

Sleeping Giant Or Much Ado About Nothing?

Examining the role of attitudes towards European integration on National vote choice in Denmark.

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Abstract

Recently, most EU member states have witnessed a rise in Euroskepticism. Authors have argued that this drop in public support for European integration since the Treaty of Maastricht constitutes a basis for potential vote mobilization for political parties both in European and in national elections. In this respect, van der Eijk & Franklin (2004) have developed the image of the “sleeping giant”. Whereas attitudes towards European integration have limited effects on vote choice in European Parliament and in national elections at the present time, the authors argue that it will only be a matter of time before political entrepreneurs politicize the pro-/anti-EU policy dimension to their electoral benefit (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004:47). Recent work by Evans (1998, 2002) demonstrates that in the case of Britain the sleeping giant has awakened. In the 1997 and 2001 British general elections, attitudes toward European integration were an important source in determining voters’ national party choice both in absolute terms as well as relative to the influence of other typically more central concerns facing voters, such as left-right issues. Moreover, Evans (2002:102ff.) shows that the role of the pro-/anti-EU policy dimension in national vote choice has even increased over time. This paper takes off from the work presented by Evans (1998, 2002) and explores the potential for the contestation of European matters in national elections. I examine to what extent these findings are specific to the British context or are indicative of a wider trend by analyzing the role of attitudes towards European integration on vote choice in Danish national elections. The analysis presented in this paper shows that attitudes towards European integration provide an alternative basis for vote choice, which is largely independent from core left-/right-issues in Denmark. However, the empirical results also show that the importance of a pro-/anti-EU policy dimension in determining voting behavior has slightly decreased over time.

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1. Introduction

With the creation of the European Monetary Union (EMU), the introduction of a single currency, the vast expansion of policy areas to the jurisdiction in Brussels, and the Eastward enlargement, the European Union (EU) has “[...] transformed into a multilevel polity in which European issues have become important not only for national governments, but also for citizens, political parties, interest groups and social movements” (Steenbergen & Marks 2004:1). With this qualitative and quantitative shift in the nature of European integration, the integration process itself has become highly salient and contested, which has recently manifested itself in an increasingly fickle public opinion on European integration. It is unclear to many citizens where the train of European integration is heading and who is in the driver’s seat. Most EU member states have witnessed a rise in Euroskepticism. This drop in public support for European integration – i.e. the Post-Maastricht Blues (Eichenberg & Dalton 2003) – could constitute a basis for vote mobilization for political parties both in European and national elections.

This is consistent with van der Eijk & Franklin’s (2004) notion of the “sleeping giant”. It will only be matter of time before political entrepreneurs politicize the pro-/anti-EU policy dimension to differentiate themselves from other parties (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004:47). In other words, it is only a matter of time before the sleeping giant is awakened. This image contrasts with earlier empirical research (Reif & Schmidt 1980; van der Eijk & Franklin 1996; Marsh & Franklin 1996) demonstrating that attitudes toward European integration only play a little role in vote choice in national or EP elections at the present time. However, recent work by Evans (1998, 2002) demonstrates that in case of the 1997 and 2001 British elections, attitudes toward European integration were an important source in determining voters’ national party choice both in absolute terms as well as relative to the influence of other typically more central concerns facing voters, such as left/right issues. Moreover, Evans

(2002:102ff.) shows that the role of the pro-/anti-EU policy dimension in national vote choice has even increased over time.

This paper takes off from the work presented by Evans (1998, 2002) and examines the potential for the contestation of European matters in national elections over time. I will investigate to what extent these findings are specific to the British context or are indicative of a wider trend by examining the role of attitudes towards European integration on vote choice in national elections in Denmark. Denmark constitutes an interesting case as it can be seen as the “usual suspect” with regard to finding an influence of attitudes towards European integration on national vote choice. Denmark, like Britain, has experienced high salience on the issue of European integration among parties as well as among citizens in the past and present (see for instance Worre 1996; van der Eijk & Franklin 2004). By comparing the 1998 and 2001 Danish elections, I will also investigate the extent to which beliefs about the desirability of European integration have become more important in national party choice over time.

This paper is structured as follows. First, I provide a general overview of the literature regarding the effects of the process of European integration on national elections and national voting behavior. I also elaborate on the EU dimension in Danish party and electoral politics. In the next section, I discuss the data, the model specification, and the results of the empirical analysis of the role of attitudes towards the European integration on national vote choice in Denmark. Finally, I conclude by discussing the implications of these empirical findings for the “sleeping giant” thesis.

2. Theoretical Framework

2.1 The European Union: A New Dimension of Political Conflict in National Elections?

Until the beginning of the 1990s European integration was largely uncontested in public opinion. Recently, however, most EU member states have witnessed a drop in public support for European integration. In the early years, the European project was conceived as a technocratic and elite-driven project. Up to the late 1980s the European integration process was characterized by the so-called “permissive consensus” (Lindberg & Scheingold 1970). As long as national and supranational elites could serve interests through European institutions, integration could be seen as nothing to worry about. Since the beginning of the 1990s, however, public support for European integration has been in decline (Anderson & Kaltenthaler 1996; Eichenberg & Dalton 2003). The referendum outcomes in Denmark, Ireland, and the more recent Swedish referendum on the Euro, the low turnout in the elections to the EP, as well as the levels of support for EU-skeptical parties in several national elections show the contemporary shift away from support for European integration. This drop in public support for European integration since the Treaty of Maastricht – i.e. the Post-Maastricht Blues (Eichenberg & Dalton 2003) – could constitute a basis for vote mobilization for political parties in both European and national elections.

In this context, van der Eijk & Franklin (2004) have developed the image of the “sleeping giant”. The authors suggest that European integration is the “sleeping giant” of national politics of European states with the potential to “undercut the bases for contemporary party mobilization in many, if not most, European polities” (van der Eijk & Franklin 2001:3). Although empirical evidence shows that the EU issue remains a relatively small issue compared to traditional issues like ‘welfare state’ or ‘social justice’ in European and national vote choice, it may only be matter of time before political entrepreneurs politicize the pro-

/anti-EU policy dimension to differentiate themselves from other parties (van der Eijk & Franklin 2004:47).

The impact of European integration on party and electoral politics has received relatively little attention within the field of EU studies (Börzel & Risse 2000:3; Tillman 2004:591). Moreover, the evidence of possible Europeanization effects on domestic processes of interest formation and representation has been mixed. Mair (2000:31) argues that European integration “[...] has had virtually no direct or even demonstrable effect on the format of the national party systems”, which is consistent with the conclusion by Krouwel (2004:1) that “[...] politics is still primarily a national affair, [while] policy-making is increasingly supranational in character.” Other scholars, however, have argued that public opinion helps shape elite preferences over the EU (Carrubba 2001) and that attitudes towards European integration may influence national vote choice (Evans 1998, 2001; Gabel 2000; Scheve 1999; Tillman 2004). This indicates that “[...] there is some sort of an ‘electoral connection’ [...]” (Tillman 2004:593) between European and national politics. This paper will add to this body of work, as it focuses on how beliefs about the desirability of European integration may affect vote choice in Danish parliamentary elections.

European integration could intersect with national voting behavior in three different ways (Gabel 2000:52-3). First, EP elections could serve as markers for national elections, i.e. the performance of parties at EP elections are presumed to predict how well these parties may perform in (subsequent) national elections. Hence, one may find an indirect impact of EP elections on voting behavior in national elections. Although it is argued that EP elections constitute “second order elections” (Reif & Schmitt 1980) – i.e. they are merely replications of national elections and mirror the popularity and performance of national governments (Niedermayer 1984; Bogdanor 1989) – studies have shown that the results of European elections have altered voting behavior in subsequent national elections (see van der Eijk &

Franklin 1996; Marsh 1998 for example). Two examples in which EP electoral results served as markers for national voting behavior are the EP electoral successes of the Front National in France and of Bündnis'90/Die Grünen in Germany, which were of crucial importance to their electoral gains nationally (van der Eijk, Franklin & Marsh 1996:159).

A second way in which European integration might intersect with national vote choice is through the importance of European economic integration, i.e. the EMU, for traditional models of economic voting. Research in this field focuses on the question of whether participation in the EMU and specifically the introduction of the single currency changes the impact of macroeconomic conditions on national vote choice (Powell & Whitten 1993; Palmer & Whitten 1999; Scheve 1999). In the case of France and Britain, Scheve (1999) shows that EMU had diverse distributional impacts for different groups within the French and British electorate, which in turn influenced their national voting behavior. Moreover, Palmer and Whitten (1999) argue that the single currency may increase the variability in national economic performance and thus Euro membership increases the relevance of changes in macroeconomic conditions to electoral fortunes of incumbent parties. These findings indicate that economic integration in Europe may change traditional models of economic voting.

Finally, the third way of conceptualizing a link between European integration and national voting behavior is through direct impact of European integration on national vote choice, i.e. support or opposition towards European integration may co-determine vote choice in national elections. This would indicate that the EU has become a new electoral cleavage in domestic politics. It seems reasonable to expect voters to express their preferences over EU membership and European integration in their voting behavior in national elections. National elections constitute important channels through which citizens can express their interests regarding political decisions at the European level. "For one, the national government that emerges from national elections designates the national representatives that participate in the

EU Council of Ministers, which must approve all EU laws. In addition, elected national heads of government directly represent their member states in the European Council, which sets the agenda for further European integration” (Gabel 2000:55). Consequently, the presence of European issues in national elections could contribute to an indirect democratic process through which European citizens could control the development of European integration (Carrubba 2001; Tillman 2004).

In this paper, I take up this last line of research and analyze the extent to which citizens base their national vote choice on attitudes towards European integration. Tillman (2004:593) refers to this phenomenon as “EU voting”. I will investigate the extent of EU voting in two Danish elections. I expect that, as the level of agreement over European integration between a citizen and a party increases, the likelihood of citizens voting for that party increases. The null hypothesis predicts no relationship between EU attitudes and voting behavior.

It is important to note that certain conditions need to be fulfilled before we can conclude that EU issues introduce a new political conflict dimension to national politics in EU member states (Gabel 2000:57; Scheve 1999:156; Tillman 2004:593). First, “[...] for EU issues to transform voting behavior in national elections, voters’ preferences on these issues must be independent, to a significant degree, of the traditional [i.e. left-right] sources of their vote choice” (Gabel 2000:57). The European integration issue should also cut across traditional bases of voting behavior; hence, the EU dimension should be largely orthogonal to the left-right dimension.² Secondly, citizens need to have the necessary information to make electoral choices on the basis of the EU issue and the EU issue should be salient enough for voters to use in their electoral considerations. Voters examine a variety of different issues and

² It is important to point out that some authors (Kreppel & Tsebelis 1999; Tsebelis & Garret 2000) argue that the issue of European integration is subsumed into the left-right dimension and does not constitute an independent dimension of political conflict. Whereas the left favors further political integration as a means to establish common economic regulation across Europe, parties on the right favored economic integration and the creation of the common market, but after the establishment of the EMU object to further political integration.

considerations when choosing which party to vote for, so the EU issue must be salient enough for voters to act on it. Thirdly and finally, voters have to be presented with a choice among varying positions of different parties regarding European integration. So, party leaderships have to formulate positions on the issue and there needs to be significant amount of variation among parties regarding European integration (Scheve 1999:156; Tillman 2004:593).

However, the presence of these conditions does not necessarily imply that European integration is a new electoral cleavage in itself. One can also conceptualize EU integration as a significant facet of a broader “new politics” dimension. Advocates of the “new politics” dimension argue that next to the traditional left-right issues a second dimension of societal conflict has evolved in advanced industrial democracies since the 1970s (Inglehart 1977). This second dimension of political contestation involves the divide between “old politics” values, such as public order, national security and traditional life styles, and “new politics” values, such as individual choice, political participation and environmental protection (Dalton 1996:81-2).³ The issue of European integration, or other types of supranational integration, may constitute a part of this “new politics” dimension (Inglehart et al. 1987; Evans 1999; Hooghe et al. 2002; Kriesi & Lachat 2004). One can expect people favoring “new” over “old” politics values to be more supportive of the integration process, as they favor cosmopolitan and culturally inclusive values over protectionism and cultural exclusion (Kriesi & Lachat 2004:6-7).

What do the empirical findings regarding EU voting tell us about the potential development of an EU dimension in national electoral politics? Thus far the research regarding the impact of European integration on national vote choice shows that citizens’ support for European integration appears to be independent of their left-right positions. At the

³ Numerous different labels are used to capture the “new politics” dimension of political contestation within the literature. Inglehart (1977) refers to it as materialism versus postmaterialism, Kitschelt (1989) uses the terms libertarian versus authoritarian and Hooghe et al. (2002) speak of the green-alternative-libertarian (GAL) versus the traditional-authoritarian-nationalist (TAN) dimension.

same time, there has been evidence that European integration has a significant influence on national vote choice in several member states with at least a subset of citizens basing their votes on the European issue (Evans 1998, 2002; Gabel 2000; Scheve 1999; Tillman 2004). These findings indicate the possibility that European integration may serve as a new dimension of political conflict in some EU member states. However, the development of EU voting over time, the influence of country specifics, and the role of different aspects of the integration process have received little attention (Gabel 2000:69). This analysis contributes to the literature regarding EU voting by providing an analysis of EU voting in Denmark while focusing on its development across time. As we will see in the following section, the Danish case is especially interesting, as high levels of conflict over European integration exist among political parties and within the public. So, if we do not find evidence for EU voting here, we are unlikely to find it in other systems.

2.2 Denmark & The European Union: An Ambivalent Relationship?

Danish application for European Community (EC) membership in 1961 was supported by a national consensus of government, opposition, and the public. But this consensus quickly unraveled as the date of EU membership drew closer. Since the beginning of the 1970s a strong strain of Euroskepticism has run through Danish public opinion and the Danish party system. Among both Danish political parties and voters a long-standing ambivalence exists about Denmark's membership in the European Union. Opposition towards the EU is "[...] motivated by a fear of erosion of Danish sovereignty and national identity, by resentment at centralization and bureaucracy, by doubts about economic benefits, and suspicion of involvement in great power politics" (Worre 1996:98). Although these fears may exist in other smaller EU member states as well, in the Danish case we are confronted with extensive

conflict within parties concerning European integration (Worre 1996:58) and with a skeptical public opinion towards European integration, which is demonstrated by rejections of the Maastricht Treaty and the Euro (Friis 1998:2ff.; Skidmore-Hesse 2003:10ff.).

Since the 1970s, the issue of European integration has become a major source of political conflict within Danish electoral and party politics (Worre 1996:98; Bjugan 1999:173). Originally only a few minor left-wing parties backed opposition to Danish EC membership. However, since the mid 1970s opposition organized anti-European factions appeared inside in almost all parties and were especially strong among the Social Democrats (Socialdemokratiet-S) and the Radical Liberals (Radikale Venstre-RV) (Worre 1996:98). The Danish party system is dominated by three traditional class parties originating in the last century: the Social Democrats representing the labor class, the Liberals (Venstre-V) historically representing agrarian interests, and the Conservatives (Konservative Folkeparti-KF) representing business interests (Worre 1996; Skidmore-Hesse 2003). These parties are strongly in favor of European integration, although the Social Democrats are internally divided regarding the EU issue. “[W]hile the Social Democratic leadership embraces the European integration process there are clear signs of ambivalence and outright opposition among rank and file” (Skidmore-Hesse 2003:10). Party opposition to the EU is most clearly articulated on the left and right extremes of the Danish political spectrum. The leftwing Unity List (Enhedslisten-E) and the rightwing Danish People’s Party (Dansk Folkeparti-DF) strongly oppose European integration. Whereas the objections of the Unity List to the integration process are based above all on Marxist and ecological grounds, the Danish People’s Party views the EU mainly as a threat to Danish identity, values, and sovereignty. The party program of the Danish People’s Party for the 2001 general election was entitled “Denmark for the Danes” and portrayed a clear anti-immigration and anti-EU sentiment.⁴

⁴ <http://www.dansksfolkeparti.dk/>

Next to these two extremist parties and the three dominant parties in Danish politics, several smaller parties exist. On the left we find the Socialist People's Party (Socialistisk Folkeparti-SF) and the Radical Liberals (Radikale Venstre-RV). The Radical Liberals emerged from a reformist and pacifist wing of the Liberals; they very strongly favor European integration. The Socialist People's Party, on the other hand, is Euro-skeptical, though not as strongly as the extreme leftwing Unity List (Skidmore-Hesse 2003:1-2). The Centre Democrats (Centrum Demokraterne-CD), which just fell under the two percent threshold in the 2001 parliamentary elections, and the Christian Conservatives (Kristeligt Folkeparti-KrF) make up the right side of the Danish party system. Both parties are supportive of European integration.

While a majority of Danes support the integration process at the present⁵, opposition to European integration is illustrated by the rejection of the Maastricht Treaty and the Single Currency in popular referenda. Danish public opinion towards Europe has fluctuated since the positive vote in the EC membership referendum of 1972 to the rejection of the Euro in the recent 2000 referendum. Under Article 20 of the Danish constitution the government is required to take international treaties and other transfers of powers to international authorities that necessitate constitutional changes to a binding popular referendum unless a five-sixths majority in the Parliament prevents this. So far, six popular referenda have been held on issues regarding European integration.⁶ Table 1 provides an overview of the results of these referenda.

⁵ In the Eurobarometer survey 60.1 from November 2003 50,6 percent of Danish respondents viewed their country's membership in the EU 'a good thing', 14,3 percent responded that it was 'a bad thing', 29, 8 percent viewed their country's membership as 'neither good nor bad' and finally 5,2 percent of the respondents responded 'don't know'.

⁶ So far, only two referenda were held under the provision of Article 20: the 1972 and the 1992 referendum. The 1986 was merely a consultative referendum and the 1993, 1998 and 2000 referenda were held on the basis of specific legislation of the Danish Parliament (Buch & Hansen 2002).

Table 1: Results of Danish Referenda on Issues regarding European Integration:

	EC membership 1972	European Single Act 1986	Maastricht Treaty 1992	Edinburgh Agreement 1993	Amsterdam Treaty 1998	Euro 2000
Yes, %	63,3	56,2	49,3	56,7	55,1	46,8
No, %	36,7	43,8	50,7	43,3	44,9	53,2
Turnout	90,1	75,7	83,1	86,5	74,8	87,5

Source: information regarding the 1972-1998 referenda in Friis (1998:1) & the results of the 2000 referendum under http://www.nationalbanken.dk/dnuk/eurohist.nsf/side/Euro_referendum_ (17.08.04).

Although the Danish public rejected only two out of the six referenda on issues regarding European integration, a large minority has continuously voted in opposition to further integration within Europe. The no-camp in the referenda mainly frames their opposition in terms of the danger that a little country like Denmark will be swallowed by the big EU. Politicians from the no-side claim that the EU is developing into a “[...] super state and that Denmark would soon become a municipality of Europe” (Friis 1998:2). For example, the Danish People’s Party voiced their opposition to the Amsterdam Treaty in the 1998 campaign by using the slogan “vote Danish, vote no”.⁷

Referenda also play a role in Danish electoral politics. On February 19, 1998, Danish Prime Minister Nyrup Rasmussen called a snap election to be held on March 11. This decision caught parties and politicians by surprise. Commentators on Danish politics point to the fact that although Rasmussen explained his decision by arguing that it was hard to maintain cooperation between parties in the Parliament, the government in reality wanted to limit the possible effect of the EU-conflict on the election campaign (Aylott 1999:65; Bjugan 1999:172). The Amsterdam referendum was due to be held in May 1998. Furthermore, at the beginning of March 1998 the Danish High Court began hearing the case against the Danish government for signing the Maastricht Treaty without popular consent. “It made sense to keep the EU issue, which has proved so difficult for the Social Democrats, out of any election” (Aylott 1999:65). Moreover, “[o]ff-loading European integration issues to the arenas of

⁷ See article *Past ‘No’ haunts EU referendum* in the Copenhagen Post under www.cphpost.dk/get/55301.htm.

referenda and elections to the European Parliament have become a Danish tradition” (Bjugan 1999:172). However, although the election in 1998 focused mainly on the issues of immigration and refugee policy, European integration became a prominent topic in the last week of the campaign. Rasmussen claimed that the Liberals were planning to drop the four Danish opt-outs from the major European Treaties in the areas of the European Common Defense policy, justice and police, the Euro and in relation to union citizenship (Buch & Hansen 2002). Whether Rasmussen’s strategy was successful is of course difficult to ascertain, however “[a] poll in the newspaper *Politiken* showed that 40 percent of the population consider the parties’ EU policy before they decide which party to vote for” (Bjugan 1999:174). The 1998 election results – see table 1 on the next page – allowed the coalition government of Social Democrats and Radical Liberals under Prime Minister Rasmussen to stay in power. It remained a minority government, which is very common in the highly fragmented Danish party system (Aylott 2001:59).

Table 2: Results of the Danish Elections in 1998 and 2001:

	1998		2001		Δ 1998-2001
	Votes %	Seats	Votes %	Seats	Seats
Socialdemokratiet (S) – Social Democrats	36,0	63	29,1	52	- 9
Venstre (V) – Liberals	24,0	42	31,3	56	+ 14
Konservative Folkeparti (KF) – Conservatives	8,9	16	9,1	16	-
Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF) – Socialist People’s Party	7,5	13	6,4	12	- 1
Dansk Folkeparti (DF) – Danish People’s Party	7,4	13	12,0	22	+ 9
Centrum Demokraten (CD) – Centre Democrats	4,3	8	1,8	-	- 8
Radikale Venstre (RV) – Radical Liberals	3,9	7	5,2	9	+ 2
Enhedslisten (E) – Unity List	2,7	5	2,4	4	- 1
Kristeligt Folkeparti (KrF) – Christian People’s Party	2,5	4	2,3	4	-
Fremskridtspartiet (FrP) – Progress Party	2,4	4	0,6	-	- 4
Demokratisk Fornyelse – Democratic Renewal	0,3	-	-	-	-
4 direct seats for representatives from Greenland & Faroe Islands	-	4	-	4	-

* Source: 1998 election results: Bjugan (1999) ; 2001 election results: <http://www.electionworld.org/denmark.htm>

In comparison to the 1998 elections, which were held on the eve of the Amsterdam Treaty referendum, the EU issue played a smaller role in the 2001 campaign. However, the large gains of the Danish People’s Party, which opposes Denmark’s incorporation in the EU, strongly increased the anti-EU voice within the Danish parliament. Similar to the 1998 elections, the 2001 electoral campaign focused heavily on the immigration and refugee issue (Bille 2002:941; Andersen 2003:188-190). The anti-immigrant tone of the election campaign was especially triggered by the Danish People’s Party; however, both Liberal and Social Democrat leaders were very responsive to the issues of the far right during the campaign (Skidmore-Hesse 2003:4). Generally, the 2001 election results show “[...] an unprecedented landslide to the right in Danish politics” (Andersen 2003:186) with large electoral gains for the Liberals and the rightwing populist Danish People’s Party. By 2001 the Danish People’s

Party had become the third largest party in Danish politics. The Social Democrats especially suffered from the electoral gains of parties on the right. In the 2001 elections the Social Democratic Party achieved only 29,1 percent of the vote, which was the second lowest level of electoral support ever. Their worst election result was in the “political earthquake” elections of 1973, in which they won a mere 25,7 percent of the national vote (Borre 1984:330-64). However, in 1973 the Social Democrats were still the largest party and remained in office, whereas in 2001 a Liberals-Conservatives minority was formed with parliamentary support of the Danish People’s Party (Bille 2002:945-6; Skidmore-Hesse 2003:1).

In this section, we were able to show that the issue of European integration is of high importance in Danish politics. An ambivalent relationship exists between Danish political parties, the Danish citizenry, and the European Union. The question remains, however, if the European integration issue also influences national vote choice. To what extent do views about European integration determine vote choice in the 1998 and 2001 elections? The next section provides an empirical examination of the influence of European integration on national vote choice in Denmark.

3. European Integration and Voting Behavior in 1998 and 2001 Danish Elections

3.1 Data Description and Empirical Specification

In order to test the relationship between attitudes towards European integration and vote choice in national elections, I employ individual-level survey data from Danish elections studies from 1998 and 2001. Both elections surveys are based on personal interviews after the elections in 1998 and 2001 respectively. The 1998 election survey included 2001 respondents

and the 2001 dataset included 2026 respondents. These datasets allow for the testing of the main hypothesis underlying this analysis, which states that as the level of agreement over European integration between a citizen and a party increases, the likelihood of the citizen voting for that party increases. The null hypothesis predicts no relationship between EU attitudes and voting behavior. Moreover, the 1998 and 2001 election studies provide an excellent test of EU voting over time, as the question wording for the dependent and independent variables used in the empirical analysis are identical.

The dependent variable is the vote choice of the respondent in the 1998 and 2001 parliamentary election respectively.⁸ To measure the importance of beliefs about European integration, I will use the respondents' self-placement on an EU scale. Respondents were asked to place themselves on a five-point European integration scale, where number 1 stands for an exit out of the EU and 5 stands for the fastest possible build-up of the EU.⁹ To determine the importance of the EU issue in relation to other central concerns facing voters, I include two control variables. Of interest is firstly, respondents' self-placement on a left-right ideological scale. This variable runs from 1 indicating left to 5 indicating right.¹⁰ I also include a variable tapping into the "new politics" dimension of political competition. Although this "new politics" dimension includes diverse issues, such as political participation

⁸ Original question wording 1998: *Stemte De ved Folketingsvalget den 11. marts? Hvis ja: På hvilket parti?* Did you vote in the general election on the 11th of March? If yes: Which party did you vote for? / Original question wording 2001: *Stemte De ved Folketingsvalget 20. november? Hvis ja: På hvilket parti?* Did you vote in the general election on the 20th of November? If yes: Which party did you vote for? (English translation provided by the author)

⁹ This question was part of a battery of questions, in which respondents were asked to place themselves and the several political parties on an EU integration scale. The exact question wording was: "*Så kommer det sidste spørgsmål af denne type. Her står tallene på skalaen for vores forhold til EU. 1 står for partier, der vil have os ud af EU, 5 står for dem, der ønsker den hurtigst mulige udbygning af EU. Hvor omtrent vil De placere [partinavene]? Og hvor omtrent ville De placere Dem selv?*" Now the last question of this type. Here, the numbers on the scale stand for our relations to the EU. 1 stands for those parties who want to get us out of the EU, while 5 stands for the fastest possible build-up of the EU. Where would you place [name of party]? And where would you yourself? (English translation provided by the author)

¹⁰ Original question wording: "*I politik taler man ofte om venstre og højre. Hvor vil De placere Dem selv på denne skala? Og hvor De placere de enkelte partier?*" In politics one often talks of left and right. Where would you place yourself on this scale? And where would you place different parties? (English translation provided by the author) The original left-right scale ran from 1 to 10, but for reasons of comparability the variable was recoded the scale to 1-5, so that we can compare coefficients across the independent variables.

or individual choice; environmental protection is usually considered a key element of “new politics”. Hence, I include respondents’ self-placement on a green scale ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 indicating “not at all green” and 5 indicating “very green”.¹¹

The model to predict national vote choice in this analysis hence consists of three predictors: respondents’ self-placement on European integration, left right and new politics scale. I test the weight of these predictors by employing a multinomial logistic (MNL) regression. Due to the fact that my dependent variable is a categorical variable with multiple values, i.e. vote choice for eight different parties, I have to deal with several methodological concerns. First of all, since the probability of voting for a party can only vary between 0 and 1, ordinary least squares regression analysis is ruled out. However, we can also not make use of an ordered probit or logit model, which assumes the electoral space to be unidimensional. It is not clear whether and how voters compare parties or order them on a single dimension (Gabel 2000:60ff.). On the basis of these concerns, we will use a MNL model of vote choice, which does not impose restrictions on the electoral space and estimates non-linear effects. Moreover, MNL does not constrain the independent variables to have a common effect on vote choice between different parties. That is, a change in support for European integration could increase the probability of voters voting for several different parties and while at the same time decrease the likelihood of voting for yet another party.

¹¹ Original question wording: “*Man taler undertiden om en grøn dimension, hvor nogle partier markerer sig ved at lægge overordentlig stor vægt på miljøhensyn, mens andre siger at miljøhensynene efterhånden er ved at tage overhånd. På denne skala står 1 for den mindst grønne politik, mens 5 står for den mest grønne. Hvor omtrent vil De placere [partinavene]? Og hvor omtrent ville De placere Dem selv?*” One sometimes speaks about a green dimension on which parties strongly emphasize environmental protection, whereas others say that environmental protection is going too far. Here, the numbers on the scale stand for: 1. not at all green and 5 most green policy. About where would you place (party)? About where would you place yourself? (English translation provided by the author)

3.2 Empirical Results

The analysis presented below explores the extent of EU voting in the 1998 and 2001 Danish national elections. As stated in section 2.1, three conditions need to be fulfilled before we can speak of EU voting in Danish national elections and conclude that a new political conflict dimension based on European integration exists in the Danish party system. First, in order for the EU issue to influence national voting behavior, voters' preferences on these issues must be independent, to a significant degree, of the traditional sources of their vote choice, such as left-right issues. Secondly, we need to determine, if the EU issue is salient enough for voters to act on. Thirdly, voters have to be presented with a choice among varying positions of different parties regarding European integration. So, the first issue we need to address is whether voters' preferences on EU integration are independent from other issues facing voters, such as left-right ideology. Table 3 presents the correlations between citizens' placements on the left-right, immigration policy, budget policy, environmental policy and law and order scales with support for European integration. All correlations are significant at a 0.01-level, except for the relationship between law and order and European integration in the 2001 survey.

Table 3: Correlations between attitudes towards European integration and other issues[†], 1998-2001

	1998	2001
Left-Right	.295*	.171*
Immigration Policy	.059*	.073*
Budget Policy	-.211*	-.155*
Environmental Policy	-.192*	-.083*
Law & Order	-.049*	.003


[†] Scales: European integration: 1 anti- and 5 pro-integration, Left-Right: 1 left and 5 right, Immigration: 1 anti- and 5 pro-immigration, Budget: 1 cut and 5 increase, Environment: 1 least green and 5 most green, Law & Order: 1 law and order and 5 prevention.

* Correlation is significant at $p < 0.01$ (two-tailed).

The results show that the EU issue is largely independent from other issues concerning voters. However, in 1998 placement on the left-right and budget policy scale is related to support for European integration. The direction of these correlations indicates that Danish respondents on the left of the left-right scale and respondents favoring an increase in the public budget express stronger opposition to the European integration process. These coefficients lose strength over time, however, so we can conclude that the EU issue is independent, to a significant degree, from other sources of vote choice. Hence, the necessary condition of EU voting stating that independent variation in voters' EU positions should exist is fulfilled in Denmark. As highlighted earlier, independent variation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for EU voting. The issue should also be important enough for voters to incorporate into their voting decision.

Figure 1 provides an overview of the importance of several policy issues in vote choice of the Danish respondents in the 1998 election survey. Respondents were asked to what extent they based their voting decision on several specific issues. Unfortunately, this question was not included in the 2001 survey, so we are not able to determine to what extent these considerations have changed over time. In 1998 the EU issue was important to voters. When we look at the percentages of voters answering that the EU issue was of decisive or of great importance for their vote choice, we see that European integration was more important than budget policy and of similar importance as tax or family policy considerations. However, other issues, such as health policy, immigration, or law and order, were more important to voters in considering which party to vote for. In all, figure 1 shows that the EU issue was important to voters, but not the decisive issue. Yet, it seems fair to conclude that European integration is salient for voters. It was more important than traditional issues, such as budget or family policy.

Figure 1: Importance of Policy Issues in Vote in 1998 Election in %



We also need to examine whether voters feel that they are presented with a choice among varying party positions regarding European integration. Table 4 presents the mean scores of the respondents’ perceptions of the parties’ positions along the European integration scale as well as the respondents’ self-placement. The integration scale ranges from 1 to 5, whereby 1 stands for the Danish exit from the EU, while 5 stands for the fastest possible build-up of the EU. The table shows the parties from right, i.e. the Danish People’s Party, to left, i.e. the Unity List; the left-right order is based on the perceptions of respondents’ of party placements on the left-right ideological scale (see table A.1 in the Appendix for the mean scores of respondents’ and party placements on the left-right scale).

The table shows that respondents see extensive variation among parties on the integration issue. The mean scores for the respondents show that the average Danish respondent is in favor of integration and that their level of support has significantly increased over time. Although the referenda outcomes have shown that Euroskepticism exists, Danish

citizens are on average in favor of the integration process. Most parties are viewed to be pro-integration as well.

Table 4: Self-Placement and Perceptions of Party Positions¹² on EU Integration Scale, 1998-2001

Mean scores on EU integration scale (standard deviations) [†]			
	1998	2001	Δ 1998-2001 [‡]
Respondents	3.14 (.123)	3.25 (.785)	+ .11*
Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	1.47 (.916)	1.68 (.966)	+ .21*
Venstre (V)	4.69 (.608)	4.37 (.761)	- .32*
Konservative Folkeparti (KF)	4.42 (.723)	4.23 (.810)	- .19*
Kristeligt Folkeparti (KrF)	3.36 (.827)	3.12 (.858)	- .24*
Radikale Venstre (RV)	3.97 (.806)	4.08 (.844)	+ .11*
Socialdemokratiet (S)	4.10 (.795)	4.26 (.785)	+ .16*
Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)	2.01 (.909)	2.52 (.971)	+ .51*
Enhedslisten (E)	1.28 (.748)	1.54 (.924)	+ .26*
(N)	(1907)	(1973)	

[†] Low scores indicate pro-independence, high scores indicate pro-integration (1-5).

[‡] 1998 score subtracted from 2001 score.


* Significant change in mean scores between 1998 and 2001 at $p < 0.01$.

Table 4 also demonstrates that opposition to European integration is found on the left and right extremes of the Danish political spectrum. The extreme rightwing Danish People's Party and the extremist leftwing Unity List are in strongest opposition to the EU of all Danish political parties. Support for European integration is found in the middle section of the Danish party system. The highest level of support in both 1998 as well as 2001 is found among the Liberals, which currently is the biggest party within the Danish parliament. This pattern between left-right positioning of political parties and their level of support for European integration is not specific to the Danish case. Within the literature on parties and the EU issue, the relationship between left-right placement and support for European integration is described as "the inverted U-curve" (Hooghe et al. 2002:968). The inverted U-curve indicates that extreme leftwing and rightwing most strongly oppose European integration, whereas

¹² Two parties, the Centre-Democrats and the Progress Party, that won parliamentary seats in the 1998 election are not included in the empirical analysis as these parties did not receive any seats in 2001 election.

parties in the middle, such as the Christian Democrats, Liberals, or Social Democrats, are generally much more supportive of the integration process. “When one charts the positions of part[ies] combining a Left/Right dimension with an orthogonal dimension indicating level of support for European integration, the result is an inverted U” (Hooghe et al. 2002:968). Figure 2 displays the relationship between respondents’ perceptions of party positions on European integration and left-right.

Figure 2: Party Positions on EU integration by Left-Right placement, 1998-2001



In Denmark we do not find a clear inverted U-curve. The figure shows that parties on the extreme right, i.e. the Danish People’s Party (DF), and on the extreme left, i.e. the Unity List (E) and the Socialist People’s Party (SF), are most EU-skeptical. Moreover, the large parties within the middle left, Social Democrats (S), and the middle right, Liberals (V), are most supportive of European integration. However, the small middle Christian Democratic Party in Denmark, which is the most middle on the left-right ideological scale, differs from the general inverted U-curve pattern found in other member states. The Christian People’s Party (KrF) in Denmark is more EU-skeptical than one would expect on the basis of their left-

right placement. In all, table 4 and figure 2 show that Danish citizens see huge variation among party positions regarding the EU issue.

As stated before, three conditions need to be fulfilled before we can speak of EU voting in Danish national elections. The analysis so far shows that that these three conditions necessary for EU voting are present within the Danish elections. In the next step, we need to determine if and to what extent Danish citizens choose among different parties on the basis of their support for EU membership. In order to examine the extent of EU voting in the 1998 and 2001 elections in Denmark, we employed a MNL regression analysis. Table 5 and 6 present the results of the MNL regression analyses using the 1998 and 2001 election survey data respectively.

Table 5: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results Predicting National Vote Choice as a Function of Respondents' Positions on Left-Right, Green & European Integration Scales, 1998 (Cox & Snell's Pseudo $R^2 = .59$) †

Estimates:	DF	V	KrF	RV	S	SF	E	Model improvement in χ^2
coefficient								
standard error								
logg odds ratio								
Left-Right	.049 (.177) 1.050	-.133 (.131) .875	-.538* (.245) .584	-2.088* (.213) .124	-2.243* (.159) .106*	-3.254* (.211) .039*	-4.121* (.288) .016*	780.52*
New politics	.106 (.136) 1.112	-.029 (.102) .971	.307 (.195) 1.360	.611* (.170) 1.842*	.397 (.118) 1.487*	1.005* (.163) 2.731*	1.158* (.236) 3.185*	65.29*
EU	-1.227* (.139) .293*	.113 (.106) 1.120	-.787* (.194) .455*	-.039 (.168) .962	-.425* (.118) .654*	-.983* (.156) .374*	-1.372 (.226) .254*	212.92*

Notes: † reference category is vote for the Conservatives (Konservative Folkeparti-KF), * significant at $p < .05$. High scores of the scales indicate rightwing, green & pro-EU positions.

Table 6: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results Predicting National Vote Choice as a Function of Respondents' Positions on Left-Right, Green & European Integration Scales, 2001 (Cox & Snell's Pseudo $R^2 = .51$) †

Estimates:	DF	V	KrF	RV	S	SF	E	Model improvement in χ^2
coefficient (s.e)								
logg odds ratio								
Left-Right	-.030 (.149)	-.271* (.123)	-1.064* (.254)	-1.891* (.188)	-2.148* (.150)	-3.080* (.207)	-4.317* (.300)	851.31*
	.970	.762*	.345*	.151*	.117*	.046*	.013	
New politics	.165 (.132)	.012 (.111)	.186 (.226)	.393 (.159)	.372* (.124)	.706* (.165)	1.138* (.235)	42.92*
	1.180	1.012	1.205	1.481*	1.451*	1.706*	3.122*	
EU	-1.006* (.120)	-.054 (.101)	-.753* (.199)	.104 (.153)	-.389* (.114)	-.800* (.149)	-.868* (.198)	176.23*
	.366*	.948	.471*	1.110*	.678*	.449*	.420*	

Notes: Table entries are logg odds ratios with standard errors are in parentheses. † reference category is vote for the Conservative People's Party (Konservative Folkeparti-KF), * significant at $p < .05$. High scores of the scales indicate rightwing, green & pro-EU positions.

The reference category against which all effects on party choice are contrasted is voting for the Conservative People's Party (Konservative Folkeparti-KF), which was the third largest party in Denmark in 1998 and the fourth largest in the 2001 elections. This party is a rightwing, pro-integration, and not very green party. Table 5 and 6 present two types of estimates, e.g. firstly the multinomial logistic regression coefficients and secondly the logg odds ratios. A logg odds ratio (or logg odds) is the logarithm of the odds in favor of or against a given event. In this case, it is the factor by which we multiply the odds (i.e. the probability, divided by 1 minus the probability) of voting for the Social Democratic or the Danish People's Party rather than for the Conservative People's Party for each one-unit increase in the independent variable. A logg odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that the odds of voting for another party than for the Conservative People's Party increase when the independent variable increases. Whereas a logg odds ratio of less than 1 indicates that the odds of voting for another party than the Conservative People's Party decreases when the independent variable increases. It is important to note that logg odds are not identical to probabilities, rather they signify the log-likelihoods of voting for one party rather than another (Menard 1995:49ff.). Moreover, one needs to emphasize that logg odds ratios do not contain different information

about the relationship between the dependent and the independent variables. Rather, it is simply a different way of communicating the empirical evidence obtained through the multinomial logistic regression analysis (Demaris 1992:60ff.). To interpret the results presented in table 5 and 6 in the most straightforward manner, we use the logg odds ratios, as it allows us to examine the percentage¹³ with which the odds of voting for a party other than the Conservative People's party increases or decreases for 1-unit increase of the independent variable.

The analyses present the full range of effects on the three scales. For example, we can see that in 1998 the odds of voting Social Democrats rather than Conservative People's Party decrease by a factor of 0.654 for 1-unit increase in the scores on the European integration scale. So, when a voter is more pro-integration the odds of voting Social Democrats decreases by 34.6 percentage-points in comparison to voting for the Conservative People's Party (this percentage is calculated as follows: $\{1 - 0.654\} * 100$, see footnote 13). In the case of the Danish People's Party, the odds of voting for this party rather than the Conservative People's Party when a voter is more pro-EU decrease to an even larger extent, namely by 70.7 percentage points (i.e. $\{1 - 0.293\} * 100$). This result is not at all surprising as the Danish People's Party is one of Denmark's most EU-skeptical parties. In all, the direction of every MNL regression coefficient reported in table 5 and 6 is in the expected direction. Moreover, the tables show that the effect of the EU issue on the odds of voting for a party other than the Conservative People's Party varies greatly per party. In the case of the Danish People's Party and the Christian People's Party, it is the most important factor in determining the likelihood of a voter to vote for these parties rather than the Conservative People's Party. Interestingly, both of these parties are on average skeptical of the process of European integration.

¹³ This percentage is calculated using the following formula: $\{1 - \text{logg odds ratio of party X}\} * 100$.

Tables 5 and 6 also contain information regarding the overall effect of the EU issue on national vote choice in relation to the left-right and new politics issues. The last column presents the χ^2 test. Although all three factors are significant, left-right ideological placement is the largest predictor of national vote choice. Hence, the EU issue is not the strongest determinant of national vote choice, but it does contribute significantly to predicting voting behavior independently from left-right and new politics. The integration issue is the second important predictor and contributes more to the overall model than the new politics issue. These results also hold up when we add socio-economic control variables, such as employment status, income or education, to the multinomial logistic regression equation (for a full account of these results, see Tables A.2 and A.3 in the appendix).

We can conclude that EU voting exists in both the 1998 and 2001 elections in Denmark, although to a somewhat larger extent in 1998 than in 2001. Respondents' preferences regarding European integration have a significant and considerable effect on their choice of party to vote for. Moreover, the signs of the effects are in the expected direction, e.g. when respondents are more pro-integrationist, they tend to vote for a party that is more in favor of European integration. Furthermore, the results indicate that the effect of European integration differs tremendously among parties. Finally, the analysis also indicates that the effect of the EU issue on national vote choice has decreased slightly over time.

4. Conclusion

This paper has explored the potential for the contestation of European matters in Danish general elections. The empirical examination shows that attitudes regarding the European integration process indeed influence national vote choice in Denmark. Although left-right ideological placement is clearly the largest predictor of national vote choice, the EU

issue does contribute significantly to the prediction of voting behavior independently from the left-right and new politics dimensions. Moreover, the analysis showed that the effect of beliefs about the desirability of European integration remained about the same over time. Interestingly, the findings thus indicate that EU voting was not merely restricted to the specifics of the 1998 election, in which due to the upcoming referendum on Amsterdam and the hearings of the Danish Higher Court regarding Maastricht the EU was a major issue. EU voting also took place in the 2001 election, in which the European integration was a less salient issue. In all, the Danish findings show that the differentiation of political parties on the pro-/anti-EU policy dimension does indeed influence national voting behavior in Danish elections. As in the British case, “the sleeping giant” has been awakened. These results demonstrate that the influence of attitudes towards European integration on vote choice is not merely specific to the British context, but may be indicative of a wider trend.

The empirical results also speak to the extensive academic discussion regarding the democratic deficit, which argues that the EU is not responsive to mass publics. The findings presented here indicate that citizens may use national elections as an arena to express their views regarding the integration process. Hence, the presence of European issues in national elections help European citizens to indirectly control the development of European integration. “Although an electorate’s ability to constrain the integration process through a national election is limited, EU voting can have important marginal effects on election outcomes, altering the constellation of parties in parliament and even governments” (Tillman 2004:604).

Surely, before we can speak of a general Europeanization of national electoral politics, we need to probe the following issues further: Who uses EU voting? Can we find that especially Euroskeptical voters or the losers of the European integration base their national vote choice on EU related issues? How does EU voting vary across space? The examination

of the Danish case shows that EU voting exists in two Danish national elections. Other studies demonstrated the relevance of EU voting in Austria, Finland, Great Britain and Sweden. But does EU voting also exist in EU member states in which the integration issue is less salient, for example in Germany or in the Netherlands? It is also interesting to extend the time-span under investigation. All studies thus far have been conducted with data gathered after the Maastricht Treaty. But is Maastricht really the watershed it is often perceived to be? Can we see an increase of EU voting after the so-called break-up of the permissive consensus? Another angle for further research, which is closely related to examining EU voting across time and space, is to incorporate more country-specific factors into the analysis. What is for example the role of referenda on EU issues in EU voting?

5. Appendix

Table A.1: Self-Placement and Perceptions of Party Positions on Left-Right Scale, 1998-2001

	Mean scores on left-right scale (standard deviations) †		
	1998	2001	Δ 1998-2001‡
Respondents	3.22 (.900)	3.21 (.893)	- .01
Dansk Folkeparti (DF)	4.46 (.870)	4.25 (.982)	- .21*
Venstre (V)	4.02 (.778)	3.93 (.786)	- .09*
Konservative Folkeparti (KF)	3.89 (.654)	3.79 (.684)	- .10*
Kristeligt Folkeparti (KrF)	3.37 (.666)	3.19 (.644)	- .18*
Radikale Venstre (RV)	2.87 (.575)	2.84 (.570)	- .03
Socialdemokratiet (S)	2.74 (.619)	2.75 (.591)	+ .01
Socialistisk Folkeparti (SF)	2.01 (.635)	2.11 (.635)	+ .10*
Enhedslisten (E)	1.48 (.732)	1.59 (.732)	+ .11*
(N)	(1932)	(1951)	

† low scores indicate left placement, high scores indicate right placement (1-5).

‡ 1998 score subtracted from 2001 score.

* Significant change in mean scores between 1998 and 2001 at $p < 0.01$.

Table A.2: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results Predicting National Vote Choice as a Function of Respondents' Positions on Left-Right, Green & European Integration Scales including Socio-Economic Controls, 1998 (Cox & Snell's Pseudo R² = .63) †

	Estimates	Left- Right	Green	EU	Income	Employment in Private Sector	Employment in Public Sector	Unskilled Worker	Skilled Worker	Managerial Worker	Manual Worker	Higher Education	Lower Education	Female
S	Coeff.	-2,18	0,42	1,53	-0,05	0,17	0,40	0,29	0,41	-0,26	-0,09	-0,21	-0,11	-0,18
	SE	(0,16)	(0,12)	(0,12)	0,11	(0,17)	(0,17)	(0,16)	(0,14)	(0,16)	(0,18)	(0,10)	(0,11)	(0,11)
	Logg odds (LO)	0,11	1,52	0,68	0,95	1,19	1,49	1,34	1,51	0,77	0,91	0,81	0,90	0,84
RV	Coeff.	-1,97	0,55	-0,11	-0,44	0,31	0,67	0,21	-0,05	-0,06	-0,06	0,24	-0,23	-0,19
	SE	(0,22)	(0,18)	(0,18)	0,20	(0,25)	(0,23)	(0,20)	(0,23)	(0,24)	(0,25)	(0,12)	(0,18)	0,16
	LO	0,14	1,73	0,89	0,64	1,36	1,96	1,24	0,95	0,94	0,95	1,28	0,79	0,83
SF	Coeff.	-3,18	1,00	-1,01	-0,28	-0,02	0,43	0,20	0,25	0,10	0,28	0,09	-0,29	-0,27
	SE	(0,22)	(0,17)	(0,16)	0,18	(0,23)	(0,22)	(0,19)	(0,19)	(0,22)	(0,23)	(0,14)	(0,16)	(0,15)
	LO	0,04	2,72	0,36	0,75	0,98	1,54	1,22	1,29	1,11	1,32	1,10	0,75	0,76
DF	Coeff.	0,12	0,14	-1,22	-0,16	0,04	-0,01	0,16	0,33	0,03	-0,05	-0,46	0,19	-0,34
	SE	(0,18)	(0,14)	(0,15)	0,14	(0,21)	(0,22)	(0,20)	(0,17)	(0,20)	(0,23)	(0,23)	(0,12)	(0,14)
	LO	1,13	1,15	0,29	0,85	1,04	0,99	1,17	1,39	1,03	0,95	0,63	1,21	0,71
KrF	Coeff.	-0,50	0,24	-0,82	-0,18	0,34	0,19	0,07	0,14	-0,08	0,06	0,16	-0,14	0,04
	SE	(0,25)	(0,20)	(0,20)	0,21	(0,29)	(0,30)	(0,25)	(0,25)	(0,28)	(0,30)	(0,16)	(0,21)	(0,19)
	LO	0,61	1,27	0,44	0,83	1,40	1,21	1,07	1,15	0,93	1,06	1,17	0,87	1,04
V	Coeff.	-0,10	-0,04	0,12	0,01	0,30	0,34	0,33	0,20	-0,27	-0,30	-0,13	0,01	-0,09
	SE	(0,14)	(0,11)	(0,11)	0,09	(0,15)	(0,16)	(0,15)	(0,13)	(0,14)	(0,16)	(0,09)	(0,09)	(0,09)
	LO	0,90	0,96	1,13	1,01	1,35	1,40	1,39	1,22	0,76	0,74	0,88	1,01	0,92
E	Coeff.	-3,98	-3,98	-1,42	-0,56	0,40	0,89	0,54	0,03	-0,05	-0,32	0,32	-0,27	-0,15
	SE	(0,30)	(0,25)	(0,24)	0,31	(0,31)	(0,29)	(0,23)	(0,26)	(0,30)	(0,33)	(0,17)	(0,24)	(0,20)
	LO	0,02	2,93	0,24	0,57	1,49	2,43	1,72	1,03	0,95	0,72	1,37	0,76	0,86
χ^2		705,00	56,39	202,10	12,26	8,44	17,24	11,58	16,95	11,62	12,97	35,57	11,60	8,99

Notes: † reference category is vote for the Conservatives (Konservative Folkeparti-KF), significant results are presented in a bold font.

Table A.3: Multinomial Logistic Regression Results Predicting National Vote Choice as a Function of Respondents' Positions on Left-Right, Green & European Integration Scales, 2001 including Socio-Economic Controls, 2001 (Cox & Snell's Pseudo R² = .58) †

	Estimates	Left-Right	Green	EU	Income	Employment in Private Sector	Employment in Public Sector	Unskilled Worker	Skilled Worker	Managerial Worker	Manual Worker	Higher Education	Lower Education	Female
S	Coeff.	-2,16	0,41	-0,35	0,12	0,37	0,52	0,29	0,14	-0,30	-0,32	-0,25	0,45	0,05
	SE	(0,15)	(0,13)	(0,12)	(0,12)	(0,23)	(0,22)	(0,16)	(0,15)	(0,20)	(0,22)	(0,11)	(0,12)	(0,11)
	Logg odds (LO)	0,12	0,12	1,51	0,71	1,12	1,45	1,68	1,33	1,16	0,74	0,72	0,78	1,57
RV	Coeff.	-1,87	0,32	0,14	0,07	0,26	0,39	0,02	-0,15	0,01	-0,17	0,31	-0,15	0,17
	SE	(0,19)	(0,18)	(0,17)	(0,17)	(0,33)	(0,30)	(0,24)	(0,20)	(0,29)	(0,32)	(0,14)	(0,23)	(0,15)
	LO	0,15	1,38	1,15	1,07	1,30	1,48	1,03	0,86	1,01	0,85	1,36	0,86	1,18
SF	Coeff.	-2,98	0,65	-0,80	-0,18	0,52	0,59	0,18	-0,02	-0,21	-0,40	0,23	-0,26	0,17
	SE	(0,21)	(0,18)	(0,16)	(0,20)	(0,34)	(0,30)	(0,20)	(0,20)	(0,28)	(0,31)	(0,15)	(0,26)	(0,16)
	LO	0,05	1,92	0,45	0,83	1,69	1,81	1,19	0,98	0,81	0,67	1,26	0,77	1,18
DF	Coeff.	0,02	0,24	-0,98	-0,19	0,51	0,39	0,33	0,19	-0,24	-0,35	-0,27	0,30	-0,32
	SE	(0,16)	(0,14)	(0,13)	(0,14)	(0,25)	(0,24)	(0,17)	(0,16)	(0,21)	(0,25)	(0,13)	(0,13)	(0,13)
	LO	1,02	1,27	0,38	0,82	1,67	1,48	1,39	1,21	0,79	0,70	0,76	1,35	0,73
KrF	Coeff.	-1,02	0,14	-0,72	-0,31	0,60	0,72	0,11	0,11	-0,38	-0,61	0,05	0,09	0,00
	SE	(0,26)	(0,24)	(0,21)	(0,29)	(0,42)	(0,39)	(0,30)	(0,25)	(0,33)	(0,40)	(0,20)	(0,23)	(0,21)
	LO	0,36	1,15	0,49	0,73	1,82	2,06	1,12	1,11	0,69	0,55	1,05	1,09	1,00
V	Coeff.	-0,26	0,00	0,00	0,23	0,25	0,32	0,22	0,24	-0,31	-0,19	-0,17	0,17	0,09
	SE	(0,13)	(0,12)	(0,11)	(0,11)	(0,20)	(0,20)	(0,15)	(0,13)	(0,18)	(0,20)	(0,09)	(0,11)	(0,10)
	LO	0,77	1,00	1,00	1,26	1,28	1,37	1,24	1,27	0,73	0,83	0,84	1,18	1,10
E	Coeff.	-4,28	1,14	-0,95	-0,18	1,15	1,00	-0,03	-0,81	-0,65	-1,02	0,34	0,09	-0,53
	SE	(0,33)	(0,27)	(0,22)	(0,28)	(0,54)	(0,48)	(0,33)	(0,37)	(0,44)	(0,49)	(0,21)	(0,35)	(0,22)
	LO	0,01	3,12	0,39	0,83	3,14	2,71	0,97	0,45	0,52	0,36	1,41	1,09	0,59
χ^2		798,43	38,01	160,73	23,56	8,23	8,59	8,91	17,37	6,02	6,79	46,56	36,56	8,23

Notes: † reference category is vote for the Conservative People's Party (Konservative Folkeparti-KF), significant results are presented in a bold font.

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