The construction of the public identity of the antiglobalization movement in Spain.

Abstract
This paper investigates the process of configuration of the public identity of the "antiglobalization" movement (AGM). First, it analyses the process of the construction of the public identity of the movement in the media during the Spanish Presidency of the EU in 2002, through an examination of the discourses about the nature of the AGM disseminated by different actors (movement spokespeople, sympathizers, observers and opponents, including the media itself). Secondly, the paper draws on movement documents reflecting the strategies adopted both within the movement (aiming at coalition building) and towards the outside world (public opinion) in order to counteract the negative discourse propagated by the movement's opponents and to win new support.

Since Seattle, the antiglobalization movement (AGM) has received extraordinary media attention. Among other factors, the public visibility of its activities has been bound to the issue of public (dis)order. The prospects of potential violent events, fuelled by both previous experiences during international summits (G8, WTO, World Bank, EU presidencies) and increasingly intense security measures, has increased media interest in a series of international meetings which previously attracted much less coverage.

This greater media attention has operated, in turn, as an incentive for the development of alliances among a wide range of different social organizations that, in most cases, have little previous experience or tradition or cooperation in the past. This has stimulated their sense of forming part of a collectivity, of having common concerns, of sharing a more or less diffuse collective identity; and, hence, promoting the consolidation of the movement.

At the same time, the presence of the AGM in the media has increased the political costs of the physical repression of non-violent action. The experience of AGM protests since Seattle (Prague, Quebec, Barcelona, Genoa, etc.) has led to the gradual modification of the authorities' responses as well as of the strategies of the movement itself. In this sense, the locus of contention has moved (or expanded) from the streets to the symbolic domain, to a focus on the process of configuration of its public identity (or image) through public discourse. In these circumstances, it does not seem too farfetched to affirm that the future of the AGM will be decided, in the first instance, in the media battle over its public identity.

This paper investigates the process of configuration of the public identity of the AGM. First, it analyses the process of the construction of the public identity of the movement in the media during the Spanish Presidency of the EU in 2002, through an examination of
the discourses about the nature of the AGM disseminated by different actors (movement spokespeople, sympathizers, observers and opponents, including the media itself). In this respect, it will consider the extent to which the nature of the movement is the subject of debate in the media, as well as the contents and principal participants in this debate. The eventual crystallization of a public discourse favorable or unfavorable to the AGM (depicting the movement as legitimate or illegitimate) will have a decisive influence not only on the movement’s social support (or mobilization potential) but also on the formation of widespread, durable and well-rooted inter-organizational networks (coalitions) on which the antiglobalization protests rests. In this sense, and secondly, the paper draws on movement documents reflecting the strategies adopted both within the movement (aiming at coalition building) and towards the outside world (public opinion) in order to counteract the negative discourse propagated by the movement’s opponents and to win new support.

2. Social Mobilization, public identity and the mass media

The mass media play a crucial role in the collective action processes. Dependence on the media has greatly transformed the dynamics of social movements (SM) in the last third of the XX century, influencing the nature of their interactions with authorities and with the public in general (Gamson 1990; Tarrow 1998).

On the one hand, almost every aspect of the mobilization phenomenon, ranging from the recruitment of activists to the protest tactics employed, has been increasingly shaped by the media. To a great extent, SM has learned to work within a media-dominated environment. Today, Gamson’s 1990 view that challengers ignore the media as a central battleground does not seem to fit with the patterns of action of current SM’s. On the contrary, SM actors rarely fail to perceive the importance of mass communication and place great importance on their media strategies.

On the other hand, the “mediatization” of collective action has influenced the response by public authorities to contenders, altering among other questions, as Gamson rightly indicated, “the effectiveness of overt versus covert repression” (1990: 147). As the repression strategy towards the AGM shows, the resort to physical repression by authorities is accompanied by a hence unknown level of security measures during protest events, judicial measures, tactics of movement surveillance and a public portrayal of protesters as violent.

A radical transformation has occurred in the nature of the political contention performed by SMs that has enlarged the participation of the public and potential third parties, including the media, which may act as allies, opponents, or brokers (Gamson 1990; see also, Molotch 1997, Gamson y Wolfsfeld 1993). To a great extent, the fate of SMs is to be decided in the process of the social construction of reality, in which the media constitute a central arena and play a key role.

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2 As Gusfield (1970: 309-10) noted “the dependence of collective action on common interpretations of events makes the conditions of communication crucial for the emergence of social movements” (cited in Kielbowicz and Scherer 1986: 81).
3 “In postwar America, the media have become the central battleground, which challengers ignore at their peril” (Gamson 1990: 147).
4 As Kielbowicz and Scherer pointed out “press coverage can influence the nature, development, and ultimate success of social movements, a fact that leaders seldom fail to appreciate (1986: 72).
Central to the symbolic dimension of the contentious phenomenon is the process through which contenders seek to influence the public perception of the SM as a legitimate actor. This process brings us to the notion of movements’ public identity. The concept of public identity, in contrast to the interactive feature that defines the concept of collective identity, pays attention to the process through which SM actors strive to enforce their own definition of the movement in the public opinion terrain in contrast to other definitions which are simultaneously promoted by other actors, including the media.\(^5\)

In this sense, the concept of public identity refers to the general public’s perception of the movement on the basis of which opinions about movements’ legitimacy are formed and decisions to support it actively are taken. It also encompasses the “self-perception” of the movement among its diverse organizational base, influencing coalition building processes and other inter-organizational patterns of interaction.

The prevailing public identity of a SM resulting from this conflictual process will determine, in part, its level of social support (i.e. its mobilization potential) and will hence shape its opportunities to mobilize large constituencies beyond the nuclei of committed activists as well as advancing their demands to include the supralocal political agenda (see Minkoff 1997).

3. Analyzing the press discourse about movements’ public identity

This work adopts the constructivist assumption, widely accepted in political science and sociology, which considers the political phenomena as constructed through discourse. Among the diverse functions attributed to the discourse, it focuses on the strategic legitimating function, assuming that the political views about SM expressed in the discourses of different actors are part of wider and coherent strategies towards the movement (Chilton y Schäffner 2000).

From this perspective, it is possible to analyze the public identity of an SM as comprising three dimensions or components upon which the dispute about the public identity of the movement in the media focuses:

- The extent to which their demands are considered justified and well-founded;
- the level to which it is considered a representative voice of wide sectors of people; and,
- the degree to which the tactics employed are judged legitimate, which usually involves resorting to a non-violent repertoire of protest.

In this process, the media does not confine itself “to telling the story as it happened”. It does not only provide the arena in which contention takes place, but also plays the role of a crucial actor that actively participates in the configuration of public opinion, generating its own discourse and promoting or ignoring others, according to its own interests.\(^6\) In this sense, the media plays a critical role in collective action processes, not only because it tends to confer public visibility to some protests while ignoring others,

\(^5\) For a conceptual distinction of diverse notions of the identity concept see Johnston, Laraña y Gusfield 1994).

\(^6\) As Page has indicated, “certain media outlets -specially newspapers and magazines, but sometimes also television programs and networks- do not merely reflect the social and political forces around them; instead, they actively work to shape political discourse to their own purposes” (1996, p.116 ).
but also because it participates in the definition of the (legitimate) nature of protest and its proponents, and can even accomplish an active mobilizing role.

The analysis of the interaction between the media and movements has profited from the newsmaking approach’s emphasis on the importance of ideological stance, organizational routines, reporter-source relations, occupational values, etc. to explain the selection of news and its contents (Kielbowicz y Scherer 1986; Van Zonen 1992). This work takes into account two aspects of the rationale followed by journalists when selecting news and their treatment of it, which, to a large degree, shape the opportunities of SMs to influence the process of configuring their own public identity.

Firstly, the media preference for institutionalized sources limits the opportunities to access alternative discourses such as those articulated by SMs. Even when a SM enters into the media agenda, the logic governing journalistic work privileges the voices of interlocutors belonging to the more institutionalized sector of the movement or that of the allied political elite. Logically, the more a movement’s demands become the subject of party confrontation, the greater their media coverage will be. However, under these circumstances, SMs are not guaranteed control over the public formulation of their demands and their own identities.

Secondly, primacy of the exceptional over the customary and, especially, the news value of violent events (Snyder y Killy 1977, Hug y Wisler 1998, Hocke 1998) place SMs in a complicated dilemma. SMs that resort to disruptive methods increase their chances of media coverage. However, they simultaneously pave the way for the configuration of a negative public image and consequently risk losing their (potential) bases of support and allies. Furthermore, media coverage may relegate, if not neglect, the content of their demands.

Before going on to show the major results of this analysis, it is first necessary to provide a brief organizational profile of the AGM in Spain and give an account of the activities carried out during the Spanish Presidency.

4. The Antiglobalization Movement in Spain

In Spain, as in other countries, the AGM is formed by an amalgam of previously existing organizations and networks of ecologists, pacifists, development NGOs or small trade unions, as well as by a (mostly) new brand of entities whose origins are directly found in struggles against economic globalization. One of the pioneers of the latter was the “Movimiento anti-Maastricht y la Globalización Económica” (Movement against Maastricht and Economic Globalization). Founded in 1996, the Anti-Maastricht Movement was composed of diverse anti-capitalist activists linked to the ecology and peace movement, minority trade-unions (such as the anarchist CGT) and extra-parliamentary parties. Its origins can be traced back to the successful campaign against the commemoration of the 50th anniversary of the World Bank and the IMF (“¡50 Años Bastan!”– Fifty Years are Enough!) that took place in Madrid in 1994, and the

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7 In this sense, Halloran et al. (1970) showed how the media focus on a series of minor violent incidents transformed a large peaceful Londoners demonstration against the Vietnam War into a violent event.
8 Among other things, by acting itself as a mobilising structure. In their study of the “White March”, the largest demonstrations in the history of Belgium (concerning the Dutroux case), Walgrave and Manssens (2000) have showed how, in the absence of a movement organisational base, the media accomplished this function in what they call a media-driven peak mobilization.
9 For more on the AGM in Spain see Durán et al 2001; Pastor 2002; see also the website of the movement’s main organizations, among others: www.nodo50.org/maast; www.mrg-e.org; www.attac.org/es.
campaign against unemployment and the Europe from Capital during the Spanish Presidency in 1995. To a great extent, the political repertoire and the discourse of the current AGM were already present in these organizational structures. Thereafter, its activity was centered upon participation in the protests organized during diverse international summits (Copenhagen, Naples, etc.) and the organization of the Euromarches against unemployment (Amsterdam, Köln, etc.).

As in other cases, the antiglobalization activities during the second half of the 1990s were ignored by the media. The events during the WTO meeting in Seattle and the subsequent media attention given to the AGM set in motion a constituent-like process of the movement in Spain. In 2000, part of this process included renaming the Anti-Maastricht movement as the “Movimiento contra la Europa del Capital y la Globalización Económica” (Movement Against the Europe from Capital and Economic Globalization), which came to occupy a central position within the Spanish AGM. Furthermore, new antiglobalization groups sprung up, including among others the RCADE, ATTAC-Spain, and the MRG. While ATTAC-Spain is the Spanish section of the International organization, the origins of the other two groups deserve some clarification.

The RCADE, which stands for Red de Ciudadanos para la Abolición de la Deuda Externa (Citizens Network for the Abolition of the External Debt), was founded in 1999 to participate in the Jubilee 2000 international campaign. Their organizational roots date back to the mid-1990’s “Plataforma del 0.7%”, a movement that brought together church and secular associations fighting to increase aid to the Third World. On 12 March 2000, these associations organized a (non-official) referendum to cancel the debt; a referendum in which over one million voters took part.

MRG is short for “Movimiento de Resistencia Global” (Global Resistance Movement). The MRG was founded with the aim of organizing expeditions of Spanish activists to Prague in September 2000 as well as raising awareness about the negative consequences of economic globalization at the local level. Using Internet as a means of interaction, MRG groups were founded spontaneously, first in Catalonia and later all over Spain. The movement soon became a reference for the AGM at the international level and was invited to participate in the International Council of the World Social Forum. Reluctant to become a formal (static) organization, the MRG-Catalunya decided to dissolve in March 2003; a decision which reflects its rejection of “those organizational models represented by both the Social World Forum or the supposedly ‘radical’, self-referential vanguards” (MRG public report, January 2003).

Prior to the Spanish presidency, the main activities of the post-Seattle antiglobalization movement were triggered by the appointment of Barcelona for the World Bank annual meeting in June 2001. Although concerns about the planned antiglobalization protests eventually led the World Bank to cancel the meeting, the AGM decided to carry on with its planned activities. In the course of the closing march that mobilized 25,000 people, there were violent clashes between a minority of violent demonstrators and the police. The conduct of the police was questioned by protesters, journalists and local authorities. The AGM blamed infiltrated police agents for provoking the violent events in order to justify physical repression, promote a violent image of protesters and intimidate movement sympathizers.

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10 Many of them already campaigned together in 1992 under the slogan (“Desenmascaremos el 92” - Unmasking ’92) against the celebration of the 500-year anniversary of Columbus’s first landing in America (around events such as the World Expo of Seville).
11 In 1994 the movement organized solidarity camps, occupying the streets of many Spanish cities.
12 The AGM blamed infiltrated police agents for provoking the violent events in order to justify physical repression, promote a violent image of protesters and intimidate movement sympathizers.
on the main official meetings held in Spain, namely the European Councils in Barcelona (March 15-16) and Seville (June 21-22). In Barcelona, the antiglobalization front was articulated around three different platforms: “La Campanya contra la Europa del Capital y de la Guerra” (Campaign Against the Europe from Capital and the War) was the chief proponent of the alternative summit, including the mass demonstration held on March 16th which was joined by the other two existing platforms: The Foro Social de Barcelona (FSB), made up of traditional left-wing parties including the PSC (Catalan branch of the PSOE which held office in the city council) and the peak trade-unions (CCOO and UGT), and the Plataforma Catalana. Among other independent political forces, the latter included the Basque Batasuna. This circumstance allowed the Spanish Government, and the media under its control, to articulate a discourse that associated the entire AGM and the protesters to violence and terrorism.

In Seville, the AGM campaigned around a single platform called the Foro Social de Sevilla (FSS) composed of ecologists, anti-war activists, students, feminists, neighborhood associations, minority trade unions (such as the CGT or SOC) and left-wing parties such as IU or Los Verdes. In Seville neither the PSOE nor the majority trade unions formed part of the antiglobalization platform.

The main AGM actions during the Spanish Presidency were characterized by a theretofore unheard of level of participation as well as by the absence of any (remarkable) violent episodes. As shown in the following analysis, these circumstances reinforced the configuration of a positive image of the AGM within Spanish public opinion, despite the strategy of delegitimization pursued by the Spanish Government and the Partido Popular (PP).

After the Presidency, the anti-war campaign concentrated the most visible efforts of the AGM, being as in other places, the main promoter of the successful 15-feb international demonstration.

5. Press coverage of the Spanish Presidency of the EU

This work focuses on two different units of analysis: (a) news about the Spanish Presidency of the EU (NSPE) and (b) statements about the nature of the AGM contained in the former. The analyses presented in this section focus on the NSPE, defined as those news items which either dealt with the organization of political events and/or the political agenda and the political decision-making process linked to the Spanish Presidency of the EU in 2002, or news regarding the activities of the AGM in the context of the Spanish Presidency. This definition of the NSPE encompasses a wide range of reviews and opinion articles published in the newspaper. The sample comprises all the NSPE published in the daily issue of El País (the electronic version) from December 16, 2001 to July 15, 2002. It includes the national edition as well as the regional editions of Catalonia and Andalusia. The inclusion of these two regional editions permits an in-depth examination of the coverage of the two main events.

13 For more on the AGM activities during the Barcelona Council see www.pangea.org/campaya UE; in Seville see www.forosocialsevilla.org.
14 “La Campanya” included ecologists, anti-war activists, development NGOs, left-wing parties, and antiglobalization groups like the MRG or RCADE, among others.
15 Of the different organisations associated to protesters, Batasuna was the most frequently mentioned entity in the total sample of NSPE.
16 In Barcelona the police used force on occasion and 94 people were detained. 300,000 people participated in the main demonstration march. In Seville, the number of participants was also very high (100,000), with only 3 people arrested. In Madrid, another 100,000 people participated in the demonstration organized during the EU-Latin America summit in May.
17 The discourse analysis presented in this work is based on a semantic level. For more on the study of news as discourse, see van Dijk 1996.
occuring during the Spanish semester of the EU: the Councils of Prime Ministers and Heads of State held in Barcelona and Seville. In all, 610 NSPE have been selected and codified from 210 daily editions. A little over half (53%) were published in sections of the national edition (Internacional, España, Sociedad, etc.) while the remaining 15% and 32% were taken from the Catalanian and Andalusian sections, respectively.\(^{18}\) The analysis in the next section (section 6) focuses on statements or pieces of discourse contained in the 610 NSPE regarding the identity of the AGM. In 138 NSPE (23%) at least one actor has been found to define the nature of the AGM.

This section presents data about the level of press coverage of the EU Presidency in El País and considers the number of news items and the type of issues that attained greater media attention. These results permit an initial assessment of the presence of the AGM and its demands in the media agenda.

**Figure 1. Evolution of press coverage of the Spanish Presidency in El País**

VOIR ANNEXE 1

Figure 1 reflects the distribution of NSEP over a seven month period. As expected, there was a greater number of news items during the two European Councils held in Barcelona and Seville. News reported in the regional sections focus (almost exclusively) on these two events, thus rising the informative peaks of March and June. The increase in the number of NSEP in May reflects the EU-Latin America and Caribbean Summit held in Madrid (May 17-18).\(^{19}\)

As the evolution in the number of NSPE over time clearly indicates, the three main political events were the cornerstone of the Spanish semester of the EU. It can be also expected that the issues covered in the news reflect the contents of the political agenda of those meetings. However, as shown below, the media agenda and the political agenda only overlapped to a certain degree.

As far as the political agenda is concerned, the Spanish Government gave priority to the fight against terrorism (European security policy), progress towards the liberalization process, economic modernization and the Euro, the enlargement of Eastern Europe, the reform of European institutions, and the strengthening of European foreign policy.\(^{20}\) Nevertheless, as a consequence of changes in the economic and political setting, these priorities changed over the course of the semester, placing, for instance, immigration policy at the top of the agenda during the Council held in Seville at the close of the semester.\(^{21}\)

In addition to the topics included in the political agenda, it would be expected that much attention be paid in the media agenda to issues related to the organizational

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\(^{18}\) The varying amount of NSEP in the two regional sections can be partly explained by the fact that the Seville summit took place at the end of the Spanish Presidency, and was consequently more newsworthy for a longer period of time. However, it might also be due to factors related to differences in the two regional editions; for instance, the different level of access enjoyed by the AGM in each case.

\(^{19}\) According to the police, a total of 212 political events took place during the Spanish Presidency (Nieto 2002).

\(^{20}\) Priorities outlined by the Foreign Affairs Ministry at the opening of the Presidency (J. Piqué, January 2, 2002 issue of El País).

\(^{21}\) Liberalization of the energy sector was one of the main issues dealt with during the Barcelona Council. In Seville, however, apart from the above-mentioned immigration policy, the main issues included institutional reform, EU enlargement and the Stability and Growth Pact (see the interview with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, J. Pique, published in El País on June 19, 2002).
aspects of the European Councils. Moreover, it also seems reasonable to find domestic policy matters among the contents of the NSPE.

Table 1 shows the frequency of the main issues covered by El País. The different categories of topics are ranked in decreasing order, according to the percentage of the NSPE in which they appear. The data in the right-hand column indicate the total extension in number of words of the NSPE in which each of the issues was codified as the chief issue.

As expected, issues related to the organization of the Presidency, were, in fact, more frequently and more extensively covered in the pages of El País. Likewise, issues regarding domestic policy appeared frequently in the NSPE. The table also reflects the political priorities of the Presidency agenda. Thus, in addition to immigration control, the results show that topics related to EU foreign affairs (with the Near-East conflict and the EU-Latin America trade relations at the top of the list) or the institutional reform of the EU were covered more frequently and more extensively. However, in terms of both number of news items and number of words, the topics that attained greater media attention were two issues directly related to the AGM: the security policy during the Councils and the debate about the negative effects of the current course of economic globalization (usually from the angle of European construction).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issues</th>
<th>Percentage of NSPE</th>
<th>Extension (total number of words of NSPE)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Organization of the Spanish Presidency</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>82178</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Security &amp; Public Order during the Presidency</td>
<td>37.0</td>
<td>77291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Alternative Globalization</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>31245</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Policy Affairs</td>
<td>12.0</td>
<td>21254</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Justice and Home Affairs (immigration)</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>23789</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>External Relations and Trade</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>27046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU Institutional Reform</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>21007</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Liberalization (energy sector)</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7497</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic and Monetary Policies</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>6491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Affairs and Security Policy</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UE Enlargement</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>7656</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>16.5</td>
<td>25047</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of issues</strong></td>
<td><strong>170.6</strong></td>
<td><strong>338682</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total number of news items</strong></td>
<td><strong>610</strong></td>
<td><strong>610</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results suggest that the presence of the AGM in the media, or at least in El País, also encompassed the movement’s demands. The fact that almost two out of ten NSPE questioned the actual pattern of globalization (viewing the process of Europeanization as governed by the same logic) is a clear sign of the high degree to which the antiglobalization critique penetrated the media agenda. Moreover, the wide coverage of this debate in the newspaper’s national sections seems to indicate that El País considered it a topic of general interest. The large number of opinion articles dealing with this topic (30% of the opinion articles and editorials) indicates that the debate on globalization was going through a phase of public opinion configuration.

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22 A maximum of three issues were codified for each NSPE. The criteria used to select the main issue of each NSPE was based on headlines and the relative extension of each issue.

23 As in the case of issues like the French national elections, the labor policy reform proposed by the Spanish Government or the confrontation between Aznar and Zapatero.
The great amount of attention paid to the question of security during the Councils, not only confirms the newsworthiness of issues related to public order, but also highlights the avenue through which the AGM was gaining access to the media. Likewise, it reveals the importance that the issue of violence had in configuring the movement’s public image. The presence of the AGM in El País was remarkable: 84% of the total NSPE included, directly or indirectly, references to the movement. It is also clear that this access to the media was linked to the potential occurrence of violent events: 67% of the total number of NSPE mentioned protests promoted in the past or announced by the AGM.

The high level of media attention given to the AGM can be interpreted as being indicative of an ongoing process of public identity construction. A process that its fuelled by (preventing) the repressive response of authorities and by the inclusion of the antiglobalization critique in the discourse of institutionalized political actors (left-wing parties and unions). An analysis of the set of NSPE in which references were made to the nature of the movement sheds some light on the main focus of the discourse of various actors regarding the AGM and permits us to draw a map of the movement’s allies and opponents.

6. Construction of the AGM’s public identity

Repeated references to the AGM in the pages of El País did not always involve discourses about its nature. Notwithstanding, almost one-forth of the NSPE (138 NPE) included discursive elements that can be considered part of a broader process of construction of the movement’s public identity. Among these NSPE, 51 were published in the national section, 33 in the Catalan section and 56 in the Andalusian section, respectively representing 15%, 36% and 39% of the total volume of news items codified from each of the three editions.

7.1. Evolution over time

Figure 2 shows the fortnightly evolution in the number of NSPE containing statements or discursive elements about the identity of the AGM. The colored segment in the columns refer to the section in which the news items appeared.

**Figure 2. Evolution of NSPE regarding the public identity of the AGM**

As expected, the process of constructing the movement’s public image was concentrated in the periods of greater media activity of March and June. However, in relative terms, it was more intense during the first European Council in Barcelona. Thus, despite that the total number of NSPE was greater during the second half of the Presidency (see Figure 1), the debate about the nature of the AGM was more fervent and attained more coverage on the national level in March. Thereafter, the intensity of the process decreased, losing national relevance. These results suggest that the Barcelona Council was a decisive moment in the process of construction of the AGM’s public identity during the Spanish Presidency.

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24 This percentage is a result of condensing the 40% of the NSPE in which the movement is directly mentioned with the 45% of the NSPE in which there is an indirect reference to the movement, its protest activities or members. References to the AGM drop to 48% in the NSPE published in the national sections.
In the course of the Council of Barcelona, the AGM proved to have an enormous capacity for mobilization. Together with the demonstration in Genoa in June 2001, it was the largest antiglobalization demonstration in the history of the movement. But apart from the sheer number of participants, the positive assessment of this event hinged on the absence of (important) violent incidents and the capacity of the organizers (especially sectors linked to La Campanya) to offer a non-violent image of the movement. Obviously, this image was either strengthened or ignored according to the ideological leanings of the various media sources. Those sympathizing with the movement, such as El País, stressed the peaceful nature of the demonstration, while minimizing the violent incidents. In contrast, conservative media and public TV channels paid less attention to the AGM and instead concentrated on the violent events.

In any case, it seems clear the Barcelona meeting furthered the arguments of those actors who transmitted a positive image of the antiglobalizers. Furthermore, the fact that Batasuna was not among the organizers of the following alternative summit in Seville, weakened the justification of opponents to the movement who described it as violent and paved the way for the movement's positive image among the Spanish public.

The depiction of Barcelona as a decisive moment in the public debate about the nature of the AGM is reinforced by a more detailed analysis of the data. Thus in March, a greater amount of NSPE referred to the movement and a larger number of actors talked about it (i.e. defining it). Thereafter, although the Seville Council was again a motive for numerous references to the movement, these allusions did not involve, as often as in the previous summit, judgments about the nature of the AGM.

7.2 Dimensions of the movement’s public identity

Three dimensions of the discourses about the AGM’s public identity can be distinguished: its violent-peaceful nature, the degree of representation, and the extent to which their demands (and alternatives) are considered reasonable and knowledgeable. These three dimensions can be considered part of intentional strategies by different actors to publicly legitimate or censure the movement. The three dimensions turned out to be recurrently part of the discourses analyzed. Thus, 55% of the actors who expressed an opinion about the AGM referred to the issue of violence, another 42% discussed its representative nature, and 41% assessed the content of their complaints and alternatives. Figure 3 shows the monthly evolution of the number of actors who dealt with each of these three discourse dimensions.

Figure 3. Evolution of three dimensions in the discourse about the AGM
VOIR ANNEXE 3

In relative terms, the attention paid to each of the dimensions is constant over time, although a slight increase was seen in the number of discourses that dealt with the extent to which the demands of the AGM were properly set forth.

7.3. Actors participating in the process of construction of the public identity of the AGM.

Table 2 indicates the relative weight of different categories of actors who took part in the media struggle to define the AGM’s public image. The two columns give the percentages of the total number of opinions expressed in the NSPE in the total data set and in the sub-sample of the NSPE published in the national edition.

25 For more on the diverse coverage of this demonstration in the press see the March 18th issue of El País. For more on TV coverage see Durán 2002.
Access to the newspaper pages differs for each of the different types of actors. This fact reflects two circumstances which traditionally take place in newsmaking approaches. First, as the results suggest, newspapers perform an active role in configuring public opinion. 21% of the time, statements are made by journalists about the movement’s identity. If we add this percentage to the statements made by newspaper columnists, a total of 37% of the actors do so (appearing in almost 50% of the NSPE). The preponderant role of the newspaper as a constructor of the AGM’s public identity becomes still more evident if we look at the results for the national edition sub-sample where 50% of all the actors who discussed the movement make judgments regarding its nature.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of actor</th>
<th>Total sample</th>
<th>National edition</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>El País (staff)</td>
<td>20.8</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion 1 (editors and newspaper columnists)</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion 2</td>
<td>8.9</td>
<td>3.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Political party representatives</td>
<td>32.1</td>
<td>38.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SMs</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (168)</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0 (63)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Percentages refer to the total number of actors. In each NSPE a maximum number of 4 actors were codified.

Second, these results also confirm the greater level of access enjoyed by institutionalized actors than those linked to the social movement sector. The former include members of the PSOE who are given priority over members the Government, or even members of minor opposition parties such as Izquierda Unida. Institutionalized actors constituted one-third of the total (almost 40% in the national pages); a relatively high percentage which indicates that the discourse about the AGM has been incorporated into the arena of political confrontation. Despite the fact that the presence of representatives of the AGM in the debate (13% and 8% respectively in the total and national data sets) is quite low, it still reflects a notable level of initial coverage by El País.

7.4 The AGM and the construction of public identity: Allies and Opponents

The issue of the violent or peaceful nature of the movement clearly illustrates the stances held by the various actors. Table 3 shows the distribution of three different stances in relation to this issue for different categories of actors. In contrast to Table 2, El País and Opinion 1 are joined under the heading of “El País”, while the “Opinion” category corresponds to “Opinion 2” of the previous table. The “institutionalised actors” category has been broken down into several categories by party affiliation. The institutions that do not ascribe to a particular political party and which act as mediators (i.e. judicial institutions and the Ombudsman) are grouped under the heading of “intermediary actors”. As mentioned above, the controversy over the violent character

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26 In the case of non-sympathetic newspapers, less access by the AGM is to be expected.
27 A more detailed analysis can be found in (Jiménez y Alcalde 2003).
of the AGM was the most recurrent feature in the process of constructing public identity with a total of 93 judgments recorded (55% of the total opinions codified). The two right-hand columns of the table respectively represent the total number of opinions and the percentage of the total opinions expressed by the actors in each category. These percentages indicate, therefore, the importance given by each type of actor to the issue of violence within their broader discourses about the AGM.

### Table 3. Discourses about the violent-peaceful nature of the AGM in *El País*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Actors (% of file)</th>
<th>“The AGM...”</th>
<th>“...includes a violent minority”</th>
<th>“...is peaceful”</th>
<th>Number of statements in each category (% of the total number of statements)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><em>El País</em> (staff, editorials and columnists)</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>55.2</td>
<td>41.4</td>
<td>29 (46.8)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Opinion (articles and readers’ letters)</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>50.0</td>
<td>37.5</td>
<td>8 (53.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Government / PP</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>47.4</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>19 (82.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PSOE</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>58.3</td>
<td>41.7</td>
<td>12 (66.7)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IU</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>1 (33.3)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CiU</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>8 (36.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AGM</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>87.5</td>
<td>8 (36.4)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other SMs</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5 (62.5)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediary actors</td>
<td>66.7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>33.3</td>
<td>3 (60.0)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>28.6</td>
<td>42.9</td>
<td>7 (63.6)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total (or mean)</td>
<td><strong>17.2</strong></td>
<td><strong>41.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>40.9</strong></td>
<td><strong>93 (55.4)</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As mentioned above, a larger number of references to the violent nature of the AGM were made by *El País*, followed by the Government and the PSOE. While *El País* was the actor that spoke more often about the AGM, independently of the dimension at stake, the discourse of actors linked either to the Government or to the PSOE focused on the issue of violence. As can be observed in Table 3, 82% and 66% of the interlocutors respectively associated to the Government and to the PSOE dealt with the issue of the violent nature of the AGM.

The percentages in the three central columns show the distribution of the total number of statements (93). These include those that defined the AGM as essentially violent, as including a minority violent sector, or as essentially peaceful. In 42% of the cases, the discourse depicted the AGM as including a minority of violent components. In a similar number of cases the movement is portrayed as essentially peaceful, while only 17% of the speakers disseminated a violent image of the movement. Based on this general data, a clear map can be drawn up regarding the allies and opponents of the AGM in the process of building its public image. Although *El País* did not show a clear interest for the AGM phenomena, it did oppose the discourse that links it (as a whole) to violence as demonstrated by statements published in the opinions sections. The slight increase in the relative number of cases defining the movement as violent can be attributed to the nature of this section, theoretically more open to positions which diverge from the editorial line of the newspaper. In sum, it can be said that, although *El País* seems to reject the idea of the movement as a violent phenomenon, the newspaper adopted a rather ambiguous stance on this issue. In all likelihood the newspaper’s main aim was not to clarify the peaceful or violent nature of the movement, nor did it seem to have a major interest in debating the legitimacy of the civil disobedience tactics employed by the AGM. On the contrary, the principal goal of the newspaper was to disseminate a negative (antidemocratic) image of the conservative government. In this sense, the newspaper’s general discourse endorsed
the stance adopted by the PSOE. Therefore, the data clearly shows how the process of configuring the public image of the movement formed part of a strategy of party confrontation.

El País' coverage of declarations by the Government underlined the latter's discourse that linked the AGM and demonstrators to violence and public disorder. Declarations by the CiU (conservative Catalonian party holding office in the regional Government) and by (pro-Government) actors in the Justice administration were in line with the Government's stance. In clear contrast to this discourse, El País gave preference to declarations coming from the ranks of the PSOE. Again, the discourse of the PSOE focused on the right of Spanish citizens to demonstrate during the Council, thus opposing the Government discourse that equated a large part of the Spanish citizenry with terrorists. However, the newspaper did avoid the trickier question of the legitimacy of the AGM.28

During the weeks prior to the Council of Barcelona, Batasuna's participation in one of the three platforms created to contest the summit was a recurrent issue in the Government's arguments to criminalize the AGM.29 El País, however, repeatedly condemned this strategy of criminalization in its pages (47% of the actors describing the nature of the movement also referred to the existence of such a strategy at work). These complaints came more frequently from the rank of the AGM and close allies (i.e. actors from Izquierda Unida and other SMs, but also from institutional mediators such as the Ombudsman).

Returning to Table 1, the party leanings of El País are also reflected in the limited coverage of statements coming from representatives of Izquierda Unida. This party (itself involved in several antiglobalization platforms) received less attention than actors from the social movement sector. The remaining categories are mainly composed of allies of different types who played a clear role in legitimizing the AGM.

The map of allies and antagonists of the AGM remains practically constant throughout the analysis of other dimensions of the discourse on identity. Only two differences deserve to be pointed out. First, as previously mentioned, the two major political parties centered their discourses on the debate about the violent nature of the movement and did not often enter into the debate about the movement's proposals or its legitimacy as a representative of a broad sector of excluded people and/or interests.

Second, aside from El País, the AGM was the actor that more actively defended the informed nature of the criticism aimed at the actual patterns of globalization. On the one hand, these results reflect the strategy of the movement to introduce their demands into the public debate and, on the other hand, they also indicate that the number of allies who back their demands and proposals is much more reduced.

8. AGM's Media Strategy

28 The PSOE's strategy of approaching the sphere of social movements became evident during the antiglobalization campaigns in 2002. In fact, in Barcelona the PSOE-PSC formed part of the Foro Social de Barcelona and in Seville the organizers received a fair amount of support from the socialist Regional Government; a strategy that became even clearer during the anti-war protests in 2003. Despite its profound Europeanist identity and its weak links to the alternative SM sector, the PSOE's support of the mobilizations promoted by the AGM can be explained, to a large extent, by the electoral necessity to gain part of the votes of an increasingly mobilized sectors of Spaniards who opposed the reforms proposed by the conservative government (education, unemployment, immigration, or later the Iraq war).

29 The Government blamed the PSC for “going hand in hand with Batasuna” in the demonstrations announced during the Barcelona summit.
Figure 4 shows the distribution of statements made by the AGM according to the analysis of the three dimensions of its public identity. 

VOIR ANNEXE 4

As can be observed, the movement’s interlocutors concentrated their discourse on the (informed and legitimate) nature of their demands. However, when translated into absolute terms that percentage stands for only 13 statements, less than 6% of all the pieces of discourse registered during the period analyzed. The communication and press committees of both La Campanya and the FSS underlined this fact:

“The media were more interested in the events (data about the number of persons in the campsite, participation in the protest events) than in the alternative ideas debated in conferences and workshops. This situation is illustrated by the attitude of journalists during the press conference on the 22nd during who, while prestigious personalities like Eric Toussaint or Paul Nicholson were speaking, preferred to leave the conference room to interrogate one of the Foro’s spokesperson about the details of the demonstration that was to take place a few hours later” (…) The media have covered the opinion of the FSS, mainly through press releases in which substantial information was displaced in favor of factual data”.

(Comisión de Comunicación y Prensa, FSS, Report July 10, 2002)

“After the massive demonstration of 16th March we have the impression that the media treatment has been correct, although the messages have lost force. It has been hard to face the resources of the FSB, which has tried to present the success as ‘its own achievement’. We made a enormous effort to counteract the strategy of criminalization; as a consequence we have been portrayed as the most civic movement, but at the cost of losing the substantial message (against the Europe from Capital)”

(Campanya contra l’Europa del Capital, Assembly minutes, March, 2002)

In both cases, the AGM’s perception about its capacity to get their message into the media discourse reflect the dilemmas and challenges that the functioning logic of the media imposed on SMs. In this sense, both assessments confirm and complement previous findings about the nature of SM-media interaction. Concerning the media preference for institutionalized sources of information, La Campaya’s considerations clearly reflect how the presence of the PSOE and other institutionalized actors in the FSB diminished the media coverage of the AGM’s core organizations.

Furthermore, the newsworthiness of (potential) violent events is clearly perceived by the AGM. In the case of La Campanya, all the protest actions during the Barcelona Council that took place in the presence of police were covered by El País. During the organizing phase prior to the EU Councils, both La Campanya and FSS worked intensely to pact the format and content of their protest activities with the authorities. La Campanya not only organized their own security service during the large demonstrations, but also managed to convince radical organizations, such as those integrated in La Plataforma Independentista, to participate in the negotiation meetings with the police authorities.

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30 This information is based on contrasting protest events codified from the NSPE in El País, and La Campanya’s report of activities (La Campanya, March 2002).
The absence of violence in Barcelona reduced the prospect for violent acts in Seville. This circumstance is considered by the FSS to be the main factor explaining the limited attention paid by the national media to the AGM activities during the Council in Seville (as shown in Figure 2).

"The protest actions and opinions of the FSS have had a notable echo in the local and the regional press, but not in the national press (...) The same occurred with respect to the coverage on TV (...) It seems that the limited attention paid by the national press was due to the absence of violence".

(Comisión de Comunicación y Prensa, FSS, Report July 10, 2002)

In this sense, the success of the efforts by the AGM to counter the strategy of criminalization deployed by the Government not only diverted the resources aimed at calling attention to the movement’s demands in the media, but also to the extent to which the AGM put forward a positive image in Barcelona, thereby leading to a drop in the attention paid to the movement by the (national) media.

9. Conclusion

The AGM media coverage has been bound to the issue of violence, as shown by the high number of NSPE regarding the security measures during the European Councils and by the repeated references to the AGM. In part, media interest has been exacerbated by the police-based response to the AGM. However, this circumstance has not prevented the debate about the consequences of current patterns of economic globalization from being included in the media and political agendas. From this general perspective, the success of the AGM is unquestionable. Furthermore, albeit to a different degree, traditional left-wing parties have incorporated the critiques and demands of the AGM into their discourse.

In turn, these two different institutional responses to the AGM, the “repressive one” based on the security discourse and the “assimilative one” that, at the discourse level, incorporates the movement’s critiques into the dynamics of party competition, have intensified the process of constructing the public identity of the movement. In this context, during the Spanish Presidency the AGM managed to find a balance between a wide number and variety of actors from such established political sectors as the PSOE or radical groups; a circumstance which permitted the movement to counteract the criminalization strategy pursued by the Government. Eventually, the absence of violence seemed to consolidate a positive image of the movement. However, it also seemed to lead the AGM towards a new scenario where consolidation appears to be conditioned by the successful confrontation of new challenges. In part, the success of the AGM seems to depend on its ability to deploy new forms of action (including certain forms of civil disobedience) and its capacity to turn into a valid interlocutor in the political arena.

First, to a great extent the visibility and organizational growth of the AGM have been based on its capacity to block the normal development of international political meetings. But this has also bounded its public visibility to these events where the media tends to center its attention on violent occurrences. As the previous analysis indicates, the media coverage of the movement’s demands and proposals did not correspond to the organizational efforts invested by the organizers of the protest. At the same time, the low prospect for violent incidents in Seville reduced the news value of the AGM’s activities to the local scope. Beyond the Spanish case, the same “positive” evolution can be observed from a general perspective. Despite its heterogeneity, the AGM has rejected violent form of protests, supporting non-violent social resistance tactics (see
the Chart of Principles approved by the World Social Forum Organizing Committee in 2001; http://www.fsmt.org.co/eng-carta.htm).

Second, the AGM has triggered a broad debate about the consequences of the prevailing globalization model. The more civic the AGM appears to be before public opinion, the greater the incentive for institutionalized actors to approach the movement and act as “interlocutors” for a growing number of sympathizers. As the previous analysis has shown, despite the inclusion of the issue of globalization in the media and political agendas, the AGM is encountering great difficulties for participation in the debate. The movement’s cautions concerning the relationship with political parties is reflected in their formal exclusion from the World Social Forum. Notwithstanding, the presence of political parties is a reality with which the movement has to deal with (as the workshop on parties-movement relationships celebrated during the European Social Forum in Florence indicates).

References


