

Role and problems of the workers' wing in the Christian Democratic Union (CDU)

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Being a people's party for all classes and sections of the population, the Christian Democratic Union (CDU) has market-liberal, conservative and socio-Christian roots and wings. In order to become capable of winning a majority, the party is dependent on the votes of a major part of the workforce. Therefore, it must be able to credibly represent the social interests of the employees. Given its character as a peoples' and a member party, it does not seem to be enough if individual politicians advocate, so to speak, the social interests of employees. Rather, there are organizations within the CDU which represent the interests of social groups. The most important employee-representation are the so-called Sozialausschüsse (social committees), which have to prove their worth in the dispute with entrepreneurial camp. How has the workers' wing developed within the Union? What role does it play inside and outside of the CDU? What are its principal problems in gaining attention inside and outside the party? What are the challenges the workers' wing must cope with in the post-Kohl-CDU?

To approach the question on the role and influence of the workers' wing inside and outside of the CDU, we will first have a closer look at how the CDA, the Christian Democratic Employees' Organization, is perceived by the public. Supporters of a CDU that should be open to the right perceive the CDA as the dominant force within the Union: If we can speak at all of a leadership in the strategic-intellectual field of the Union, it has come from the „Sozialausschüsse“ for a long time. Together with their mentor, Heiner Geißler, they determine the course of the party to a large degree¹. For the supporters of the neo-classical approach inside and outside of the CDU, the CDA impedes cuts in social services in Germany. They feel that the CDA pursues the politics of the DGB (Federation of German Trade Unions) in the CDU instead of making CDU-politics in the DGB². In the past, some critics of the CDA even spoke of the reserve army of social democracy³ or of a fanatical and unshakeable loyalty to the DGB⁴.

But those who believe that the trade unions have an unanimously positive attitude towards the CDA are wrong: in the past, scepticism prevailed rather often even here. Apart from a few exceptions, the „Sozialausschüsse“ have been less interested in representing the workers and their unions in the CDU than in trying to give the CDU as a peoples' party its legitimation to be an employee party as well, and, in particular, they have been trying to influence the DGB and its affiliates from within or from without according to conservative inclinations⁵. The two researchers Höfling and Schmidt also estimate that the influence of the CDA on the political orientation of the CDU is rather small: first and foremost, they perform the function of

¹ Greve, Uwe, *Parteien-Krise. CDU am Scheideweg*, Frankfurt/Berlin 1993; p 18.

² Kramer, Gertrud/Kramer, Johannes, *Der Einfluß der Sozialausschüsse der Christlich-Demokratischen Arbeitnehmerschaft auf die CDU*, in: *Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte*, 13.11.1976; p 25.

³ Bock, Peter Josef, *Die CDU und ihre Arbeitnehmer*, in: ders. (Hrsg.) *Im Prinzip sozial*, Hanover 1976, p 73.

⁴ George, Heimo, *Sozialausschüsse und Partei*, in: Breidbach, Ferdi/May, Rüdiger (Hrsg.), *Das soziale Feigenblatt? Die Sozialausschüsse in der Union*, Düsseldorf 1975, p.101.

⁵ Bamberg, Hans-Dieter, *Von Blüm zu Fink*, in: *Blätter für deutsche und internationale Politik*, 12/1987, p.1510.

integration,... propaganda and, with regard to the trade unions, of pacification.⁶ In spite of all disagreements, there is a consensus that the „Sozialausschüsse“ do set a style in the CDU. What organizational, idealistic and personnel resources do they possess to influence the political development of the post-Kohl-CDU?

1. The workers' wing of the CDU : fragmented

After the defeat in the election 1998, the donation scandal and the retreat of Helmut Kohl, the power architecture was reorganized within the CDU. The clearest expression of this is the retreat of Helmut Kohl and Wolfgang Schäuble from the leadership of the CDU and the handing over of the leadership to Angelika, who does not lead a relevant regional organisation with a big impact of the party-course. Nevertheless, the reorganization of the leadership so far has not led to a modification of the general concept of orientation. To this day, interests and political ideas are the main lines of conflict in the CDU drawn between modernizers and traditionalists and between supporters of a German- approach focussing on Germany and supporters of an approach focusing on a European civil society.⁷ During the past 15 years, these conflict lines have been the centre of public debate on the course of the CDU. Ever since the defeat in the election, the conflict about the welfare state has been pushed to the fore. This is reflected in the concept of the “new social market economy”, a clearer commitment to promote flexibility in the labour market and labour market policies, and it is reflected by new initiatives on family politics.

The integration of diverging interests would probably stretch the leadership of the CDU too far without the existence of an organized plurality of interests within the party, which sorts out, defuses and balances out conflicts beforehand. But, how long will this system continue to work? In the party struggle for power, besides the regional associations (federal structure) the social associations⁸ are the second most important internal actors⁹ : With respect to social and economic interests, the “Mittelstandsvereinigung” (medium and small businesses' organization), the “Wirtschaftsrat” (Economic Council)¹⁰ and the “Christlich-Demokratische Arbeitnehmerschaft” (Christian Democratic Employees' Organization: CDA) are in opposition. Whereas the medium and small businesses' organization has been gaining internal power in recent years with increasing

⁶ Schmidt, Ute, Christlich-Demokratische Union Deutschlands, in: Stöss, Richard (Hrsg.) Parteienhandbuch Bd. 1, Opladen 1983, p.615.

⁷ In accordance with this, for instance, Zafer Senocak writes: What is there against establishing two parties instead of this Janus-faced party: a conservative, German-national, anti-European party and a liberal-conservative party, orientated to the modern age, which, together with other forces, could continue to carry the unified Germany along on its way towards a pluralistic state. (Die CDU muß sich spalten, in: TAZ, 28.9.1994).

⁸ Such organizations are: Junge Union (organization of young union members), the Womens' Union, the kommunalpolitische Vereinigung (local political organizations), Mittelstandsvereinigung (the medium and small businesses' organization, MIT). Special organizations are: the Ring Christlich-Demokratischer Studierender (Christian Democratic Students' Organization, RCDS), the Wirtschaftsrat (the Economic Council), the Evangelische Arbeitskreis (Protestants' Association).

⁹ In particular, this concerns the nomination of candidates for national and regional elections, the nomination of delegates for party conferences and the composition of the executive committees.

¹⁰ The medium and small businesses' organization (MIT) was founded in 1956. In 1981, it had 15,222 members. After merging with the economic organization, it stated in 1998 that it had some 40,000 members (cf. internet-homepage MIT). Provided that this figure is accurate, the MIT has almost twice as many members as the „Sozialausschüsse“.

membership and in the number of MP's, the „Sozialausschüsse“ have been losing ground. A balance between the diverging interest groups within the party cannot be achieved only through the actual power of the groups, but also through party leadership and political pressure from the outside. In this connection, the strength of the trade unions, and the politics of the churches, although to a much lesser degree, are particularly important to the workers' wing of the CDU.

Fragmentation also contributes to the weakness of the workers' wing of the CDU. Apart from the social committees, the workers' group of the CDU/CSU faction¹¹ in the Bundestag has a particular importance. This group attempts to influence the politics of the faction, but often, it is the other way round. Because of faction discipline, its scope of action may be quite narrow in decisive situations. To put it in a nutshell: First and foremost, the „Sozialausschüsse“ have to win this group over if they want to exert their political ideas in the parliamentary sphere. More often than not, it is the decisions and positions of the workers' group that call the tune, and not those of the CDA-leadership. So, within the Union, the workers' wing not only has to hold its ground against the representatives of the economy in general and against the interests of the middle class in particular, but also in a permanent struggle inside of its own groups. What is meant are the conflicts between those who follow the tactical considerations of the party and faction leadership, and those who orientate towards the trade unions. Thus, there are two points of reference: the party and the trade union.

The CDA possesses its own rules, resources¹² and members. Its relative independence and its close interconnection to the party are important conditions to act as a bridge between the society and the party. It was the CDA itself that took on the responsibility to promote the workers' interests within the CDU, and to represent the Union in the workforce. The pursuit of these –occasionally contrary - aims may lead to a polarization of the party wing and of the trade union wing within the CDA, as in 1996 when the CDU-government allowed a deterioration of the legal protection against dismissal and reduced the continued payment of remuneration in case of sickness. Even though many protagonists do not see themselves as loyally bound either to the party or to the trade union, those two decisive centres of power develop binding effects during such decision making situations. This was not always the case: during the Adenauer-era, there was a third force, the workers' Church-wing, which was closely linked to organised Catholicism and acted as a force of its own.¹³ The CDA leadership has always been dominated by the one party wing which is controlled by the workers' group of the parliamentary faction. By contrast, in decision-making situations, the trade union wing succeeds only rarely in pushing through its interests – it lacks the shaping power of parliament-influence.

2. The development of the CDA in the 1990's

¹¹ During the parliamentary period 1994-1998, this group had 84 MP's and therefore was much larger than the factions of the Green Party and of the Liberal Democratic Party, FDP.

¹² In 1997, the CDA had 21 full-time employees nationwide. They are financed by membership fees, other financial means, donations and party-money. The Foundation for Christian-social Politics and Education (Stiftung für Christlich-soziale Politik und Bildung e.V), founded in 1977, plays an important role in financing the CDA. In addition to that, there is the Jakob-Kaiser-Foundation, already founded in 1961.

¹³ cf. Schroeder, Wolfgang, *Katholizismus und Einheitgewerkschaft. Der Streit um den DGB und der Niedergang des Sozialkatholizismus in der Bundesrepublik bis 1960*, Bonn 1992.

The social committees have always considered themselves as the social conscience of the CDU. The catholic workers' and trade union environment was a decisive factor for the spreading of the „Sozialausschüsse“. This is the reason why the CDA is established so unequally in the regions. Since 1945, it has had its centre in North Rhine-Westphalia, where about half of all the CDA members live. This is the main region where the Sozialausschüsse make their politics. The denomination even played a significant role in the conflicts with the representatives of the economic wing. As the latter had its ideological roots in the Protestant environment of the individualistic, property-owning bourgeoisie, and the „Sozialausschüsse“ mainly were rooted in the social-Catholic environment, the social tensions within the Union were marked for many years by a – at least latent – denominational component.¹⁴

The founders of the „Sozialausschüsse“ mostly stemmed from Catholic environments. Before 1933, they worked as trade union officials for the Christian unions, the Catholic labour movement, and they formed the workers' wing of the catholic Centre Party. In 1945, they were the initiators of the „Sozialausschüsse“ and, simultaneously, the founders of the CDU and of the unified union. The „Sozialausschüsse“ were meant to fill up the vacuum that had emerged because the Christian trade unions had ceased to exist. They were built up as an authority that should influence both the unified trade union and the CDU¹⁵. The reputation of the former Christian trade union officials, which stretched far beyond the borders of their own environment, was thus an important basis to credibly convey the character of the CDU as a peoples' party outside of the party.

After World War II, the establishment of the „Sozialausschüsse“ as a relatively independent organization was regarded inside the CDU with scepticism. Konrad Adenauer and some other important people of the economic wing held the opinion that a group with such a strong independent existence (a party in the party) and with – from their point of view - such an exaggerated political orientation (Christian socialism) was incompatible with a peoples' party.

For this reason, the leaders of the CDU tried to make the „Sozialausschüsse“ superfluous by dealing with all socio-political questions in the so-called economic and socio-political committees, where employees and employers were united on all levels of the party. The failure of these endeavours may have contributed to increase the attraction of the „Sozialausschüsse“ during their foundation phase.

During the phase of political reforms of the party as well as socio-political reforms, lasting from the mid-sixties until the beginning of the nineties, the CDA developed an alliance with the Women's Union (since 1975) and the Junge Union (1973 – 1994). This alliance became an important cornerstone of modernizing the Union. The two CDU-general secretaries Kurt Biedenkopf and Heiner Geißler also were important allies: their approach was to modernize the party and the welfare state, and even for them, the „Sozialausschüsse“ represented a significant group to carry out their own aims.

¹⁴ Hie liberal-protestantisch, hie sozial-katholisch, in: Unternehmerbrief des Deutschen Industrieinstituts, 12.10.1961, p.3.

¹⁵ They feared that the CDU would weigh down the workers and that the unified trade union would be dominated by the Social Democrats. (Hans Katzer, in: Schroeder, Wolfgang, 1990).

When Heiner Geißler was voted out of office in 1989, the CDA lost its most important ally in the party leadership beside Norbert Blüm, who was Minister of Labour (1982-1998). Another factor that restricted the scope of action of the CDA-leadership in the nineties was the narrow majority of the Kohl government (1994 - 1998). This resulted in every important parliamentary decision being stylised as a question of survival for the chancellor, so that, the CDA-leadership functioned as a part of the Kohl system ever since Ulf Fink had been voted out in 1993. What was decisive for the role of the CDA within the union was the fact that the term “reform” was taken over by the neo-classical wing of the party. Symptomatic of this transformation was the change in the leadership of the Junge Union, which has been allied to the medium and small businesses association and the economic wing roughly since 1993, and which pleads for a determined neo-classical development.¹⁶

In the nineties, the „Sozialausschüsse“ went through a harsh test of endurance: polarized factional disputes, declining ties in the enterprises, and a weakened leadership. Within two years (1993/1994), three different chairmen took over the leadership of the „Sozialausschüsse“. The most important supporter in the leadership of the party was Norbert Blüm¹⁷; whereas Heiner Geißler played to the gallery as a publicly respected politician raising the issues. Blüm, in his position as Minister for Employment, not only was fighting against the neo-classical tendency in the party, but also was able to establish a large project, the nursing care insurance, Heiner Geißler, with his input of analyses and ideas, pursued a policy of ideological dissociation from the Liberal Democratic Party, the FDP, and from the right-wing door openers. Torn between the party wing and the trade union wing, the „Sozialausschüsse“ were roller-coasting through the nineties, and in the end, they turned out to be a visibly shaken and destabilized organization that suffered both from the very long period of the Kohl government and from a missing internal consensus about how to react to the challenges of globalization.

A. Organization crisis

The most obvious sign of the organization crisis in the nineties was the drastic loss of members.¹⁸ Between 1991 and 1997, membership of the CDA decreased from ca. 40,000 to roughly 25,000 – that is a reduction of 21 per cent. This decline is more drastic than the one in the CDU itself, which lost about 16 per cent of its members in the same period of time.¹⁹

¹⁶ In some cases, this may be different on the Land- and local levels. A number of CDA-groups report good relationships with the Junge Union which lead, for example, to joint activities against youth unemployment, etc.

¹⁷ Elisabeth Niejahr, Schröders Arbeiter fürs Soziale, in: Die Zeit, 15.11.01: „Blüm was the brain, the heart and the centre of power of social policies during the Kohl-era“.

¹⁸ Only a part of those employees who are affiliated to the CDU also belong to the CDA. Only the members of the CDA executive council – from the district level upwards – must also be members of the CDU. The extra membership fee is considered an obstacle to affiliation, because this puts off many prospective members from the employees' side who are already affiliated to the CDU, to the trade union and to the Protestant or Catholic Workers' Movement. For this reason, the membership fee for those who are already members of the CDU is currently only 60 DM; whereas non-CDU-members must pay 72 DM per year (regardless of one's actual income).

¹⁹ In 1991, the CDU had 751,163 members; in 1997, the party only had 631,700 members.

Membership Development of the CDA						
1980	1981	1985	1989	1991	1995	1997
40,000	37,000	32,232	31,412	31,412	26,735	24,782

With 17 organizations at the Land-level, it is true that the CDA is represented in the whole country, but it has not yet succeeded in overcoming the asymmetric Rhineland federalism, and in achieving a more symmetrical distribution of the members throughout the country. To this day, the dominating regional organization within the CDA is the one of North Rhine-Westphalia, where roughly 40% of all members of the CDA live, followed by the organizations of Baden-Württemberg, Hesse, and Rhineland-Palatinate, which have 9% of the members each. The bottom of the league are Brandenburg and Mecklenburg-West Pomerania with only 1 per cent of the members each. Thanks to the financial support of the CDU, the CDA is represented by full-time officials in each of the new federal states; nevertheless, it could not win over more than 1,000 members. This confirms the thesis that the „Sozialausschüsse“ only find fruitful ground where a social-catholic tradition exists.²⁰

The CDA-traditionalism also is reflected in the membership problems.²¹: loss of members, increase in the percentage of older members and big regional gaps are the most striking problems. Civil servants form the dominant group of members and about a third of all members are retired people or pensioners. What is positive is that they are established to a certain extent in the works councils and in the staff councils for civil servants, even though their number has declined considerably in recent years. It is difficult to win over new elite groups to represent them: Just like the trade unions, they hardly recruit new members in the modern industry and services sectors. And also the representatives of the young generation, who have their own CDA-working group, the Junge Arbeitnehmerschaft (Young Employees, about 2,500 members), only rarely find their way to the CDA.

B. Leadership crises

During the Kohl-era, four different presidents²² and four general secretaries²³ held the chair of the „Sozialausschüsse“. These figures alone point to unrest and discontinuity. All of the presidents were a problem for the organization, each in his own way: Blüm, because being a minister, he held too many offices and united too many loyalties to be an authentic advocate of the interests of the „Sozialausschüsse“. The leadership problem of the CDA worsened with Ulf Fink, Werner

²⁰ In East Germany, the CDA has some regional importance where there is a social-catholic environment, that is, in Eichsfeld in Thuringia, and to a much lesser degree in the region of Dresden.

²¹ The percentage of blue-collar workers in the CDA is higher than in the CDU, where they are underrepresented (7%) compared to their percentage in the population (15%).

²² Norbert Blüm (1977-1987), Ulf Fink (1987-1993), Werner Schreiber (1993-1994), Rainer Eppelmann (1994-2001) and since 2001: Hermann-Josef Arentz.

²³ Heribert Scharrenbroich (1977-1985); Adolf Hörsken (1985-1991), Franz Dormann (1991-1995), Jürgen Radloff (1995-1998) and since 1998 Ulrich Hettinger.

Schreiber and Rainer Eppelmann, who questioned the „Sozialausschüsse“ ability to act in different ways.

From Jakob Kaiser until Norbert Blüm, the presidents of the „Sozialausschüsse“ were always accused of doing too little for their own organization and too much for their own political career. The leadership problem reached its peak during the Fink era, when, for the first time, a politician who had not been socialized into organized Catholic ways became the leader of the CDA. What made this even more problematic was that he was not only the president of the CDA, but also the vice-president of the DGB. With his objection to the then chancellor, Helmut Kohl, Fink continued the series of breaking continuity with the party. Therefore, Kohl saw to it that a national president of the CDA was not elected into the federal executive of the CDU for the first time ever. This was a novelty in the history of the „Sozialausschüsse“. The decisive difference between Fink and his predecessors was that Fink did not have any influence with the CDU-leadership and did not have any influential patron. Therefore, he was accused of having weakened the influence of the CDA on CDU-politics in such a way that compounded both the lack of influence of the CDA and its internal disunity. The reaction to the discontent with Ulf Fink was that the party-orientated leading wing of the „Sozialausschüsse“ built up Werner Schreiber, a social politician who had his roots in the catholic-social environment and was closely linked to Kohl. When he had to resign from his position as the minister for social affairs in Saxony-Anhalt because he was accused of personal gain, he became unbearable as the leader of the „Sozialausschüsse“. This apparent leadership crisis was followed by the election of Rainer Eppelmann, who had made a name for himself as a committed priest and a civil rightist in the GDR, and who was now trying to follow the “German-Unification” tradition of the „Sozialausschüsse“ under Jakob Kaiser. Instead of mediating between the government and the trade unions, he publicly defended the politics of cutting social benefits without even making a symbolic attempt to introduce alternative options to the discussion. Such close ties to a concrete government policy had been hitherto unknown in the leadership of the „Sozialausschüsse“. As a consequence, it became more difficult for the CDA to act as a mediator for the trade union officials and works councils, and the fragmentation within their own ranks intensified. With the election of Hermann-Josef Arentz (2001), once again an official from the Catholic Workers’ Movement heads the CDA. He is a CDU-member of the regional government in North Rhine-Westphalia and an experienced social politician and he could once again build a bridge between the trade union and the parliamentary camps.

C. Political programmatic profile

With their perspective focusing on social reforms, the „Sozialausschüsse“ hold a special position within the CDU. They see themselves both as a social motor and a modernizer in the CDU. They have not restricted themselves to the typical issues of the German model of industrial relations (e.g.: codetermination, collective bargaining policy orientated towards remuneration). Due to their competition with the trade unions and the SPD, they have always dealt with those socio-political issues that other organizations have put in second place. Among these issues are first and foremost those concerning family politics and workers’ participation in productive capital in the form of invested wages. With their commitment to solidarity and justice in the fields of development aid politics, feminist politics and alien politics, they also tried to work towards the integration of those issues into the CDU-discussion that were dealt with in the church circles.

On the federal congress in Magdeburg in May 1997, the party-orientated leadership of the CDA tried to make the organization follow the strategy of rebuilding the welfare state, which corresponded with the neo-classical wing in the CDU. An employment strategy was suggested, which was to be based on a more flexible labour market, according to which everything that creates employment is social. In a pointed debate, this initiative finally was neutralized by trade union-friendly forces and replaced by the formula placing priority on employment. This controversy also revealed that there was no consensus about how to tackle the debate on the welfare state. Simultaneously, it also showed that the „Sozialausschüsse“ were not willing to support an election campaign (1998) aimed at an aggressive deregulation of the labour market. Since the CDU is in the opposition, the „Sozialausschüsse“ can dedicate themselves again more actively to their own socio-political reform issues, the most important of them being family and educational policy. They legitimate their claims to leadership in regard to these issues with the analysis that the election defeat of the CDU in 1998 was the result of socio-political inactivity.²⁴ They emphasized this claim launching an initiative to introduce a family payment²⁵, which was also adopted on the party conference of the CDU in Dresden (3-5.12.2001). But at the same time, in 2001, they took on a more neo-classical position concerning labour market policy than in the nineties by embracing a flexible labour market policy and by welcoming, for example, the financing of a low-wage sector. The forthcoming election campaign (2002) will show how far their option in favour of flexibility will go. Being in the opposition, they have supported the Social Democratic-Green government against their own party leadership to pass a new Works Constitution Act. Together with the trade unions, they have been fighting the government's plans to partly privatise the pension scheme for some time.

3. Prospects

The CDA has contributed to binding the majority of the remaining Christian-social electorate to the CDU. At the same time, it has helped the CDU to open up not only to the right, but also to the left. One of its activities is the current attempt to put the issue of family policy into the centre of CDU-politics. What is even more prominent is the fact that it was mainly due to the „Sozialausschüsse“ that the CDU now admits that Germany is an immigration country – after having refused to admit that until the year 2000. Within the party, the CDA so far has adopted one of the most sceptical attitudes towards the proposition of the party leader, Angelika Merkel, to talk about a “new social market economy”²⁶.

The „Sozialausschüsse“ are particularly successful if, apart from their regular partners, parts of the economic wing²⁷ take their side or if the party leader advocates their interest. Whether

²⁴ cf. Soziale Ordnung, Offenes Streitgespräch, 6/2001. or: Eppelmann: „Without social justice, the Union will grow old in the opposition.“ (Soziale Ordnung 7/2001). The analyses of the Allensbach Institute in 1998 are the point of reference for the subject of social justice being a cause of the defeat: Noelle-Neumann, Elisabeth, Ein Riß teilt das Land, in: Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 18.11.,1998, p.5.

²⁵ In the future, non-working mothers with children under three years should be paid a salary of 1,200 DM per month.

²⁶ cf. www.angelika-merkel.de

²⁷ This is the reason why the CDA again and again is testing whether it would be possible to act

this happens depends basically on the environment of the „Sozialausschüsse“, that is, it depends on the social interests of the citizens and on the power of the trade unions. In the nineties, the loss of power of the churches and of the trade unions, the neo-classical reorientation of the Junge Union and the internal leadership crisis in the CDA have led to a situation that weakens the „Sozialausschüsse“ in the Union. This became apparent on September 13, 1996, when the government reduced sickpay, the continued remuneration payment of in case of illness, and limited the protection against dismissal. As a result, enormous pressure was put on the officials of the „Sozialausschüsse“ at company level, and some of them left the CDA. Until the defeat in the election of 1998, September 13, 1996 was the most important day of the internal crisis. Since then, that day is the legitimation for a new claim to power within the CDU.

Finally, a few fundamental words about the perspectives of the CDA: It is quite obvious that with the end of the competition of economic systems and the insignificance of the catholic-social movement, the possibility of an anti-socialist catholic re-traditionalization has no chance. The programmatic change of the DGB-trade unions and of the SPD, both of which based on a positive assessment of the process of consensus between the social partners, market-economic regulation, and coordination between government and market, will make it more difficult for the „Sozialausschüsse“ to maintain their identity by dissociating themselves from the left. This has also changed their programmatic profile. In the future, the „Sozialausschüsse“ will be asked to fight more against right-wing, authoritarian and neo-classical political projects in the CDU (limitation of the protection against dismissal, preservation of the collective bargaining autonomy). Especially the way the welfare state will be further reformed also depends on the strength of the „Sozialausschüsse“. From this point of view, it is not a too strong neo-classical wing but a much too weak workers' wing that questions the unity of the CDU