and EP) elections with the effective number of electoral candidates in presidential elections (data not shown), and we found that the latter is usually much lower than the effective number parties in the other types of elections, except in the highly polarized and competitive 1986 presidential election (about Portuguese presidential elections, see Freire, 2001). Also, it was found there is no similar development between the effective number of candidates in presidential elections and the effective number of parties in all the other elections.

2 The post electoral survey (2002) included questions on past voting in legislative elections (2002 and 1999), and also a recall question for electoral behaviour in the previous local elections (December 2001).

3 Of course, the term sophistication is used loosely here. We could just as easily say fickle. Voters who demonstrate consistent ideological positions and party loyalties that correspond to a predictable sociological position may be just as (if not more) sophisticated as voters who shift back and forth between parties.

4 Both Eurobarometers include recall questions about past vote in EP (1994 and 1989) and legislative elections (1991 and 1987), which we used.

5 For the period 1976-1987, economic data is from Barreto (2000); for 1989-1997, it is from the UN World Development Indicators, cd-rom; for 1999-2004, it is from INE (National Statistical Institute).

Note that the results of the present article, in terms of the effects of economic factors on electoral behaviour, are different from those found in Freire (2004) due to the fact that in the present article we consider (economic and political) data for the period 1976-2004 (N = 9), and in the former paper we only had access to economic data for the period 1989-1997 (N = 5). The relationships between economic factors and national government’ losses in second-order elections are now much stronger and statistically significant in the case of GDP and household final consumption expenditure; on the contrary, in the cases of inflation and unemployment, the relationships in the present paper are now much weaker than in Freire, 2004, and in the case of the former indicator the sign of the coefficient is reversed.
Figure 1  The evolution of the party system in legislative elections  
(vote percentages)

Figure 2: Effective Number of Parties (ENEP) in Portuguese Elections

ENEP in each election

year of election
Figure 3: Total Volatility (TV) in Portuguese Elections

Year of election

Total Volatility in each election

- TV
- Legislative Election
- TV
- Local Election
- TV
- EP Election
Figure 4: Inter-Bloc Volatility (BV) in Portuguese Elections

Year of election

Inter-Bloc Volatility in each election

Legislative Election
Local Election
EP Election
Table 2: Political Parties’ Average Vote Percentages by Decade in First-Order and Second-Order Elections

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Political Parties</th>
<th>Type of Elections</th>
<th>1970s (*)</th>
<th>1980s (*)</th>
<th>1990s (*)</th>
<th>2000s (*)</th>
<th>1975-2004 (*)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>PS+PSD Legislative</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>77.9</td>
<td>78.0</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>(72.3) (***)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS+PSD Local</td>
<td>58.6</td>
<td>63.4</td>
<td>74.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
<td>68.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PS+PSD EP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>60.1</td>
<td>71.7</td>
<td>70.5</td>
<td>67.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP+CDS Legislative</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>26.5</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>15.6</td>
<td>21.7</td>
<td>(19.4) (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP+CDS Local</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>29.5</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>25.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PCP+CDS EP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>27.7</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD Legislative</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>(6.0) (**)</td>
</tr>
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<td>PRD Local</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRD EP</td>
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<td>4.4</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: left and right Legislative</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>(4.0) (**)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others: left and right Local</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>3.3</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>2.9</td>
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<tr>
<td>Others: left and right EP</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>9.2</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:


(**) Because before 1987 the party system in legislative elections was rather more fragmented, and EP elections only began in 1987, to compare averages for the whole period in EP (1980s-2000s) and legislative elections, we consider only the 1980s-2000s period also for the latter contests – the correspondent values are shown in parenthesis.
Table 3a: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in European Parliament (EP) and Legislative elections, 1987-1994 – OLS regressions

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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td>Betas &amp;</td>
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<td>significance</td>
<td>significance</td>
<td>significance</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self placement on a left right scale</td>
<td>0.705***</td>
<td>0.683***</td>
<td>0.626***</td>
<td>0.586***</td>
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<td>Education</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
<td>-0.019</td>
<td>0.080**</td>
<td>0.072</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Household Income</td>
<td>0.045</td>
<td>0.117**</td>
<td>0.028</td>
<td>0.100*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
<td>0.054</td>
<td>-0.045</td>
<td>0.061</td>
<td>0.091*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.112***</td>
<td>0.111**</td>
<td>0.077**</td>
<td>0.097*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>n.u.</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
<td>n.u.</td>
<td>n.u.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.552 (0.554)</td>
<td>0.504</td>
<td>0.423 (0.381)</td>
<td>0.381</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
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<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>324</td>
<td>276</td>
<td>420</td>
<td>272</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:
1) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01
2) For the Adjusted R² in legislative elections we present two values: one with the total number of people who voted for legislative elections; the other with only those who voted in legislative and EP elections (in parenthesis).
3) N.a. = not used.
4) Self-placement on a left right scale: 0 – left; 10 – right
5) Age Finished School ordered from lowest to highest.
6) Household Income (Quartiles): 1 – Poorest; 4 - Richest.
7) Church attendance: ordered from lowest (“never”) to highest (“more than weekly”).
9) Vote in legislative elections: 1987: 1 - UDP (left) ; 2 – PCP-CDU; 3 – MDP-CDE ; 4 – PS; 5 – PSD; 6 - CDS; 7 – PPM; 8 - PDC (right); 1991: 1 – PCP-CDU (Left); 2 – PS; 3 – PRD; 4 – PSD; 5 – CDS; 6 – PSN; 7 – PPM (right).
10) In legislative elections, due to the additional use of “past vote,” only people aged 20 or more (1987) or aged 21 or more (1991) were included.
### Table 3b: Ideology, cleavages and the vote in European Parliament (EP), Local and Legislative elections, 1999-2004 – OLS regressions

<table>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beta &amp;</td>
<td>Beta &amp;</td>
<td>Beta &amp;</td>
<td>Beta &amp;</td>
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<td>significance</td>
<td>significance</td>
<td>significance</td>
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<td>significance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self placement on a left right scale</td>
<td>0.610***</td>
<td>0.430***</td>
<td>0.502***</td>
<td>0.617***</td>
<td>0.478***</td>
<td>0.505***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>-0.064</td>
<td>0.074</td>
<td>0.038</td>
<td>-0.044</td>
<td>-0.013</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.063</td>
<td>n.u.</td>
<td>n.u.</td>
<td>n.u.</td>
<td>n.u.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Union membership</td>
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<td>-0.084</td>
<td>0.090**</td>
<td>0.084**</td>
<td>0.021</td>
<td>0.033</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church attendance</td>
<td>0.007</td>
<td>0.127**</td>
<td>0.105***</td>
<td>0.068**</td>
<td>-0.179***</td>
<td>-0.080*</td>
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<td>Occupation</td>
<td>-0.038</td>
<td>0.105**</td>
<td>0.011</td>
<td>0.030</td>
<td>0.010</td>
<td>-0.004</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Adjusted R²</td>
<td>0.354</td>
<td>0.243</td>
<td>0.299</td>
<td>0.419</td>
<td>0.325</td>
<td>0.292</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>500</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>1303</td>
<td>1000</td>
<td>1000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Valid N</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>303</td>
<td>554</td>
<td>538</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>478</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Notes:
1) * p < 0.1; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01.
2) For the Adjusted R² in legislative elections we present two values: one with the total number of people who voted for legislative elections; the other with only those who voted in legislative and local elections (in parenthesis). Except for EVS 1999, because past vote in EP elections was not asked. For the vote in the 2002 legislative elections N.u. = not used.
3) Self-placement on a left right scale: 0 – left; 10 – right
4) Education. For EVS 1999 and Portuguese NES Survey 2002: highest level of education attained ordered from lowest to highest. EES 1999 and 2004: Age when stopped full-time education, in ascending order.
5) Household Income ordered from lowest to highest.
6) Union membership: 1 – yes; 2 – No.
7) Church attendance: ordered from lowest values (1: “never”) to highest (“weekly” or “more than weekly”).
10) Vote in Legislative elections 1999: 1 – MRPP – (left); 2 – PSR; 3 – Left Bloc (BE); 4 – PCP-CDU; 5 – PS; 6 – PSD; 7 – CDS-PP (right).
11) Vote in local elections 2001: 1 – Left Bloc (BE) – (left); 2 – PCP-CDU; 3 – PS-PCP; 4 – PS; 5 – PSD; 6 – PSD-CDS-PPM; 7 – PSD-PP; 8 – CDS-PP (right).
12) Vote in legislative elections 2002: 1 – BE – (left); 2 – PCP-CDU; 3 – PS; 4 – PSD; 5 – CDS-PP (right).
14) Voting intention in legislative elections 2004: 1 – BE (Left); 2 – PCP-CDU; 3 – PS; 4 – PSD; 5 – PSD-PP; 6 – CDS-PP (right).
Table 4: Electoral Cycles in Democratic Portugal, 1976-2004: change in national government vote support in second order elections, and government’s popularity

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date and Type of Second-order Election</th>
<th>Change in vote percentages of the party(ies) controlling national government: second order elections compared with the prior (or concurrent) legislative election</th>
<th>National government popularity (in the month of the second-order election)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Honeymoon: 0-12 months after legislative election</td>
<td>Midterm: 13-36 months after legislative election</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976: L</td>
<td>-1.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979: L</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982: L</td>
<td>-5.7</td>
<td>n.a.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985: L</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>28.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993: L</td>
<td>-16.9</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994: EP</td>
<td>-16.2</td>
<td>33.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997: L</td>
<td>-3.6</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999: EP</td>
<td>-0.6</td>
<td>22.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001: L</td>
<td>-7.7</td>
<td>24.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Sources: in terms of electoral returns, the data was elaborated by the author from official electoral results available at www.cne.pt. The data referring to government popularity was elaborated by the authors from the monthly polls carried out by Euroexpansão, a commercial polling unit, between 1986 and 2001, and published by Expresso, a weekly Portuguese newspaper. From January 2002 on, the Expresso’s monthly polls used were carried out by a different commercial polling unit, Eurosondagem, and there was a change in the measure of government popularity. About the latter issue, see comments in the paper text.

Notes:
- n.a. = not available.
- L = Local elections.
- Honeymoon – see definition in the paper text.
- Midterm – see definition in the paper text.
- Later term – see definition in the paper text.
- National government popularity: see definitions in the paper text.