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Pogge **A Global Principle of Fraternity? A Feminist Critique of Rawls** *and*

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## **A Global Principle of Fraternity?**

The name friendship ought to inspire respect.

--- Immanuel Kant

1. International *Philia*? The call for political relations of friendship, particularly in the international domain, strikes many as hopelessly naïve. Whereas there may have been a certain place for political friendship in the small, ancient polis of Aristotle – or even, as some argue today, as a necessary condition for justice between equal democratic citizens in the modern state (Schwarzenbach, 2007) -- in the global arena of interstate relations, the inequalities and differences among states in terms of brute power, natural resources, in terms of wealth and standard of living, etc., are just that much more *extreme*. Roughly one fourth of the planet, after all, is undernourished and starving, while the differences and diversity in natural habitats, customs, social structures, languages etc. are near infinite. The use of any genuine notion of a friendship across such myriad “differences” is stretching the term beyond its breaking point.

So too, for centuries now, the sphere of international relations has been conceived primarily in terms of a Hobbesian state of nature: as one governed by a self-interested realism or what neo-realists term “structural anarchy.” Under anarchic assumptions, states are unitary and rational actors seeking security and survival in an international system void of all genuine law and Leviathan. This system is regarded as one of self-help; each state is primarily responsible for its own security and thus (as in the well known prisoner’s dilemma where cooperation with others is far too risky) it is only rational that each must consider other states as potential threats. Under structural anarchic assumptions, that is, states would be amiss if they *did not* aim to accumulate power and military capabilities for deterrence and defensive purposes.

The problem, of course, and as Hobbes further argued long ago, is that such a diffident and anxious self-conception -- if truly universal and absent all enforcement -- quickly degenerates into a war of all against all. With each state trying to secure its own security, the system as a whole becomes *less secure*, since other states may mistake defensive efforts for offensive buildup they will be inclined to strengthen their own military capabilities as well. Individual rational (state) actions here lead to a collectively irrational outcome. If active war does not break out, it nonetheless seethes beneath the surface. Even in the best of times we are left with a global arms race and a dangerous international “balancing of power.”

Cracks are beginning to appear in this centuries old dominant picture, however, as the resurgence of neo-Kantianism in the last decades, and the explosion of work in the area of “global justice” bear witness (e.g. Beitz, 1979; Pogge, 1989; Rawls, 1971, 1999; Wendt, 1999; O’Neill, 2000; Gould, 2004; Brock & Moellendorf, 2005). Even those partaking in this promising new discourse, however, rarely (if ever) use the language of friendship. In particular, the heart of the present paper focuses on a recent debate concerning the

possibility of a global “difference principle,” that principle which Rawls, in *A Theory of Justice*, calls an expression of “fraternity” between citizens (Rawls, 1971: 105). At the same time, in his later work on international relations, Rawls explicitly *denies* that the difference principle applies between peoples (Rawls, 1999). Nonetheless, there are many who defend some version of a global difference principle – most famously Beitz and Pogge --- but they continue to shy away from any and all talk of fraternity or friendship. In what follows, I argue that *both* positions are seriously mistaken. Not only is an analysis of friendship necessary for *any* adequate account of justice (Schwarzenbach, 1996), but the *form* of friendship we assume emerges as critical to the substantive justice debate.

**2. International Relations, Structural Anarchy, and Friendship** Let us recount certain features of the dominant international relations view (IR). First, the Peace of Westphalia (1648) is generally considered the constitutive event of this modern world order, having codified the principles of tolerance and peaceful coexistence between Catholic and Protestant (European) states, as well as legitimized the existence of such religious self-sufficient states, not only as the center of political order and authority (in contrast to the Roman Emperor and Pope), but as independent (equal) actors on the international arena.

Thus, second, the new nation-states are now not only assumed to be rational, corporate actors seeking survival and security, but they are considered to be “politically sovereign;” there is no higher court of earthly political appeal. Despite a political and legal order *within* the boundaries of the state (constituted by all persons giving power over to the sovereign) the sovereign itself inhabits an uncertain state of nature populated by other sovereigns (anarchy). Since there is no authority over and above individual states to ensure rule enforcement between them, and due to the problems of cooperation noted above, a war of all against all exists just beneath the surface of this international order whenever it does not actively break out. Of course, some kind of order, security, and predictability must be sustained – even on the structural anarchistic view -- and this is done by forming leagues, creating alliances and, finally, by distinguishing “one’s friends from one’s enemies.” Since one cannot rely too much on such political alliances and friends either, however (because states cannot fully trust each other when compliance with rules is not guaranteed), the declaration of war and the making of peace become exclusive powers belonging to the sovereign. Thus, Hobbes writes in *De Cive*:

[...] no Subject can privately determine who is a *publique friend*, who an enemy, when Warre, when Peace, when Truce is to be made [...]. These, and all like matters therefore are to be learned, if need be, from the City, that is, from the Sovereign powers (Hobbes, 1972: 344).

Three centuries later, Carl Schmidt will again emphasize this power of the state to stipulate an enemy, arguing that the declaration of war in times of emergency and chaos is in fact *what constitutes sovereignty itself*. Schmidt writes in *The Concept of the Political*:

The state as the decisive political entity possesses an enormous power: the

possibility of waging war and thereby publicly disposing of the lives of men. Thus *jus belli* contains such a disposition. It implies a double possibility: the right to demand from its own members the readiness to die and unhesitatingly to kill enemies [...] As long as the state is a political entity this requirement for internal peace compels it in critical situations to decide also upon the domestic enemy [...]; the aim is always the same, namely to declare an enemy (Schmidt, 1996: 46).

In this quote of Schmidt's we have a critical further piece of the international realist position: even *internal* state unity is *maintained* by the existence of a common enemy. The enemy – whether external or from within -- becomes a “requirement for internal peace”.

A conception of friendship thus lies at the heart of the realist worldview after all. Let us call the above form of friendship and cooperation with others – hardly a friendship for its own sake, but cooperation formed under the necessity of confronting a common threat -- *negative friendship*. And it soon becomes apparent that Carl Schmidt, in all his writings and despite the importance of the friend-enemy distinction in his thought, has no other notion (nor does the neo-realist). Schmidt's model of friendship is the rather simple one of being *held together* by a common menace, like two soldiers bonding under fire. Such *comraderie* may, no doubt, produce strong emotional and long-standing attachments, as anyone who has attended a veterans' group knows. Nonetheless, such is hardly an adequate account of friendship *in general*, nor is it enough for the explanation of the behavior of political states -- as I shall next try to show.

Elsewhere I have elaborated a *positive* conception of friendship as *philia*: one performed for its own sake as in those friendships between persons who genuinely like each other. Such friends respect each other as moral equals, reciprocally express good will, “delight in each other's presence” and practically do many things for one another other (Schwarzenbach, 1996). This can clearly be the case between good parents and children, between siblings, or between lovers. Moreover, in these (far more common) everyday cases, having an “enemy” is largely *irrelevant*. It sounds decidedly odd, for instance, to say that I am a friend of Martin's *because* I hate Peter. Or, if I marry a man because such allows me to escape my family or my father, we tend to think such a poor reason for marriage -- or at least not an instance of genuine love. It is relatively late in the life of a healthy child that the concept of an enemy is even learned (in contrast to “Mommy,” “Baba,” “Nana,” etc.). Positive bonding need not be predicated on the existence of an enemy-- in fact, it appears the far more “primary” human attitude.

Such a positive conception of friendship, moreover, may be found at the political or citizen level. What Aristotle called “political friendship” works *via* public institutions, customs, a society's constitution and its laws. Citizens can show care and concern for their fellow citizens for their own sake insofar as they (at least in a democracy) enact legislation which “takes care” of everyone: citizens can enact and enforce laws such that all are minimally but decently fed, housed, have jobs, adequate medical treatment, etc. and such in turn becomes the habitual expectation (as well as obligation) of each. So too, such civic friendship applies within the modern nation state, just as well as to the

ancient polis. Since civic friendship operates, not personally, but through large scale institutions and the habits and customs these instill, it can apply to a state of millions. A central difference between ancient and modern civic friendship may be stated thus: the latter -- considering the fact of modern pluralism -- must legitimately operate via a doctrine of individual rights as well (Schwarzenbach, 1996). That is, the legitimate care and concern democratic citizens reveal to one another today can no longer be dogmatically imposed, but operates within the range of recognized legitimate differences in religion, culture and moral sensibility; it refers to an overlapping minimal conception of citizens; good.. Clearly, citizen concern for their fellows varies to a greater or lesser degree. If this is the case, however, then the question becomes why modern states -- particularly the newly emerging states of the 21<sup>st</sup> century -- should somehow be *incapable* of this form of positive “friendly” relation with other states? Again, why should the negative form of attachments between humans (hostility, fear, suspicion, greed, etc.) forever be projected as fundamental to state behavior in international affairs -- a projection the neo-realist clearly makes?

Two points should here be noted. First, a closer study of human behavior and history reveals that such projection is precisely that: *projection*. The actual state of affairs in the world (all the present wars notwithstanding) is not nearly so impoverished. Since such projection may actually *bring about* the reality that it fears and desires, however, -- namely war -- it is highly dangerous; hence we see the critical importance of delineating alternative self-conceptions, different models of agency, and realistic routes not taken.

Second, if we factor in, not merely the traditional male roles of productive competition and military activity -- always at the base of neo-realist models of motivation --, but include traditional activities of women as well, such projection on the part of IR is far easier to expose. That is, Dominant IR theory acts as if women and the alternative social and ethical “reproductive” labor they perform -- the labor of taking care of people, of healing, feeding and teaching them, of encouraging their abilities and soothing their fears, etc. -- simply do not exist. It acts as if military action and competitive production are the *only* significant forms of human labor and practice. In so proceeding, however, IR not only overlooks the activity of at least half the world’s population (not to mention all the men also performing such labor), but it falsifies history and the present state of things. Allow me briefly to elaborate upon these two points.

First, what the dominant realist view fails to acknowledge is that a principle of friendship *is* already operating internationally -- it even began to do so during the 17<sup>th</sup> century -- and not merely friendship in its negative sense. That is, the new world order of the 16<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries, not only distinguished itself from the *respublica christiana* of medieval times (associated with figures of pope and emperor), but it did so in terms of discussions of *public* friendship. Recent scholarship has revealed, for instance, that the Latin concept *amicitia* (amity or friendship) was a rare concept in The Middle Ages, at least when it concerned the concrete relations *between* princes within Christian Europe (Roschin, 2007). The idea of a public friendship functioned predominately in the *vertical* dimension of the medieval political order -- requiring princes to have some friends *among* their subjects (and thus mediating relations of subordination) as a requirement of

peace and stability – but it rarely functioned *between* principalities themselves. With the age of discovery, reformation, religious wars, and the final emergence of the sovereign nation state, however, the *horizontal* dimension became the main domain for the realization of a now international, political friendship.

For instance, not only does Moore's *Utopia* already in 1516 (as well as other literature in the utopian *genre*) use the term "friendship" in regard to external relations of abstract, political entities (such as England), but with the rediscovery of Roman law (and the influence of the ancient republican tradition), the sixteenth century saw a relative boom in concluding "friendship treaties" among European sovereigns (granted, many of them were broken and many were entered into with what were considered 'inferior' peoples) (Lesaffer, 2002: 95ff; Roschin, 2007). So too, in the seventeenth century writings of the political theorist Edward Coke [1608], or in those of the jurist Hugo Grotius [1625] (often considered the first thinker of international relations), the concept of *amity* contrasts with a public and authorized enemy [*hostis*]: that is, both refer to political entities of equal status (Roschin, 2007). Indeed, *amity* (or public friendship) is here viewed as a prerogative of the king, and perceiving other (at least European) states as a potential friend, could be a way out of religious massacres and could lay the foundation of civilized interstate conduct (codified in the peace of Westphalia in 1648).

Finally, by 1871 Thomas Starkey claims friendship with surrounding nations is *one of the three main* requirements for a commonwealth to exist and to prosper; the other two requirements being number of people and good laws and order (Roschin, 2007). These latter conceptions are clearly moving *beyond* a merely negative conception of friendship, and the historical movement is mirrored by various practices on the ground. With the slow emergence of the European Union, and despite all its recent problems, few today continue to think that the self-conception and unity of Spain, say, will persist only if it is enemies with France or Italy.

What begins to emerge is that many such thinkers (unlike a Hobbes or Schmidt) did *not* think state unity is attained *only* in the face of an enemy, nor were relations outward among neighboring states based merely on calculations of self interest and "marriages of convenience." Friendship between nations *can* and has begun to be sought positively as an end in itself. Just as for individuals and citizens, in states at least *two* incentives can operate and these differ in both motivation and effects: i) the desire to meet an external threat by cooperative effort where the cooperation is *predicated* on the continuance of the threat, and ii) cooperation from a *desire to improve relations* within the cooperating group itself (Wolfers, 1962: 25-27). Friendship, like so many other human activities, may proceed in stages.

Finally, a number of important changes since WWII reinforces this changing conception of the role of states to one another. Among these are: 1) a slow demise of the legitimacy of colonial rule; 2) increasing international recognition of human rights (and the growth of a "culture of rights"); 3) the view that war is legitimate for self-defense only (including collective defense) and, in extreme cases, for the protection of human rights; and 4) the establishment and development of the United Nations and other supranational organizations (Martin & Reidy, 2006). All of these developments entail a reevaluation of the old IR picture. Of course, the neo-realist does not claim that the

second state motivation (for improved relations) is impossible, only that the former (the desire to meet external threats) proves far more potent and reliable than the latter. We have the cynical Hobbes pitted against the more idealistic Kant.

This leads to my second point: the claim that theorizing the overlooked category of ethical reproductive labor, *praxis*, and *philia* – now applied to the domain of the relations between states – can help us break ties in the direction of Kant. For, properly speaking, such labor and activity is also that type which aims at *philia* or friendship in the best case; it helps build confidence and mutual trust (Schwarzenbach, 1996), and far more people *de facto* operate on this ethical reproductive model than Hobbes in his wildest dreams could imagine. Specifically, most *women* are still socialized for it (but many men of especially the third world as well). And surely, as the number of women increase in positions of power (not merely one or two here and there), the chances are good that their alternative “attitude” will affect the dominant view. Indeed, an increasing number of contemporary IR scholars are themselves coming to recognize that *relations comparable to those of friendship* have grown in certain regions of the world where the condition of anarchy has taken a very different turn from what realism predicted (e.g. Deutsch et al, 1957; Adler & Barnett, 1998; Wendt, 1999, Kacowicz 2000; Oelsner, 2007).

Andrea Oelsner, for instance, basing her work on the “securitisation approach” of the so-called Copenhagen School, argues that the maintenance of stable regional peace is connected with domestic processes of *desecuritisation* taking place at the regional level (Oelsner, 2007). That is, states can – and in deed have -- surmounted the Hobbesian “security” dilemma externally, without need of resorting to a global enforcer, on the one hand, and without resort to threats and shifting alliances, on the other. Allow me briefly to summarize a number of the findings of this new approach.

By “securitisation” (or “the logic of security”), Ole Waever intends the process by which issues *come to be seen as security matters* (Waever, 1998: 61). Building upon Austin’s speech act theory, Waever argues that the mere invocation of something using the word “security” can declare its existential threatening nature to some referent subject, thereby justifying the use of extraordinary measures (read competition or violence) to counter it. Security is the realm where emergency measures beyond ordinary political procedures become permissible. By contrast, “the logic of desecuritization” is the process of *moving issues out of the emergency mode* and into the normal bargaining processes of the political sphere (1998: 4). In this case, violence ceases to be a legitimate option. One can thus identify not just two but *three states* or conditions of security: i) *insecurity*, belief one lacks adequate defenses to counter perceived threats, ii) *security*, when sufficient counter-measures are felt to be available; and iii) *asecurity*: the slow erosion of the perception of threat, until neither security nor insecurity language applies.

What Oelsner adds to this securitization debate (which tends to focus on internal state processes) is the extension of its central concepts *to regional peace between states*: to the establishment of pluralistic security communities, where war becomes unthinkable, and which she argues are comparable to genuine friendship relations. Theorists have long placed stages of peace on a continuum (fragile, unstable, cold or

conditional peace) and distinguished between negative and positive forms (Boulding, 1978: 3; George, 2000: 8). Whereas negative peace might range anywhere from the recent cessation of war, perhaps with troops remaining on the borders, with continued antipathy between two societies, to the beginnings of diplomatic visits, etc., the move to a positive peace entails a different type of relation altogether. In positive peace -- defined by the presence now of mutual confidence and trust -- states do not prepare for war at all, nor do they frame issues between them in security language, nor are disputes resolved by force, but by negotiation and agreement. Here scholars distinguish at least two further stages: *stable peace* and *pluralistic security communities* (Kacowicz, 2000: 22).

The idea of a pluralist security community is important for our purposes because it is this notion that exhibits traits of genuine friendship; it is a “consolidated” zone of stable peace and

the states reciprocally observe *at least two rules* together: that of non-violence and the rule of mutual aid (Wendt, 1999: 299). Moreover, such observance is not narrowly self-interested but more “participatory” in that the societies involved have developed links, mutual sympathies, and various types of common identifications that make members perceive themselves as members of similar, or even of the same, communities (Buzan, 1998: 4). The two (or more) states typically possess similar political systems (or even common ones) and have considerable cultural exchange and economic interdependence. In sum, envisaging the option of advancing *rapprochement* with a hitherto rival need not be merely instrumental, but may already contain value for its own sake. Whereas members of the European Union, as well as Canada and the United States, are clear examples of pluralistic security communities, relations between members of, say, the Association of the Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) since the late 1970s are frequently cited as examples of stable peace.

What allows two states (even those who were once bitter rivals) to step outside “the security dilemma” and progress to a pluralist security community where war (or resolution of issues by force) has been taken “off the table”? Traditional IR might stress shifting circumstances such that two states suddenly find themselves with growing common “material interests.” But such an account could never describe more than a *contingent* calculating relationship (contingent on the coalescence of material forces), whereas recent scholarship stresses something further and deeper: a changing self-image, transformed rhetoric, the construction of common projects and an *altered perception of the other*.

In her study of the evolving relations between the once bitter rivals Argentina and Brazil, for example, Oelsner notes how in the 1970s a cold peace still prevailed: both countries were under military rule, each pursued its own nuclear development program, there were serious water disputes and negative perceptions abounded (Oelsner, 2007). To be sure, in the late 1970s U.S. pressure on nuclear arms development led both countries to cooperate (and Carter’s pressure on rights violations punished both), but simultaneous with international pressure there was a regional *abertura* (liberalization of politics) and changing domestic circumstances where leaders (military, scientific, economic) in both countries began to adopt more positive images. By 1979 Argentina,

Brazil and Paraguay had signed the Tripartite Agreement, presidents began to visit each other's countries, documents were signed ending competition -- Brazil and Argentina, for instance, established joint hydroelectric enterprises -- and Brazil went on to support Argentina's claim to the Malvinas against Britain at the United Nations and so on.

What appears to have happened (although Oelsner calls the relation between Argentina and Brazil an "incipient" security community only) is that through new interactions and ideas, identifications and perceptions were transformed, in turn opening up new possibilities of policy actions (e.g. removal of troops from borders) and an emerging confidence and trust. Analogous to the individual who is tired of fighting and suddenly realizes it is also unnecessary, a country's "interest" may be redefined in such a way that mutual peace and a positive regional friendship becomes a part of it. Further, this evolving "interstate amity" -- in direct contrast to realist claims -- tends to promote *emotional* friendship as well: the experience of successful common effort (for instance, a bilateral common market); positive rhetoric and favorable images of the other (in which government typically plays a role); increasing communication and ties among civil societies (e.g. facilitation of mobility, or cross-country recognition of degrees) and; finally, social and cultural exchange in the arts, music, languages, literature and festivals.

Thawing traditionally chilly interstate relationships, however, need hardly work always "from above." As one author notes, municipalities themselves can initiate friendly relations with other cross-border cities as in the phenomenon known as "town twinning:" the intentional creation of new practices establishing a friendship bond between towns or cities in two different countries (Vion, 2007: 283). Foremost among such practices are official ceremonies (a mix of solemnity and enjoyment: with flags, garlands, rhetorical speeches, exchange of keys to each city, etc.), the celebrations of ritual (always music, often dancing, traditional costumes, sports' competitions with their trained aggressiveness, etc.) and, of course, feasts (the enjoyment of local foods, wine, including frequent bouts of drunkenness, etc.). Containing vestiges of the medieval communes, town twinning makes an interesting study of how friendship bonds are actually forged and maintained through *the civilization of habits*, even over long distances and times, and with the necessary participation of large numbers of people. They reveal that achieving friendship -- even on the interstate level -- is not a matter of mere "discourse" or discursive speech, but that emotional and aesthetic experiences -- as well as outright "fun"-- are critical parts of the process. Similarly, what is exemplified by such rituals between two cities is not only local state or regional diplomacy, but the communal autonomy of each city or region and its inhabitants (Vion: 2007: 29x). The independence of each is hardly relinquished in the celebration of their relationship, but on the contrary exemplified.

The phenomenon of town twinning fundamentally entails widespread participation in the construction of compatible identities, mutual sympathies, and the sense of a shared transnational (at least transregional) security community with a common future and destiny. In this way, the conditions for the possibility of a genuine political friendship between larger states may emerge from the "bottom up" as well (another case, is the razing of the Berlin Wall): not just material forces are transformed

but cognitive structures, emotions, and identities too and in such a way that disputes are now resolved by negotiation and discussion -- *as if* between two friends. War between former rivals becomes unthinkable, but such is the case *only* because a great deal of ethical reproductive work and *praxis* has been performed on both sides and become deeply embedded in the history of the relationship.

Indeed, in direct contrast to Schmidt's claim that it is a sign and first right of sovereignty to declare war in the name of state interest, what appears to be emerging over time is a *duty* among states to pursue a positive friendship. But for instances of genuine self-defense (instances in actual fact growing ever rarer), the declaration of war *need no longer be perceived* as crucial to our emerging conception of state sovereignty (much as the death penalty is no longer considered a civilized state's internal right by many nations). Just as I no longer see myself physically "fighting" to resolve disputes with my family members, my colleagues or fellow citizens (something many of us still did as a child), the time is arriving when the sovereign state matures to the point where military methods will be revealed for what they characteristically are: the egoistic utilization of brute force -- typically combined with base ulterior motives -- that increasingly wins only the world's *condemnation*. Certainly women as a whole are becoming ever less enamored of the macho show of military muscle (Fisher, 2002). The emerging positive duty on the part of states, moreover, must include the rhetoric and images of good will and friendship, backed by practical actions and sustained funding, as well as the construction of common projects, cultural exchanges and participation in festivities, histories and simple fun. All of these result *in the changed perceptions and motives* of a state's own (as well as of the other's) citizens.

Of course, the case of Brazil and Argentina may be distinguished by the fact that both are large industrializing countries of the southern hemisphere, with contiguous borders, each rich in natural resources, with vast populations and each capable of standing on its own feet. What if we turn our attention to the relations between North and South in general, however, or between the wealthy United States and, say, impoverished Bangladesh? It is at this point, that Rawls's famous difference principle again becomes relevant -- only now at the international level.

**3. A Global Difference Principle?** Scholars tend to agree that the modern nation-state is undergoing profound transformations, but they hardly agree in which direction. Unfortunately, much of the recent debate on global justice proceeds in terms of "integration" or its absence -- a conception and vocabulary that is far too simple. On the one extreme, we find the many moral and political cosmopolitans (Charles Beitz, Carol Gould, Martha Nussbaum, Thomas Pogge, Henry Shue, Peter Singer, Peter Unger, etc.) who argue that we are all "world citizens" now due to the "globalization" of both legal and economic structures, a process whereby the functions of the nation state are increasingly being replaced by new "horizontally" dispersed agencies and/or world agents (e.g. NGOs, the UN, the World Bank, International Monetary Fund, WTO, and so on). Such integration is not only assumed to be inevitable by this group, but for the most part *a good thing*; global interaction is revealing our dependencies and need for one another, including our common "shared humanity", etc. Although most cosmopolitans do not advocate a world government, there exists a subset who argue for

global political democracy (e.g. David Held or Kai Neilson) on the one hand, or for some version of a global economic difference principle, on the other (Beitz and Pogge).

In the opposed camp, we find critics of globalization who claim all moves towards greater integration inevitably favor the most powerful states such as the United States or those of the European Union --hegemonic states who can set the rules of the game to their own advantage -- and thus this alternative group of theorists advocates “de-globalization.” Omar Dahbour, for example, argues *against* “a world of common concern” and claims that a system of “mutual indifference” is actually preferable. Building upon the work of Herman Daly and John Cobb (and we might assume many of the Seattle protests against the WTO in 1999), Dahbour concludes that the ideal global community is one of autonomous, ecologically sustainable, communities that are “disengaged” and even “self-absorbed” (Dahbour, 2005: 217).

In this section, I argue it is not *whether* there should be “integration” or not (nor even how much of it there should be, etc.), but rather the *quality* of the relations between what at present still count as nation-states. And, for this purpose, a model of a now international political *philia* becomes critically necessary for (as in the domestic case) it may play *the role of normative guide*; it can help distinguish undesirable “integration” (domination, oppression, exploitation, etc.) from the more enabling and positive sorts of interactions between persons and peoples. Specifically, I here turn to a well-known argument for an international difference principle: to Thomas Pogge’s Global Resource Dividend (GRD), which is a tax on the use of the earth (roughly 1% of the global product) by the wealthy nations, as that which rightfully belongs to the poorer peoples (Pogge, 2002: Ch.8). I focus on Pogge’s view, not only because his proposal has garnered much attention of late, but also because it begins to broach the important issue of environmental responsibility as well.<sup>1</sup>

In its simplest formulation, Rawls’s difference principle states that any systematic differences in the basic structure of a particular society should work to advance the position of its “worst off members” (Rawls, 1971: 60). Famously, in his later work on international relations, Rawls denies that this “principle of fraternity” should apply to the global community, for the main reason that one people should not have to bear the costs of decisions made by another (Rawls, 1999: 116ff). Beyond a guarantee of minimal universal rights, general fair trade practices and laws, as well as an important transitional “duty of assistance” to help “burdened societies” (societies where conditions are so dismal that just institutions are impossible) until such point as they can manage their own affairs justly, there should be no further economic “target” such as reducing vast inequalities in wealth for its own sake. This is the case, because Rawls believes the “crucial element” in how a society fares in establishing just institutions (the ultimate political goal in his view) is its “political culture” and *not* the level of its resources. “The arbitrariness of the distribution of natural resources causes no difficulty,” Rawls writes and he mentions, as illustrative of his point, Japan, which is flourishing despite

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<sup>1</sup> For my critique of the anti-globalization argument, see my forthcoming *On Civic Friendship*, Ch.6, where I argue that this group of thinkers overstates their case; integration *need not* be exploitation, even if at present it often is.

possessing scanty natural resources (Rawls, 1999:119). Not only would a global difference principle require some form of “world government” for its implementation -- and hence in his view a dangerous concentration of power – but every society (except for the burdened ones) has within its own population a sufficient array of human capabilities and resources to realize just institutions on its own. Rawls’s “law of peoples” concerns itself with “the justice of societies” or “peoples” and is *not* a cosmopolitan view concerned with the “well being of individuals.”

By now numerous thinkers have argued that Rawls’s arguments justifying a *domestic* difference principle continue to hold for the international domain; Rawls fails to give adequate justification for “the separation of contexts.” Most importantly, Beitz and Pogge point to an ever more integrated global “basic structure:” a more or less common background of international economic, political, and social institutions, as well as an extensive and shared history of European colonialism. Although not as tight knit as in many domestic cases, such modern world institutions include increasing global trade with a general set of rules, an ever-growing body of internationally recognized law and a developing language of universal human rights norms. Further, just as in the domestic case, this common “system of cooperation” morally demands (*via* a similar method of choice now from within a higher level global original position) that those who gain most by this global system should do so *only if* they also benefit the earth’s worst off members. This is particularly critical when one acknowledges that the inequality between states (and between northern and southern hemispheres) in terms of wealth and advantages is not only radical, but in the last few decades has been *radically expanding*.

For instance, the income gap between the fifth of the world’s people living in the richest countries and the fifth living in the poorest -- far from diminishing, as many believe -- is growing at an astonishing rate. According to the 1999 UN Development report, in 1820 this gap was 3 to 1; by 1913 it was 7:1; in 1960 30:1; but in 1997 it was 74:1 and with no end in sight (Pogge, 2001: 13). Similarly, one quarter of the 6 billion people alive on the earth today subsist below the international poverty line (pegged at about \$2 per day), while 1/3 of all human deaths on the planet are due to hunger related causes. This means global hunger causes approximately 18 million person deaths *per year* -- 15 million of which are children. Finally, Pogge emphasizes that such radical inequality is fully *avoidable*. Effective reduction of hunger and severe poverty worldwide, it is generally estimated, would require an effort costing perhaps as much as \$230 billion annually for several years – an enormous amount until one realizes that this is only 1% of the affluent countries’ gross national product (Pogge, 2001: 14). The fact that we *can* help with so little cost to ourselves underscores the “ought” and the fact that we should.

Pogge labels his approach to global justice “ecumenical;” he uses different arguments appealing to the diverse assumptions of his different readers (Pogge, 2002: 199ff). Thus, in the face of those (such as Nozick) who defend historical-entitlement conceptions of justice, Pogge points out that the actual historical path leading to the present inequality arose by way of grievous wrong. There is a *causal, historical, connection* between how such inequality came about and the past practices of the

wealthier nations: in particular, the ugly and violent history of European colonialism with its bitter legacy of exploited peoples, destruction of their local institutions, and theft of natural resources.

To the libertarian of a different stripe (one who doesn't believe that the actual history is relevant for today), Pogge argues that the richer nations also violate their – purely *negative*—

duties not to harm the global poor *now*; they do so by continuing to uphold and exploit the global system for their own advantage (Pogge, 2002: 201). Whether through unilateral appropriations (often by way of the military) or through institutional arrangements such as the imposition of radically non-equalitarian property regimes, the rich nations are not leaving “enough and as good” natural resources of the globe to the poor (Locke's criterion of the state of nature baseline). Finally, to those of a broadly consequentialist persuasion, Pogge argues that there exists *a feasible alternative* under which such extreme poverty would not persist: adopting a Global Resource Dividend (GRD) or 1% tax on the use of the world's resources by the wealthy as compensation to the poor for their exclusion from adequate access to natural resources. In sum, the present state of affairs, where social and economic human rights are unfulfilled on a massive scale, is morally unacceptable whichever way one looks at it. We denizens of the rich countries all share in responsibility for such rights “unfulfillment” insofar as we participate in and continue to support the existing institutional imposition of this order.

Not surprisingly, many of Pogge's critics have attacked his empirical, causal claims. Thus (like Rawls) they stress the frequent corruption and incompetence of many third world officials, and the latter's responsibility for the poverty of their own people, etc. The responsibility of local officials and institutions for their peoples' poverty is surely often the case, but from this it does not follow (as Pogge points out) that the advantaged nations therefore have no responsibility; there are typically multiple causes of poverty. (Rawls himself commits this fallacy when he writes that “the crucial element” in poverty is a people's “political culture” -- including their religious, philosophical and moral traditions -- but then goes on to treat such as the *only* factor (Rawls, 1999: 117.) Indeed, Pogge shows quite nicely how the present global system of trade and property rights *sets the agenda and many of the incentives* for local corruption (for instance, by granting international legal recognition and ownership rights of national resources to every two bit tyrant – what Pogge calls a “resource and borrowing privilege” -- which in turn encourages further coups attempts by illegitimate others to plunder their nation's wealth).

Even if we acknowledge the critical importance of a background global structure, however, others argue that by Pogge's *own criteria* we are responsible only for those who partake in a coerced “shared system of cooperation;” this is hardly each and every impoverished person at every far-flung corner of the disconnected earth (Risse, 2005:100). Pogge appears to leave himself open to such criticism when he (ambiguously) writes in such instances: “[w]e are concerned about avoidably unfulfilled human rights not simply insofar as they exist at all, but *only* insofar as they are produced by coercive social institutions in whose imposition we are involved” [emphasis

mine] (Pogge, 2002: 172). Nonetheless, critics such as Reiss overlook the fact that the causal argument is only *one strand* of Pogge's overall "ecumenical approach."

In the view proffered here, all such criticisms miss the central thrust of Rawls's original (economic) difference principle: it is a political interpretation of *fraternity* which expresses the idea of *not wanting* to have greater advantages unless this is to the benefit of others less well off (Rawls: 1971: 105). Thus, even if some of Pogge's causal claims break down (which I believe they do), it is still the case that *a significant portion* of world poverty is due to the legacies of colonialism. So too, it is still true that world hunger and poverty are *avoidable* through a better global institutional order; an alternative system is clearly possible. But most importantly, even if the above were not the case, there still exists (as argued in Section #2) the political duty of positive friendship; it is a duty we attract simply by being alive and human and living in a half way functioning state (what Kant called "*Menschenliebe*"). In explicit contrast to Pogge, we have a *prima facie* duty (other things being equal) to befriend even those we might discover on Venus and to help them should they be in trouble (Pogge: ). Why? Because such is an expression of our essentially *giving* nature (just as fundamental as our "taking" side); it a part of our human nature traditionally expressed far more in ethical reproductive labor and activity, than in production or the military. The question now becomes whether Pogge's Global Resource Dividend is the best way to pursue this international duty.

I next offer three criticisms of Pogge's GRD principle, difficulties that (significantly enough) track my earlier criticisms of Rawls's domestic difference principle itself (Schwarzenbach, 1986). Most importantly, Pogge's proposal, i) does little to dislodge the reigning Lockean conception of *labor as acquisitive production*: the dominant paradigm of "mixing one's labor" with the natural physical world with the aim of private property. Although Pogge explicitly criticizes the ideal type *homo economicus* (the model of the acquisitive individual seeking to maximize his preferences, 2005: 29), he fails to delineate any plausible alternative conception of work. On the contrary, Pogge (like Rawls) accepts a number of questionable tenants of neoclassical economics. We find scattered throughout his texts, for instance, references to "economic growth" (as if this were an unmitigated good), to percentages of Gross National Product (which environmentalists increasingly emphasize is *the wrong* and a highly destructive *measure*), and Pogge leaves the structure of property rights pretty much as they are (but for his 1% resource tax). There is, for instance, no further attempt to limit or restructure the firm or economic corporations themselves. Pogge even sees his closeness to standard economic theory as a virtue; he writes that it is possible "without major changes to our global economic order [...] to eradicate world hunger within a few years"(2005: 205-6).

From the perspective of this essay, this last claim is mere wishful thinking. Not only (like Rawls) does Pogge minimize the human as well as environmental waste and destructiveness of the present system of production, but in lacking any alternative conception of labor, he ignores the ethical reproductive activity of millions of people (many of them women) who still perform it outside the market (and in the industrialized world as well). As a consequence, ii) the *motivation* for the richer countries to give even

1% of their GNP remains problematic on Pogge's own assumptions. If the ideal of individual economic action (and a central goal of the nation state) remains private acquisition and "economic growth," then the moral "ought" that the individual should think of others also emerges as a bit weak -- like blowing into a strong headwind. Pogge acknowledges this problem when he writes, "there remains the problem of generating this good will, especially on the part of the rich and mighty" (2002: 210).

Indeed, on this point, Pogge is between a rock and a hard place, for his main proposal concerning a GRD has also been criticized as "unrealistic" by others (e.g. Jamieson: 2005: 161). Let us repeat that this is *not* our criticism. Pogge's proposals are hardly farfetched *if* one rejects the acquisitive self as necessarily primary in the realm of labor (as a false description of human motivation in general) *and*, at the same time, acknowledges and delineates the realistic alternative model of ethical reproductive activity: labor and action whose ultimate aim is the reproduction of flourishing human relations, in the best case, relations of *philia*. Nor can such labor be so easily appropriated or bought by the more powerful nations, for any genuine friendship must include the recognition and free response of both parties or peoples. Finally, it is hard to imagine that women *as a group* would not support a global policy, which is so clearly an extension of their traditional line of work, were they only allowed entry into our international governing institutions *en masse* and on equal terms. Thus, it is not so much that Pogge's principle is actually unrealistic or unrealizable as it is that his own theory has insufficiently questioned reigning assumptions regarding labor and motivation, assumptions which keep the principle from being plausible to so many of the first world.

This last point leads to our third and final criticism of the GRP principle. Again, like Rawls's domestic principle, the GRP *operates from the "top-down."* In Rawls's domestic theory the difference principle is to be implemented by one of the four branches of government: that branch which implements "the principle of need" (*TJ*, Sec. 43). However, what might be called *the problem of theoretical acceptance* emerges. If the private acquisitive self is assumed as primary in the realm of individual action and labor, there exists little possibility that the difference principle could *ever* become an actual directive of representative government. For, what will motivate the average individual -- atomized and self-absorbed after long hours in the competitive market place -- to vote for this "principle of fraternity"? How are fundamentally acquisitive individuals suddenly to emerge unscathed and other-directed in the voting booth? Similarly, there exists the problem of how the difference principle would practically be implemented *even if it were accepted* by government and decided upon "from above." That is, if the dominant model of individual behavior remains the Lockean acquisitive self, who in this case will do the actual hands on, other-directed activity of feeding and caring for the hungry in the concrete? Who will carry out the project and see its completion through to the end? This may be called the problem of *the practical implementation* of Rawls's principle

The same difficulties of both theoretical acceptance and practical implementation plague Pogge's proposal. Pogge just *assumes* that his GRP is to be applied by the United Nations or by some analogous economic global agency (2002: Ch.8) without taking into account the resistance of the wealthier nations nor problems of enforcement,

etc. Similarly, *even if* we could somehow manage to get the rich and powerful nations to consent and agree upon when and how to extract dividends and redistribute them -- sending monies to where they are needed most on the planet -- these are merely but *the first steps* in the far larger practical project of *de facto* feeding the starving, much less of bringing about an end to world hunger and poverty. That is, these steps are hardly sufficient although (to Pogge's credit) they may well be necessary.

Let us here distinguish four stages in any accomplished act of genuinely caring for another (Tronto, 1993:) whether personal or political. In any positive duty of aid, there exists i) *noticing the existence of a need in the other* as well as ii) *beginning to take some responsibility* for its fulfillment. In the case under consideration, that the wealthy nations actually acknowledge the horror and immensity of world hunger, as well as grant at least 1% of their collective wealth to help the poor would be the equivalent of taking these two steps. For a genuine act of friendship or care to be completed, however, at least two further stages are necessary: iii) the actual "*hands on*" *reproductive labor* which goes about concretely working to satisfy particular need and iv) the final stage of *listening and obtaining feedback* from the worst off regarding their position. To my knowledge Pogge speaks about neither of these two last stages. But what is sending money abroad but a way of *getting other people* to do the actual hands on reproductive labor all people -- but especially the starving and vulnerable -- need?

Concerned about precisely this top-down implementation of Pogge's GRP principle, a further set of criticisms has emerged in the literature. Mathias Risse, for instance, has pointed out how such freely moving "monies" from the advanced nations present numerous problems: there is the danger that such outside assistance from the world's wealthy is often *ineffective* (one can't import what is truly needed to end hunger, which are local institutions built up from within); such funds are spent *inefficiently* (often going to special and corrupt interests rather than to the poor); there is the *paternalism concern* (outsider help from above is inevitably shaped according to the giver's understanding); those giving aid are still *lacking in responsibility* (after their failures, they simply move on), and the stability of *local institutions may be undermined* (by continued support from without) (Risse, 2005: 91).

Similarly, Dale Jamieson advocates "extreme caution" in the face of such a global principle (Jamieson, 2005: 154). Jamieson points to what he calls the "LiveAid Conception" of humanitarian aid that emerged from the celebrity-driven, media-centered projects of the 1970s and 1980s. This conception models humanitarian aid (reflected in Singer's analogy of plucking a drowning child from the pond) as a response to immediate needs of innocent, passive victims (primarily women and children), whose lives are threatened by some natural disaster (such as a drought or earthquake). In actual fact, however, Jamieson argues things are far more complex. Famine is increasingly being revealed as linked to war, vulnerability (frequently due to ecological degradation), systematic violations of human rights, and radically unequal power relations.<sup>2</sup> If we are so concerned with world hunger perhaps our primary goal should

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<sup>2</sup> From 1990-2000, for instance, two million children died in wars, three times the total number of American soldiers killed throughout history (Jamieson, 2005: 155).

be aimed at *hindering wars and ecological destruction in the first place* – at the very least stop instigating and perpetuating them -- and a decrease in poverty and starvation may just follow.

So too, humanitarian assistance (and development aid, I am here not distinguishing between them) has *become a self-serving industry*. As the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) has itself acknowledged, of the billions of dollars the US spent on foreign aid in the late 1990s (actually a tiny fraction of 1% of its global GDP), an astonishing 77% went to suppliers within the United States (Jamieson, 2005: 159). Nor is such aid distributed on the basis of need, but largely for political reasons. While the United States spends more than 20% of its development aid on the relatively well off Israel and Russia (and lately increasingly on Bosnia and Iraq), the far larger needs of Africa continue to be ignored. Finally, Jamieson points to the serious new dangers that accompany using military intervention in the name of peacekeeping and aid. Not only are armies trained primarily to kill people and to smash things (they are not humanitarian organizations), but many an imperial empire (e.g. the British) enriched the mother nation in the name of “doing good” to others (for the British, ostensibly to abolish the slave trade and spread civilization).

So what is to be done? Most of the above dangers could be avoided, I believe, if our primary aim in helping the worst off is not simply to send dollars, but to *re-conceive the fundamentals of our own laboring arrangements first*. Not only must the production model of labor, along with its destructive consumption, be criticized far more ruthlessly than Pogge does, but it must also be acknowledged that there exists an alternative type of activity—and millions upon millions of laboring peoples-- that the old productive ideal actually *obscures*: those still operating on an ethical reproductive model. Again, what is needed today is a *profound change in the awareness and structure of dominant motivation in the wealthy nations*. I have argued, moreover, that such a widespread change in motivation is hardly utopian once we begin to factor in (finally) the alternative structure of motivation operating right before our eyes, and which has been eclipsed by reigning metaphors and theories. Elsewhere I have argued that in the emerging 21<sup>st</sup> century state -- where ethical reproductive labor and *praxis* is finally acknowledged at the highest levels of government -- at least one half of our (US) exorbitant military budget should be turned into a mandatory civil service: a service where ethical reproductive labor (and not productive and military skills) would be more fairly distributed among all (Schwarzenbach, 1996: 125). Similarly here, at the international level and in the name of international *philia*, why not send, not simply dollars, certainly not our weapons and military, but our idealistic and unarmed youth in what could be an expanded peace corps, as it were? Before rejecting this possibility outright (and perhaps laughing in the face at such *naïveté*), let us ponder this proposal for just a moment.

As a partial fulfillment of their mandatory civic duties, the 18-25 year olds of the rich nations could be sent to foreign and exotic lands for six months or up to a year, not to exploit or control the inhabitants, but with no further aim than to learn and *to be of service*. Carefully supervised and trained by local organizations themselves, such crews of strong and healthy youth (rather than our weapons, economic theories, etc.)

could be sent to where they are needed most: to build roads, transport food or medicines, to help bring in the harvest or to watch the children, etc. In this way, the youth of the richer (but often emotionally impoverished) nations could learn of how the other half lives: of their work and family life, their festivals and growing seasons, their sacred rites and alternative ways of life. For the wealthy nation's privileged youth, such would be an opportunity to see beyond the endless materialism, the vacuous bubble of country clubs, elite hotels and debutante gatherings. For the less well off (of the wealthier nations) it may be the only opportunity to travel and experience foreign lands that their lives afford. In this way *all* citizens will have at some point left the narrow confines of their home countries. What these young people from the wealthier nations lack in expertise and know how, moreover, they will surely make up one thousand fold by their energy, their curiosity and their enthusiasm -- above all by their often still in tact ethical idealism. Such crucial experiences will also surely leave a host of strong and positive concrete friendship relationships in its wake.

#### **4. Conclusion**

The nation state is clearly in transition. However, recent calls by postmodern, cosmopolitan, Marxist and others, for the growing insignificance or even end of the modern state altogether are a bit premature. While clearly the political state's absolute sovereignty has come to an end -- it is no longer considered legitimate to make war in the name of plunder or self-interest, for instance, or to kill members of its own citizenry (as in the death penalty, which most civilized lands have abolished) -- the whole of its role is by no means expendable. It is true, the nation state's actions are being restricted by an ever-evolving doctrine of international law and universal human rights, and its legitimate unity (in the face of a growing multiculturalism world-wide) is ever less to be found in the "nation" proper: in birth, blood, religion or ethnic identity. Nonetheless, while certain traditional functions are being given over, on the one hand, to more global institutions (such as the United Nations or WHO) and, on the other, to more local ecological and civic groups of civil society, there still remains much for the democratic representative state to accomplish before it takes its bow from the stage of history and becomes obsolete. Among these central goals are realizing a reasonable democratic control over its own economy, working conditions and ecological territory, as well as striving (I have argued) for a positive political friendship, not only between its own citizens, but with its international neighbors as well. And, in this way, the new state is in actual fact only realizing a promise vaguely expressed already in the Peace of Westphalia in 1648: the duty of amity or, as we here like to call it, that of both civic and political friendship. International *amity*, perceiving other sovereign peoples as a potential friend -- and such takes a good deal of preparation and work back on the home territory -- must become an explicit demand of the peace and women's movement and may just be the surest way out of a new round of religious and other massacres.

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