Assessing deliberation in European Parliament – Building up an extended measurement instrument

Paper to be presented at the International Conference Making Parliament speak, Paris, 13-14 October

Lea Roger, Helmut-Schmidt-University, Hamburg

Abstract

Deliberation is in the heart of Parliamentary work. Arguing – and not bargaining – should dominate the parliamentary decision-making process. According to the Habermasian understanding of deliberation, arguing is subject to validity claims, implying that the speaker has to be truthful. However, up to now empirical research did not strive to verify the sincerity of an actor. In this paper, I develop a measurement instrument to assess the quality of deliberation in European Parliament, including actors' motivations. The instrument combines interviews with the actors of debate based on Naurin (2007) with a revised version of the discourse quality index (DQI) developed by Steenbergen et al. (2003). Thus, the instrument permits to measure the quality of deliberation with respect to all its components, including actors' motivations in parliamentary forums as well as in informal communications.

Introduction[1]

From a normative point of view, deliberation is in the heart of parliamentary work.[2] Thus, arguing – and not bargaining – should dominate the parliamentary decision-making process. Decisions should be reached in the debate, through the rational exchange of impartial arguments. Participants have to account for their preferences by giving reasons. Decisions are made by the "unforced force of better argument" (Habermas 1999: 53). As Steenbergen et al. (2003: 1) put it, deliberation is a process in which "political actors listen to each other, reasonably justify their positions, show mutual respect, and are willing to re-evaluate and eventually revise their initial preferences trough a process of discourse about competing validity claims." Thus, compared to the method of aggregation in voting procedures, decisions that come out of deliberation are assumed to be better reasoned and more legitimate. Decisions are based on reasons (*high quality decisions*) and minorities can't be outvoted but their arguments have to be considered (*legitimacy*). (Manin 1987: 359f.)

However, despite the importance that is accorded to deliberation in legislative activities in normative concepts (see Gutmann/Thompson 1996, Bessette 1994, Habermas 1996), only few studies tried to analyse deliberation in legislative settings empirically (for the first study, see Elster 1991). The most important and successful work has been undertaken by Steiner et al. (2004) in their study of deliberation in different parliamentary settings. Based on the Habermasian concept of deliberation, they developed the Discourse Quality Index (Steenbergen et al. 2003), an empirical instrument that allows measuring the quality of deliberation. The DQI is composed of five different categories, measured through different indicators: (1) Participation (2) Justification (3) Common good (4) Respect (5) Constructive politics (that is, the willingness of participants to reach at least compromise solutions) and, finally, (6) authenticity. The aim of DQI is to measure a continuum of deliberation that ranges from no deliberation (if categories are not found) to the ideal discourse. The unit of analysis is a speech act, only relevant parts are coded. The higher the code assigned to the speech act, the better the quality of deliberation is.

While the DQI met the support from diverse deliberative theorists (Thompson 2008), including Habermas who writes that the DQI captures "essential features of proper deliberation" (Habermas in Bächtiger et al. 2010a), the instrument was also subjected to numerous critics since it is limited to the Habermasian concept of deliberation. Thus, DQI does not take into account the critics formulated by other deliberative theorists on the Habermasian concept of deliberation. In view of the critics, the Habermasian model of deliberation is too restrained, excluding other groups in focusing on rational, impartial communication. To ensure equal participation, it was argued, other forms of communication such as storytelling, rhetoric and humour should be admitted (Sanders 1997, Young 1996). Jane Mansbridge (2010), together with James Bohman, Simone Chambers, David Estlund and other deliberative theorists, even extended the concept of deliberation to the inclusion of self-interest and some forms of bargaining in deliberation: "Including self-interest in deliberative democracy", they argue, "reduces the possibility of exploitation and obfuscation, introduces information that facilitates reasonable solutions and the identification of integrative outcomes, and also motivates vigorous and creative deliberation." (Mansbridge et al. 2010: 72-73)

Responding to the critics, Bächtiger et al. (2010a) considered the "Blind spots" of the DQI and discussed possibilities on how to include the critics in the measurement instrument. Whereas they recognize that the model of rational discourse describes an ideal, this does not preclude, in their view, the use of "ideal deliberation as an evaluative benchmark." (Bächtiger et al. 2010a: 37) Taking into account the arguments advanced, they propose to differentiate two types of deliberation: Type I deliberation, characterized by the Habermasian logic of communicative action and aimed to reach

---

[1] I am grateful to André Bächtiger and Gary S. Schaal for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
[2] For the bases of deliberative theory, see Jürgen Habermas (1992, 1999). For alternative concepts of deliberation, see Amy Gutmann and Dennis Thompson (1996), James Bohman (1996) and John Dryzek (2000).

a consensus in rational discourse via the "unforced force of the better argument." And – acknowledging the limits of ideal deliberation - Type II deliberation, that includes other forms of communication, such as storytelling, rhetoric and even bargaining (Bächtiger et al. 2010a). In a recent study of two parliamentary debates in the Swiss first chamber, Bächtiger et al. (2010b) developed a Discourse Quality Index including components of Type II deliberation. The research group was then able to distinguish different "discourse types" that ranges from the ideal rational discourse where all "Type I –Deliberation" components are fulfilled to the "Proto-Discourse", catching every-day-communication.

The distinction of different discourse types allows to better explore the link between deliberation and outcomes and gives us a more sophisticated insight in policy-making process, being able to clearer distinguish between different dimensions of deliberation as well as other forms of communication, such as negotiation. It also permits to include some "Type-II"-Features and thus to distinguish different forms of deliberation (e.g. deliberative negotiation, see Mansbrige 2009).

However, bearing in mind the normative bases of deliberation, the extension of the concept confronts us with the problem of *concept-stretching* (for the concept, see Sartori 1970): If even bargaining and self-interest are included, how shall we distinguish discourse from other forms of communication? Bächtiger et al. (2010a) recognize the problem when they write: "One danger is that almost every communicative action may qualify as 'deliberative'" (see also Steiner 2008). In order not to "cover more […] only by saying less, and by saying less in a far less precise matter" (Sartori 1970: 1035), we should concentrate on the main features of deliberation and in particular on the rational exchange of arguments.

The distinction of different discourse types may help to clarify policy-making processes. However, the objective of my study is a different one: My analysis is aimed to assess the quality of deliberation in the European Parliament. Therefore, what I am interested in is not to explore the relationship between political processes and policy outcomes, neither to analyse all communication in policy-making, but to discover *when* and *under what circumstances* high quality deliberation takes place in parliamentary debates. To this end, it is sufficient and – in order to avoid conceptual stretching – necessary to focus on the main concept of deliberation (that is the exchange of impartial arguments). I assume that deliberation is a distinctive feature of good (in a normative point of view) and efficient (in a functional point of view) parliamentary work.[3] Being able to distinguish different discourse types adds nothing to my research question. That is why I decided to limit my analysis to the analysis of the quality of deliberation (as done with first DQI) and not to include non-deliberative elements of communication, such as bargaining or self-interest.

In my study, I use an extended and adapted "Type- I" - Discourse Quality Index to assess the different components of deliberation, such as free participation, mutual respect, sophisticated justification and common-good-orientation. I will not stay with the "first version", but pick up some of the critics and remarks that have been made in the last years without however including any form of negotiation. One important result that has to be taken into account is the fact that deliberation is not *uni*-dimensional but *multi*-dimensional (Bächtiger et al. 2010b). Following the argument, I assume that some components of deliberation can be on a high level, whereas others – at the same moment – are quite low. In my analysis, I do not correlate an index "Quality of Deliberation" with different sociological, institutional and cultural factors that may influence deliberation, but rather correlate the individual components of deliberation with the variables.

---

[3] Here, I refer to the argument of John Madison, saying that – in case number and variety of groups is great - „a coalition of a majority of the whole society could seldom take place on any other principles than those of justice and the general good." (see Madison cited in Bessette 1994: 27). Deliberation and efficiency are assumed to be *unidirectional*. However, the argument is controversial (for an extensive discussion of the relationship between arguing/bargaining and efficiency, see Neyer 1994). In some situations, bargaining may be the more efficient way of decision-making. The question needs to be further explored.

Discourse Quality Index

One key component of deliberation is free and equal participation. Following Steenbergen et al. (2003), the indicator "participation" captures the speaker's ability to take part in the debate without being interrupted.

Participation

1a - Participation (constraints)

(0) The speaker indicates that he or she is constrained.

(1) The speaker does not indicate that he or she is constrained by the behaviour of other participants.

However, not being interrupted not necessarily signifies that deliberation is free and equal. As Lynn Sanders (1997) demonstrates in her analysis of American Citizen Jury's, the domination of opinion leaders in the debate might also bias participation. Following Thompson (2008: 507) who argues that coding interruptions might not be enough to measure participation, I also test the frequency of participation of individual group members (Stromer-Galley 2007). As Tamvaki/Lord (2010) pointed out in their analysis of European Parliament, even though formal participation *de jure* is laid out in Parliament's internal organisational and operational rules, *de facto* equality of participation might be biased and has to be included in the analysis.

1b - Participation (frequency)

Possible numbers of speaker variables to be tested are nationality, gender, political affiliation, position (e.g. Group president, National Delegation Leader etc.), age, years served and so on. Additionally, I test the inclusion of a wide range of opinions via an indicator "Ideology" (for measurement, see Hix et al. 2006, McElroy 2006).

Level of justification

Since the aim of deliberation is consensus, the level of justification is central. In this perspective, successful communication requires the justification of validity claims. In raising a validity claim, the speaker affirms that a certain claim meets the conditions for its validity (Habermas 1996: 65). Arguing is used to obtain the recognition of the validity claim and to transform opinion in knowledge (Habermas 1988: 48). Without any justification given, the listener cannot assess the validity of a claim. It is not possible to reach consensus or even mutual understanding (*Verständigung*), since the persuasion takes places by the "unforced force of better argument". Without justification, there is simply no deliberation. Following Steenbergen et al. (2003), I distinguish four levels of justification:

Level of justification

(0) X should be done but no reason is given

(1) reason Y is given why X should or should not be done but no linkage is made

(2) linkage is made why one should expect that X contributes to or detracts from Y

(3) two complete justifications are given (either for the same demand or for two different demands)

Content of justification

In deliberation, participants are supposed to be common-good oriented, taking into account the views and interests of others. They do not ask: "What is good for me?" or, as representatives, "What is good for my constituents?" but "What is good for us?" or "What is good for all citizens?".

In parliaments, the question is extremely important since it is linked to the *content of representation* (for the link between content and deliberation, see Tamvaki/Lord 2010). Thus, if we consider representatives as *trustees*, they are supposed to act in behalf of all citizens, trying to overcome conflict of interests and looking for the common good (see Pitkin 1967, Buchstein 1997).

In the European Parliament, the question to which group MEPs do refer in their justifications is of particular interest. Do they refer to their constituents? Do they refer to their nation? Do they refer to Europe? Or do they refer to universal norms?

In a recent study on how MEPs perceive their role as representatives, Scully and Farrell (2003) found out that the representation of national interests still plays an important role: 13,7% of MEPs indicated that they thought it of "little importance" to represent all people in Europe, whereas this was the case for only 3,7% of MEPs concerning all people in member states.

Table 1: Representation of Interests

Table 1: MEPs' Views on Importance of Representing Different Interests (%)

How Important to Represent the Following Groups of People?	Of Little Importance			Of Great Importance		Mean Importance (out of 5)	N
	1	2	3	4	5		
All people in Europe	13.7	8.9	18.9	26.3	32.1	3.54	190
All people in my Member State	3.7	6.9	19.1	34.0	36.2	3.92	188
All people in my constituency	6.1	7.3	16.2	33.0	37.4	3.72	179
All people who voted for my party	4.3	9.6	24.5	33.0	28.7	3.88	188
My national party	4.9	11.4	24.3	33.5	25.9	3.64	185
My EP party group	7.0	11.4	28.6	38.4	14.6	3.42	185

Source: MEP Survey 2000.

Source: Scully/Farell 2003.

Given the importance of lobbying in European Parliament, references to sectoral groups should also be included in the measurement instrument. Again, in the same survey, 69,4 % of MEPs indicated that "Social group representation" was of "Great importance" (4+5) as part of their work.

It would be interesting to see if these role perceptions also have an impact on deliberation. Thus, we count the number of references to each group (see also Steiner 2010).

Country:
(1) The speaker refers to the interests of its country.
(2) The speaker does not refer to the interests of its country.

Europe:
(1) The speaker refers to the interests of Europe.
(2) The speaker does not refer to the interests of Europe…

… and the same for constituents and sectoral interests.

Regarding the DQI, the difficulty lies in the ranking of each reference: Is it better to refer to sectoral group or to nation? Originally, in first DQI, the indicator ranges from (0) Explicit statement concerning group interests through (1) Neutral statement to (2) Explicit statement of the common

good. It will not be possible to rank in a same way the reference to sectoral group, constituency, nation, and Europe or universal norms. But if deliberation in European Parliament shall fulfil its aims, participants shall focus on European Common Good. All other references are partisan and can be ranked on the same level. Accordingly, I assess the quality of the content of justification as follows:

3a – Content of Justification (common good)

(1) The speaker does not refer to any interests.

(2) The speaker refers to the interests of its constituents/its country or to sectoral interests.

(3) The speaker refers to European or universal interests.

<u>Respect</u>

Participants should treat each other with respect (Gutmann & Thompson 1996). Respect is a prerequisite for serious listening, which is essential for good deliberation (Steenbergen et al. 2003). Respect involves two dimensions: Respect towards other participants within the deliberative group and respect towards groups that are to be helped through policies (Steenbergen et al. 2003). Respect toward other participants implies that participants acknowledge the right of other participants to justify their view and to equally participate in the debate (Steiner 2010). Respect toward groups that are to be helped through policies implies that participants, either implicitly or explicitly, acknowledge the needs and rights of different social groups (Steenbergen et al 2003: 26). While previous measurements also include an indicator "respect toward arguments" (see Steenbergen et al. 2003, Bächtiger et al. 2010b), I do not think that this is necessarily a valid measure for good deliberation: We might be able to degrade an argument and still respect the fact that the argument was made and consider it as valid. Thus, I prefer to include an indicator measuring the "reference toward arguments", subsuming it under "interactivity" rather then "respect" (see next category).

4 a - Respect toward other participants

(1) Personal attack on other participants

(2) No reference to other participants

(3) Neutral *or* positive reference to other participants

4 b - Respect toward groups that are to be helped through policies

(1) Only negative statements about the groups

(2) No explicitly negative statements, but neither are there explicit positive statements

(3) At least one explicitly positive statement about the groups, regardless of the presence of negative statements

<u>Reciprocity</u>

Reciprocity is an important element of deliberation: Participants shall listen and respond to each other. Following Bächtiger et al. (2010b) and Steiner (2010), I measure the level of interactivity. As Bächtiger et al. (2010b: 6) note in reference to Goodin (2000: 91), " '[t]here must be uptake and engagement – other people must hear or read, internalize and respond' before a process can be judged appropriately deliberative. Despite its crucial importance for deliberative theory, the interaction component of reciprocity has been largely neglected in previous measurement." It is

important to note that *interactivity* is a distinct category that should not be confused with *respect* (Bächtiger et al. 2010b). Following Steiner (2010), we can distinguish two different categories of interactivity: Interactivity between participants and the exchange of arguments. However, while Steiner (2010) combines in its category "Respect" and "Interactivity" (*Respect towards other participants (Interactivity I)* and *Respect towards arguments of other participants (Interactivity II))*, I prefer to measure interactivity via the *reference* to other participants or other arguments.

5a - Reference to other participants (Interactivity I)

(0) Participants do not refer to other participants.
(1) Participants do refer to other participants.

5b -Reference to other participants' arguments (Interactivity II)

(0) Participants do not refer to other participants' arguments.
(1) Participants refer to other participants' arguments but do not discuss them.
(2) Participants refer to other participants' arguments and do discuss them.

However, it might be difficult to distinguish the two indicators empirically. On a theoretical level, it is doubtful if we need to distinguish them: Is the simple reference to other participants (without referring to their argument) an indicator for good deliberation? While the differentiation surely makes sense in measuring respect (since respect toward participants is an own dimension of deliberation), this does not apply to the interactivity. Thus, I follow Bächtiger et al. (2010b) and focus on the *reference to other participants' arguments* to measure interactivity.

Further, following Pedrini and Bächtiger (2010), I also analyze who made reference to whom. As Knight and Johnson (1997) argue, what is important in deliberation is not the intervention as such but the influence ones arguments have on other participants. In fact, speaking time does not guarantee that the other participants listen to the speaker. However, deliberation requires that all arguments be taken into account.

In their study on deliberation in Swiss parliamentary committees, Pedrini/Bächtiger developed a useful method to measure if all arguments are equally uptaken and debated. All incoming and outcoming references of every participant are represented in a matrix. For the incoming references, it is taken into account how often a participant speaks. The more often he speaks, the higher the chances that his argument will be referred to by other participants. Thus, incoming references are weighted by the number of speech acts.

Table 2: Matrix

	A	B	C	D	Outcoming references
A			1	2	2
B				1	1
C		2		1	2
D	2		1		2
Incoming references	1	1	2	3	
Number of speeches	2	3	3	4	

Notes: 1 = reference without discussion; 2 = reference and discussion. Table adapted from Pedrini/Bächtiger (2010: 14.)

For example, speaker A refers to the argument of speaker C (but does not discuss it) and D (and discuss it). Speaker A's arguments are referred to once (by D, with discussion). Following Pedrini and Bächtiger, I measure the *frequency of incoming and outcoming arguments*. In their analysis, Pedrini and Bächtiger also include the frequency of negative or positive reference to other

arguments. However, as said, I do not think that the positive reference to an argument is necessarily a good indicator for respectful deliberation since we may degrade an argument and still respect the fact that it was made. Thus, as second indicator, I measure the *frequency of incoming and outcoming arguments being discussed* (coded with "2"). The calculations will permit to assess if all arguments are equally taken into account; the results will also show if some participants are excluded of deliberation.

Constructive politics

Finally, since "ideal deliberation aims to arrive at a rationally motivated consensus" (Cohen 1989: 23) participants should be open-minded, considering the arguments made. If participants do not change their minds, deliberation can't be successful. In real world, consensus might be impossible to achieve; participants should then "at least attempt to reach mutually acceptable compromise solutions" (Steenbergen et al. 2003).

Following Steenbergen et al. (2003), I measure the willingness of people to reach an agreement via their indicator "constructive politics":

Constructive politics

(0) Speakers sit on their positions. There is no attempt at compromise, reconciliation or consensus building.

(1) Speaker makes a mediating proposal that does not fit the current agenda but belongs to another agenda.

(2) Speaker makes a mediating proposal that fits the current agenda.

The indicator presupposes that good deliberation involves an agreement. However, this assumption is contested. In deliberation, participants may carefully consider other participants' arguments without being convinced. Again, it depends of the features of deliberation we refer to. If we refer to deliberation in a normative sense, the indicator may be dropped. But if we refer to the functional aspects of deliberation (efficiency), the indicator is of crucial importance.

Though, even in case we refer to the functional aspect of deliberation, the use of the indicator might induce measurement error in our analysis. Imagine, for example, a situation when participants are not able to convince each other during deliberation. No opinion change takes place. Imagine, further, that voting is not admitted to come to a decision. Let's presuppose that participants *must* come to a decision. At this stage, external pressure might influence participants to make mediating proposals without being convinced that this is the right way to go.

The situation described is not a pure theoretical one but frequently occurs in European decision-making process. If the EP wants to have its word to say in European decision-making, its members have to overcome internal divisions. In many cases, the absolute majority is requested for decision. In ordinary legislative procedure (ex co-decision procedure), if Parliament does not come to a decision within three months, it can be overruled by the Council. Some MEPs may consider it better to support *any* decision and thus to secure the influence of EP than to insist on their position, even if they think they are right. In this case, mediating proposals are an indicator for external pressure rather than for deliberative quality.

Consensus is not necessarily an indicator for good deliberation. As I said, people may deliberate without being convinced by other participants' arguments. But they have to open–minded (Barabas 2004). Since open-mindedness is difficult to assess empirically, it is often replaced by other indicators, measuring opinion change or – as constructive politics – the number of mediating proposals participants make. But we do not know why people change their mind – therefore, taking

opinion change or the number of mediating proposals as an indicator for good deliberation may induce measurement error. Thus, in order to prevent such error, the context of decision-making has to be taken into account. In case constructive politics takes place, are there institutional pressures that put the EP toward an agreement?

<u>Veracity</u>

According to the Habermasian understanding of deliberation, arguing is subject to validity claims, implying that the speaker has to be truthful (*Wahrhaftigkeit*) whereas bargaining is subject to credibility claims, such as promises or threats. Elster (1991), however, pointed out the problem of the strategic use of arguments, meaning that impartial arguments are advanced for egoistic reasons (*strategic arguing*). Accordingly, to assess the quality of deliberation in parliaments implies to find out what are the motivations behind the arguments.

However, up to now empirical research did not strive to verify the sincerity of an actor. In their research project on arguing and bargaining, Deitelhoff and Müller (2005) concluded that even though it is possible to distinguish arguing and bargaining analytically it is impossible to do so empirically. Originally, since the truthfulness of an actor was not measurable, the authors of first DQI decided not to include it in the DQI to avoid measurement error (Steenbergen et al. 2003).

With respect to this problem, researches in international relations claimed that there is no need to know the motivations of the actors, since even strategically motivated actors have to engage in serious dialogue and have to proove their truthfulness (argumentative entrapment). (Risse 2004, Schimmelfennig 2001)

However, while argumentative entrapment may be enough to reach an agreement in international negotiations, it cannot replace truthfulness if the following features of deliberation are to be attained: Participants shall reflect upon their interest, listen to each other, respect other viewpoints and be open to persuasion by the better argument (see Bächtiger et al. 2010a). Participants that are not convinced but have been "entrapped" by their own strategic arguments will not be convinced by the best solution as *legitimate and best solution*. In the long term, they will probably not accept the decision but still pursue their interest. In this case, deliberation will not lead to mutual understanding, neither to a solution that is commonly accepted. As Tschentscher et al. (2010: 11) put it: If "Words do not mean what they say [...] language loses its meaning, and communication breaks down." Thus, in assessing the quality of deliberation in parliaments, reasons *and* actors motivations need to be considered.

As a second-best solution, Tschentscher et al. (2010) and Bächtiger et al. (2010) proposed to measure the *perception* of truthfulness among participants. Following their proposition, I complement the DQI with interviews with actors of debate.

Interviews

Recently, Steiner (2010) included the perception of truthfulness in his analysis on deliberation with ex-combatants in Colombia. Depending on how the item was formulated he got different answers. As he supposed, this was certainly due to the tendency people have to answer in the positive. Following Steiner (2010), I include two inverse statements in my questionnaire:

Perception of truthfulness

1. I feel that I can trust the other participants in their words.

2. I cannot escape the feeling that many participants were hiding their true beliefs from the discussion.
      - Strongly agree
      - agree
      - neither agree or disagree

- disagree
- strongly disagree
- don't know

The combination of interviews with the actors, aiming at detecting the underlying motivations, and a discourse analysis of the debate constitutes an innovative approach in the research field of deliberation measurement. It allows us to assess all elements of the Habermasian concept of deliberation, including the (perception of) truthfulness.

In addition, the inclusion of interviews with the actors of debate allows me to include in my analysis informal communication. In fact – and in particular in European Parliament – informal communication plays an important role in parliamentary decision-making. One of the main tasks of the *rapporteur* in any committee is to meet other MEPs to reach an agreement (Costa 2001). During policy-making process, MEPs always stay in contact and discuss the issue with their colleagues, representatives of interest groups and civil society, citizens, members of the European Institutions, members of their national parties… The assessment of deliberation should include the communication that takes place before and between the debates in different formal forums (caucuses, committees, plenary session).

Originally, the idea to use interviews to capture deliberation in informal forums as well as actor motivations stems from Daniel Naurin (2007), who used interviews in his analysis of reason-giving in the working groups of the Council of the EU. Since the meetings take place behind closed doors, Naurin did interviews with the actors involved in negotiations to catch their intentions underlying the proposed reasons. Taking into account the informal communication in its analysis, Naurin used the same question referring to the preparatory phase before the meeting.

Following Naurin, I therefore propose to complement the discourse analysis by interviews with the actors of debate including questions concerning the informal communication that takes place on the issue. In a similar way, Bächtiger et al. (2010a: 57) recently proposed to use a "perception-based DQI" where the degree of justification rationality or respect is evaluated by the participants themselves, on the same scales as the original DQI.

Accordingly, I include in my questionnaire two questions concerning the justification rationality as well as the respect in informal meetings. However, I do not ask participants to evaluate on the DQI-scale since this could be perceived as too difficult (in particular, when it comes to the assessment of informal communication). Participants may then be reluctant to give an answer. Also, people could have got an impression without being able to remember exactly what kind of statement was made. In order to catch all impressions, I decided to simplify the questions. The indicators, however, are the same so that comparison is still possible.

Level of justification

1 - "We distinguish different levels of justification. In your view, what level of justifications was dominant in informal communications you had with other persons on this subject?" (Give examples to clarify).

(0) Most of the time, people just told me their positions without giving me any reason why they were right in what they said.

(1) Most of the time, people indicated a reason to underline their position but they did not made clear the linkage between their position and the reason.

(2) Most of the time, people gave reasons and made a linkage why one should expect that their position X contributes to or detracts from reason Y.

Respect

2 – "Respect is another element of deliberation. In informal communications, did you get the impression that your interlocutor respected you?"

3 - "Did you get the impression that your interlocutor was respectful vis-à-vis the needs and rights of other social groups and especially those that are helped through [the specific policy]?"

Interactivity

4 – "One crucial element of deliberation is the exchange of arguments. Could you please comment on following statements concerning the interest of your interlocutors in your arguments?"

> 1. Most of the time, my interlocutors did not listen to my arguments.
> 2. Most of the time, my interlocutors listened to my arguments but did not consider them.
> 3. Most of the time, my interlocutors listened to my arguments and considered them carefully.

Truthfulness

4- "Going back to the informal communication you had, could you comment on following statements concerning the motivations of your interlocutors?"

> 1. I felt that I could trust my interlocutors on their words.
> 2. I cannot escape the feeling that many participants were hiding their true beliefs from the discussion.

The same question will be asked with respect to 1) deliberation in formal forum, which gives us the opportunity to compare the quality of deliberation *measured with DQI* and the *perceived* quality of deliberation and 2) informal communication. With respect to informal communication, it would be interesting to specify the question in reference to different groups. Thus, the question are specified as follows:

(1) In communication with your colleagues, what level of justification…?
>> … representatives of interest groups …
>> … your constituents…

In order to take into account time constraints of MEPs, the questions should be limited on maximum three "focus groups" (e.g. interest group, colleagues, constituents). All other communications could be catched by a supplementary question: "In general, in informal communications…".

In sum, the instrument combines interviews with a quantitative discourse analysis. Both instruments – interviews and discourse analysis – have been adapted in such a way to permit an extensive analysis of deliberation, including actors' motivations, actors' perception of the debate and informal communication.

References

Bächtiger, André/Niemeyer, Simon/Neblo, Michael/Steenbergen, Marco R./Steiner, Jürg (2010a): Symposium: Toward More Realistic Models of Deliberative Democracy. Disentangling Diversity in Deliberative Democracy: Competing Theories, Their Blind Spots and Complementarities, in: The Journal of Political Philosophy 18(1), pp. 32-63.

Bächtiger, André/Shikano, Susumu/Pedrini, Seraina/Ryser, Mirjam (2010b): Measuring Deliberation 2.0: Standards, Discourse Types, and Sequentialization, available at http://ash.harvard.edu/extension/ash/docs/baechtiger.pdf, last accessed: 31.07.2010.

Bessette, Joseph M. (1994): The Mild Voice of Reasons. Deliberative Democracy and American National Government. Chicago/London: The University of Chicago Press.

Bohman, James (1996): Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Buchstein, Hubertus (1997): Repräsentation ohne Symbole - Die Repräsentationstheorie des "Federalist" und von Hanna F. Pitkin, in: Gerhard Göhler u.a.: Institution - Macht – Repräsentation. Wofür politische Institutionen stehen und wie sie wirken. Baden-Baden: Nomos.

Cohen, Joshua (1989): Deliberation and Democratic Legitimacy, in: Hamlin, Alan/Pettit, Philip (eds.): The Good Polity: Normative Analysis of the State. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 17-34.

Costa, Olivier (2001): Le Parlement européen, assemblée délibérante. Bruxelles: Les éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles.

Deitelhoff, Nicole/Müller, Harald (2005): Theoretical paradise - empricially lost? Arguing with Habermas, in: Review of International Studies 31(1), pp. 167-179.

Dryzek, John (2000): Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Elster, Jon (1991): Arguing and Bargaining in Two Constituents Assemblies, The Storrs Lectures. New Haven: Yale Law School.

Goodin, Robert E. (2000): Democratic deliberation within, in: Philosophy and Public Affairs 29(1), pp. 81-109.

Gutmann, Amy/Thompson, Dennis (1996): Democracy and Disagreement. Cambridge, Mass./London: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.

Habermas, Jürgen (1999): Die Einbeziehung des Anderen: Studien zur politischen Theorie. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, Jürgen (1992): Faktizität und Geltung. Beiträge zur Diskurstheorie des Rechts und des demokratischen Rechtsstaats. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Habermas, Jürgen (1988): Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.

Hix, Simon/Noury, Abdul/Gérard, Roland (2006): Dimensions of Politics in the European Parliament, in: American Journal of Political Science 50(2), pp. 494-511.

Knight, Jack/Johnson, James (1997): What Sort of Equality Does Deliberative Democracy Require?, in: James Bohman/William Rehg (eds.): Deliberative Democracy. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 279-320.

Manin, Bernard (1987): On Legitimacy and Political Deliberation. In: Political Theory 15(3), pp. 338-368.

Mansbridge, Jane/Bohman, James/Chambers, Simone/Estlund, David/Føllesdal, Andreas/Fung, Archon/Lafont, Christina/Manin, Bernard/Martí, José Luis (2010): The Place of Self-Interest and the Role of Power in Deliberative Democracy, in: The Journal of Political Philosophy 18(1), pp. 64-100.

Mansbridge, Jane (2009): Deliberative and Non-deliberative Negotiations, HSK Faculty Research Working Paper Series.

McElroy, Gail (2006): Committee Representation in the European Parliament, in: European Union Politics 7(1), pp. 5-29.

Naurin, Daniel (2007): Why Give Reason? Measuring Arguing and Bargaining in Survey Research, in: Swiss Political Science Review 13(4), pp. 559-575.

Neyer, Jürgen (2004): Explaining the unexpected: efficiency and effectiveness in European decision-making, in: Journal of European Public Policy 11(1), pp. 19-38.

Pedrini, Seraina/Bächtiger, André (2010): Deliberative Inclusion of Minorities: Equality and Reciprocity among Linguistic Groups in Switzerland. Paper prepared for delivery at the 2010 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 2-5 2010, Washington (DC).

Pitkin, Hanna F. (1967): The Concept of Representation. Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press.

Risse, Thomas (2004): Global Governance and Communicative Action, in: Government and Opposition 39(2), pp. 288-313.

Sanders, Lynn M. (1997): Against Deliberation, in: Political Theory 25(3), pp. 347-376.

Sartori, Giovanni (1970): Concept Misformation in Comparative Politics, in: The American Political Science Review 64(4), pp.1033-1053.

Schimmelfennig, Frank (2001): The Community Trap: Liberal Norms, Rhetorical Action, and the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union, in: International Organization 55(1), pp. 47-80.

Scully, Roger/Farrell, David M. (2003): MEPs as Representatives: Individual and Institutional Roles, in: JCMS 42(2), pp. 269-88.

Steenbergen, Marco R./Bächtiger, André/Spörndli, Markus/Steiner, Jürg (2003): Measuring Political Deliberation: A Discourse Quality Index, in: Comparative European Politics 1(1), pp. 21-48.

Steiner, Jürg/Bächtiger, André/Spörndli, Markus/Steenbergen, Marco R. (2004): Deliberative Politics in Action. Analysing Parliamentary Discourse. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Steiner, Jürg (2010): Deliberation. Empirical Research and Normative Implications, Unpublished Book Manuscript, Bern.

Steiner, Jürg (2008): Concept stretching: the case of deliberation, in: European Political Science 7(2), pp. 186-90.

Stromer-Galley, Jennifer (2007): Measuring Deliberation's Content: A Coding Scheme, in: Journal of Public Deliberation 3(1), pp. 1-35.

Tamvaki, Dionysia/Lord, Christopher (2010): The Content and Quality of Representation in the European Assembly: Towards building an updated Discourse Quality Index at the EU level. Paper prepared to the IPSA Conference on European Governance, March 18-20 2010, Luxembourg.

Thompson, Dennis F. (2008): Deliberative Democratic Theory and Empirical Political Science, in: Annual Review of Political Science 11(June), pp. 497-520.

Tschentscher, Alex/Bächtiger, André/Steiner, Jürg/Steenbergen, Marco (2010): Deliberation in Parliaments. Research Objectives and Preliminary Results of the Bern Center for Interdisciplinary Deliberation Studies (BIDS) (November 4, 2009), in: Legisprudence, Special Issue 'Legislation and Argumentation', 2010, available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1500011.

Ulbert, Cornelia/Risse, Thomas/Müller, Harald (2004): Arguing and Bargaining in Multilateral Negotiations. Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Politics. Paper presented to the Conference on Empirical Approaches to Deliberative Politics, 21-22 May 2004, Firenze.

Young, Iris M. (1996): Communication and the other: beyond deliberative democracy, in: Seyla Benhabib (ed.): Democracy and Difference. Contesting the Boundaries of the Political. Princeton: Princeton University Press, pp. 120-35.