Representational Force Meets 'Real'-ist Force:
Thoughts on the relationship between linguistic and material forms of coercion

Janice Bially Mattern
Associate Professor
Department of International Relations
Lehigh University

How does language express power? And how does 'language-power' matter for world politics? While these questions are not new in International Relations (IR) of late, they have acquired renewed importance. With a more sophisticated understanding of language-power can come deeper insight into the politics of meaning that constitute the contemporary global crisis of 'terror' and 'war'. Against this backdrop this essay considers the conceptual development of one particular type of language power that scholars increasingly take as central to the production of meaning—*representational force.*

Otherwise referred to as rhetorical coercion or discursive entrapment, representational force is a form of language-power expressed through narrative structures that threaten unacceptable harm to an audience's subjectivity (Barnett 1998; Krebs and Jackson 2007). Because representational force *compels* the audience members (rather than persuades or deceives them) to submit to the logic of the narrative through which it is expressed, representational force suggests how representations that are roundly contested can nonetheless prevail (Bially Mattern 2005). In this way representational force offers a framework for understanding how, for instance, hypocritical national and international representations of danger and justice can prevail and persist as legitimate justifications for policy (Gelber and McDonald 2006; Krebs and Lobasz Forthcoming).

And yet if representational force is to offer satisfying analytic leverage over the political dynamics entailed in the production of meaning, its conceptual contours must be developed considerably. One notable gap concerns the connection between representational force, as a form of language-power, and other forms of power, whether

expressed through language, practice, materiality or so on.[1]   Understanding these interconnections is important for, while it is analytically necessary to delineate among forms of power and their expressions, each such manifestation is part and parcel of the same phenomenon.   Thus all modalities of power are necessarily interconnected and related so that in a given context there may well be many types of power at work (Barnett and Duvall 2005).   The question, largely neglected by those interested in language-power (and by IR scholars more generally) is how the simultaneous expression of different modalities of power interact with each other. Wisdom on this issue can help promote more sophisticated accounts of the role of representational force in world politics.

What is ultimately needed is a systematic matrix of the interaction between representational force and the multifarious forms and expressions of power. As a start, however, it makes sense to begin with the form and expression of power most common to IR scholars: 'real' force, or more exactly, the realist conception of force. In what follows, I characterize 'real'-ist force, contrast it with representational force, and argue that these forms of force are continuous and recursive with each other rather than dichotomous and opposing. This suggests that in order for studies focused on representational force to be convincing, they must take systematic account of the context created by 'real'-ist expressions of force. And yet, the dependence of representational and 'real' force upon each other is not equal, as it were. The functionality of 'real' force depends upon the meaning-producing effects of language-power while the reverse is not necessarily true. The implication is that representational force can operate independently in the production of meaning, if not from other modalities of power, at least from 'real' force.

---

[1] Though elsewhere I offered a preliminary account of how representational force is related to two other forms of language-power: persuasion and demand (Bially Mattern 2005: 103-106).

This indicates that it is not just analysts of representational force—usually constructivists—that need to embed their concepts more carefully within the larger context of power. Realists must do so as well.

'Real'-ist Force

For many IR scholars force, understood in realist terms as power politics, is what *really* gives shape to world politics (Schelling 1966; Schmidt 2005:524). What does it mean then to think of force as power politics? To unpack this realist conceptualization, consider force in a generic sense. Force is a particular way of *exercising* power that is distinguishable from other such exercises along three dimensions (Connolly 1974).[2] First, force is exercised *bluntly*, meaning that the force-wielder's intent is made obvious. Manipulation, to offer a contrasting example, is an exercise of power that is not blunt because the power-holder conceals his intent from the subject. Second, force is exercised for *self-interested* purposes in that the perpetrator's intention is to settle in his favor what he perceives to be a zero-sum conflict. In contrast, authority, for instance, cannot be exercised solely in the self-interest of the perpetrator for that would undermine his legitimacy. Finally, force is *nonnegotiable* in that it leaves the victim with no viable alternative options. The victim faces a 'nonchoice' ultimatum of either compliance or unacceptable loss or suffering. By contrast, persuasion is a form of power that is necessarily negotiable since the recipient is not constrained by considerations of penalties (Wrong 1988).[3] Exercises of power that are simultaneously blunt, self-interested, and

---

[2] In this way force is an adjective not a noun; it modifies the noun of 'power' (Wrong 1988). Interestingly, one can thus almost talk about force without having to resolve the contested nature of power itself (Bially Mattern 2008, forthcoming).
[3] This is an illustrative, not exhaustive, list of nonforceful forms of power.

nonnegotiable are forceful. According to these generic guidelines, power politics, understood as the intent to leverage violence in order to drive a victim into compliance, are an instance of force (Morgenthau 1954).

But the realist conception of force as power politics can also be distinguished from the generic conception. For one, unlike the generic conception, the realist conception recognizes a distinction between coercive and brute force. As Schelling explains brute force is an exercise of power that aims to limit the options of its subject through conquest—by overcoming the victim's strength. In contrast coercive force seeks to limit the options of its subject by making the victim so afraid of some pain or loss that it succumbs in order to avoid it. Brute force, thus, is exercised through physical attack while coercive force is exercised through a psychological trap. Coercive force, in other words, is intended to effect overbearing anxiety and, thus, submission from the victim (Schelling 1966:3-4). Since power politics only properly count as power politics for realists when they target the victim's *psychology* it follows that realists conceive of force in coercive, not brute, terms.[4]

A second distinguishing characteristic of realist force is that it presumes that the resources or vehicles through which force (power politics) can be expressed are tangible and scarce. More specifically, although force is an exercise or practice rather than a thing, it is made possible, like all exercises and practices, by access to relevant resources (Lukes 2005). So what kinds of resources facilitate the expression of forceful power? On this question the generic conception of force is silent; it entails no specific assertions about which kinds of resources might become vehicles for the expression of force. The effect is

---

[4] Coercion exerts power over psychology, which creates a struggle. Brute force does so over the body, implying nothing but biology (Morgenthau 1954), 27.

that the generic conception leaves open a broad range of possibilities, suggesting that the resources for force may be infinite and heterogeneous.

The realist conception of force presumes the opposite. Steeped as it is in the state-centric, nationalist framework for thinking about the management of an unforgiving anarchy, realists link security to the capacity of states to effectively practice power politics. Thus the whole purpose of realist theory is to understand which particular resources will endow states with the capacity to wield coercive force. If there were an infinite pool of force-enabling resources, theorists would be too overwhelmed by the possibilities to make specific observations that can be useful for states. Realists thus have come to primarily focus on the one type of resource that is both 'important' and easily measurable: material capabilities. Whether this means military, economic, or demographic assets (Morgenthau 1954; Schweller 1998; Mearsheimer 2001), or whether it also means others' perceptions of those assets (Wohlforth 1993) the realist conception of force necessarily links an actor's force-wielding potential to material conditions.

This emphasis on material capabilities raises one final aspect of a realist conception of force that, while not ruled out by the generic conception, is not required in the way it is in the realist conception. This is the notion that what makes a threat to a victim credible (and thus effective at producing psychological anxiety and exacting compliance) is the harm it promises to do to that victim's *physical or material* well-being. Thus when military power or economic sanctions are used to communicate a threat, they send that message by threatening the victim's body and wealth. Certainly the compliance exacted through those threats may entail nonmaterial or nonphysical 'activities' (e.g., the apparent adherence to certain values) but even so, it is the threat to the victim's physical or material well-being that accomplishes the psychological anxiety that does the coercive

work.   It is this undeniable, material threat of violence to the body that makes the realist

conception of force seem so immediate and fundamental; it is what underwrites the broad

acceptance among IR scholars that the realist conception of force captures the 'real'

expression of force.   It is, thus, a 'real'-ist account.

In short, a 'real'-ist conception of force tracks with the generic view of a blunt,

self-interested, and nonnegotiable exercise of power.   But beyond that it specifies that to

qualify as force, such an exercise of power must aim to *threaten* its victim into compliance

by using *material capabilities* to credibly promise the delivery of some degree of *physical or*

material harm that the victim finds *psychologically intolerable*.

Representational Force

Representational force is like realist force in that it is a blunt, self-interested and

nonnegotiable exercise of power.   It is also like 'real'-ist force in that it treats force as

coercive rather than brute. Representational force, that is, works not by direct violent

attack but by leveraging threats of violence that generate such unbearable psychological

anxiety for the victim that it submits to the force-wielder's demands.   But representational

force is also quite different from 'real'-ist force.   For one, whereas in the realist conception

the threat of violence is leveraged against the victim's physical or material well-being,

with representational force the threat of violence is leveraged against the well-being of the

victim's subjectivity—understood as the matrix of discursively produced, constantly

evolving identities that make up the victim's Self.   Moreover, whereas in its realist

manifestation force is expressed through material capabilities, in its representational

manifestation, force is expressed through language—or more precisely, through the

linguistic structure, or genre, through which the force-wielder communicates the threat.

In short, rather than using material capabilities to threaten material or physical violence, representational force uses 'linguistic capabilities' to threaten 'identity violence'. [5]

To understand how such a process works, one must first appreciate that identity, and so the matrix that constitutes the Self, is socially constructed. It is produced, sustained, and altered through intersubjective, social processes. Just what those processes are is a matter of significant research[6] but at some implicit or explicit level all identity-constituting processes depend on language. [7] Understood as collective or socially shared sign systems,[8] language is what enables actors to make their ideas intelligible to each other, and so to differentiate characteristics in ways that create social knowledge of the boundary between self and other (Derrida 1978; White 1987). Indeed, given the fundamental role of language in identity-production, it seems more precise to say that identity and subjectivity are *sociolinguistically* constructed.

A sociolinguistically constructed Self, however, is intrinsically vulnerable. Representational force works by playing upon this vulnerability. More exactly, insofar as subjectivity is sociolinguistically constructed, so can it be socially unconstructed, altered, or even dissolved.[9] The reason is that identities are only as stable as the narratives that render their boundaries socially intelligible. So when those narratives are interrupted,

[5] Thus the use of representational force constitutes a "power politics of identity" (Bially Mattern 2001).
[6] For instance, practice, culture, rules, discourse, argument, and interaction (Onuf 1989; Campbell 1992; Adler and Barnett 1998; Bukovansky 2002; Crawford 2002; Neumann 2002).
[7] Practices, rules, culture and interaction all require prior communicative exchanges to make their meaning, and so reality-producing implications, socially intelligible (Scollon 2001). Argument and discourse are language-based forms of communicative exchange.
[8] Any sign system amounts to language – whether those signs are verbal or written words, gestures, art, or other forms of expression.
[9] For subjectivity to dissolve, all of a person's identities must be erased. Thus, amnesia or trauma could dissolve subjectivity. More common is that specific identities within the matrix of subjectivity are dissolved.

modified, or silenced, some degree of alteration occurs to the larger subjectivity.[10] This

can be problematic because actors tend to become psychologically attached to their

identities and subjectivity.[11] Indeed, they can become so attached that challenges to the

logic of their Self—dissident narratives, or ones that offer a radically competing

perspective—are experienced as *threats* to its very survival. Dissident narratives, in other

words, can become sources of 'ontological insecurity' (Mitzen 2005). Representational

force works precisely by generating dissident narratives; ones that would, if socially

accepted, radically and unacceptably alter or even destroy the sociolinguistic matrix of a

victim's Self.

Once a force-wielder generates a threatening dissident narrative[12] he delivers it to

the victim via the genre through which he communicates his demands for compliance.

More exactly, genre is the logical structure according to which words and sentences are

organized to form a narrative—for instance, metaphor, argument, negotiation, and

(linguistic) fighting are all genres. In this way, genres are like templates or structures into

which content can be 'plugged'. What is important is that each different genre forges a

different relationship between speaker and listener. Thus narratives structured according

to the logic of argument, for instance, forge a relationship of equality among

interlocutors. By contrast, narratives structured according to the logic of (linguistic)

fighting forge a relationship of bully and victim between speaker and listener, respectively.

This is because they are constructed by connecting phrases and sentences that depict the

---

[10] For instance, when a parent disowns a child, he effectively erases the reality of 'parent-child', writing a
new narrative about their relationship instead. If that narrative sticks (not all do; more below) it
fundamentally changes who each actor is in relation to the other, thus changing the configuration of
identities that constitute each of their subjectivities.
[11] For an account of how a de-centered subject can become psychologically attached to its Self see Bially
Mattern 2005, Chapter 4.
[12] Because each victim has different subjectivity each is threatened by different types of dissident narratives.

speaker's demands to phrases and sentences that depict vulnerabilities in the listener's subjectivity.[13] The combination yields a blunt, self-interested, and nonnegotiable threat.

To offer a somewhat obvious example from IR, consider how, during the early post-9/11 days, the US intimidated ambivalent countries, such as Jordan, into agreeing on the necessity and appropriateness of a war on terrorism.[14] The US first devised words and sentences depicting the war on terror as righteous, appropriate, and the only logical response to 9/11, and then linked those to the assertion that 'you are either with us or with the terrorists'.[15] Importantly, 'with us or against us' was not a physical threat. No US administration official ever articulated any relationship between a refusal to accept the appropriateness of the American war on terror and military repercussions.[16] Rather the threat was that unless the victim publicly registered approval of US policies and followed that up with supportive actions, it would be narrated as evil; rogue in the international system. For Jordan, which is known to harbor aspirations toward some aspects of Westernness, the possibility of being socially designated by the West to the evil side of the 'good/evil' divide was intolerable (Lynch 1999). In the face of that threat, Jordan embraced the war on terrorism, even hosting US troops.

Representational Force meets 'Real'-ist Force

So what does representational force have to do with 'real'-ist force (or, more precisely, with coercive material force)? The relationship, I suggest, is multidimensional

[13] I have developed models of two distinct variations on this narrative structure—Terror and Exile (2005).
[14] The same case might be made for Turkey, Syria, and Eygpt.
[15] George Bush, Address to a Joint Session of Congress and the American People, 20 September 2001. This phraseology was then adopted by other members of the US administration. See, for instance, Rumsfeld's invocation of the phrase as reported by Ann Scott Tyson in 'Where the anti-terror doctrine leads', *Christian Science Monitor,* 7 February 2002.
[16] There *was* a physical threat associated with *harboring terrorists,* but that was not the threat implied by the narrative links between 'war on terror' and 'with or against us'.

to the point that in practical terms they are more continuous and interconnected than autonomous in their impact on the meanings that shape world politics. To see how this is so consider three (of what are surely many) dimensions of the representational force-realist force relationship.

First, *representational force can constitute the condition of possibility for coercive material force*. This proposal emerges from the more general claim that discourse constitutes reality, even the reality of the threat posed by a specific material capability. Thus, as Wendt (1995) argued discourses of enmity and friendship can account for why North Korean nuclear weapons credibly threaten the US while British ones do not. From this logic it follows that where the language-power expressed by the constitutive discourse is representational force, representational force is constitutive of coercive material force. Of course, it is unlikely that *all* reality-producing discourses will be constructed through the genre of fighting, so I am not suggesting that representational force *per se* is constitutive for coercive material force. However, inasmuch as material capabilities only become meaningful (and thus, potentially threatening) through discourses that signify them as such, it does suggest that all expressions of coercive material force are indebted to *some* form of language-power.[17] Representational force *can* be that constitutive form.

A second dimension of the relationship highlights *how coercive material force can facilitate representational force*. This, for instance, is one common interpretation of Jordan's acquiescence to the US demands for rhetorical and behavioral support for its war on terrorism. On this view, representational force was effective at exacting Jordan's

---

[17] This is arguably not so of brute material force since it depends on attack rather than threat. Assuming that actors value their physical existence, it may be that brute force speaks for itself—that is, without discourse and without dependence on language-power. However, while I grant this for argument sake, I personally question the extent to which actors naturally value their physical existence. It seems entirely plausible to me that such values are themselves socially constructed, which suggests that in the end even the meaning of brute force would be indebted to language-power.

compliance because the US narrative was backed by superior American material power. Understanding the implications of this characterization requires some delicacy. After all, depending on one's view of material capabilities, acknowledging the effects of coercive material force on representational force may seem to obviate the need to discuss the latter at all. Insofar as one takes coercive material force to be the real engine behind representational force, representational force simply becomes superfluous. Jordan, on this view, would have supported the US war on terrorism whether or not the US bothered to construct the representationally forceful narrative of good and evil.

But I resist this view. Even if Jordan did ultimately comply solely because of American material power (and I am skeptical about that) US representational force still uniquely forced Jordan into framing or articulating its compliance in certain terms. Importantly, those terms then came to define the actions that the Jordanian leaders would ultimately have to take to demonstrate consistency between rhetoric and practice. This point is generalizable: demonstrating consistency between rhetoric and action is critical for an actor's reputation, not to mention for avoiding future subjection to force (representational or material) (Cruz 2000). Thus, even in instances where representational force is 'only' directly responsible for forcing specific terms of submission upon the victim, it still has significant impact on behavior and outcomes in world politics. In other words, just because there is a role for coercive material force in facilitating the effectiveness of representational force does not diminish the need for analysis of the latter.[18]

---

[18] What is more, since material capabilities only acquire meaning within the context of discourses, it makes little sense to attribute fundamental causality to material capabilities. On the contrary it suggests that at base it is language-power 'all the way down', so to speak.

So how else might one construe the fact that coercive material force facilitates representational force? One way is to focus on the manner in which an actor's access to material capabilities (and so coercive material force) affects its capacity to *effectively wield* representational force. To clarify this, consider what it takes to successfully coerce a victim using representational force.[19] First, one must identify a compelling threat; one that is sufficiently important to the victim that it will provoke anxiety about the stability of his Self. This means that the aspiring force-wielder must have enough information about the target's subjectivity that he can isolate and exploit the particular vulnerabilities to which the victim will respond. Second, the aspiring force-wielder must also be able to credibly deliver upon that threat. In this context that means he must have sufficient authorial presence in the relevant sociolinguistic circle to be able to actually upset, if not entirely shift, the victim's sociolinguistic matrix as promised.

Material capabilities can facilitate both of these efforts. When it comes to developing a threat to which the victim will respond it is clear that access to resources can be helpful. Not least of all, material resources can augment the force-wielder's capacity to conduct inquiry into the sociolinguistic configuration of its target's identities, particularly by endowing it with the capacity to launch costly investigations, research, and surveillance. Material capabilities can also enhance the force-wielder's credibility for delivering on the threat to the victim's subjectivity. Here the reason is that contemporary international culture tends to bestow authoritative international social standing, or privileged institutional position, to those with greater material resources. Since privilege,

---

[19] It is worth noting that the requirements of representational force discussed here are not necessarily more onerous than those of coercive material force. In fact, in some sense they are parallel. If coercive material force is to work, the aspiring force-wielder must successfully discern which threats to its victim's well-being will be (a) of sufficient concern to the victim and (b) possible to actually deliver.

in turn, bestows voice, those in privileged positions have more wherewithal to reconfigure the sociolinguistic matrices of a society (Foucault 1995). In this way material capabilities can seriously enhance the potential for an actor to effectively deploy representational force.

Material capabilities also bear on representational force by helping to augment a victim's capacity to resist this form of coercion. This is so because a victim with access to material resources is as likely as the force-wielder with access to material resources to occupy a privileged, authoritative institutional position. Thus even where the force-wielder has managed to leverage a sufficiently anxiety-producing threat to the victim's subjectivity, that victim may nonetheless have the voice to neutralize or discredit the force-wielder's narrative efforts. The victim, in other words, can undermine the credibility of the threat. Interestingly, in such an instance the struggle between the parties to control the terms of the victim's subjectivity can come down to the relative material capabilities of force-wielder and victim.

Such cases thus reveal a third dimension of the relationship between coercive material force and representational force: *material capabilities can become means for accomplishing the goals that were originally pursued through representational force*. Coercive material force, that is, can become a proxy for representational force. It might seem counterintuitive for actors to transmute their discursive identity struggles to the level of physicality since the damage sustained as a result of coercive material force is so much more palpable than that of representational force. And yet such is a way of turning the abstract, traumatic psychological terror about the ontology of the Self into the more comprehensible form of terror associated with damage to the physical self. (Bloch and Reddaway 1977; Derrida 1978; Wrong 1988; Glass 1989; Feldman 1991; Caruth 1996;

Oliverio 1998). Recognizing this suggests the possibility of an edifying historical

rereading of the origins of ethnic, racial, or other physically violent identity conflicts

through the lens of representational force.

     A variety of analytic implications arise from recognizing these three types of

interactions and connections between representational and 'real'-ist force (and surely

others would emerge from exploring other dimensions of the relationship). The first of

these is that research that leverages representational force to access the political dynamics

entailed the production of meaning must remain conscious that there is a continuity and

even, in some cases, dependency between representational and 'real'-ist force. 'Real'-ist

force is constituted through language-power (sometimes representational force) while the

efficacy or fragility of representational force can be shaped by 'real'-ist force. That this

would be so certainly makes instinctive sense—after all, subjective and physical well-being

are themselves continuous and dependent. But it also makes analytical sense since force is

not a theoretical model; it is a lived process of expressing power. The challenge thus is to

resist the urge to let our necessarily limited theoretic models blind us to the complexity of

that process as a lived experience. This has been the unfortunate modus operandi in IR,

since the realist and constructivist scholars aligned with 'real'-ist and representational

force respectively, have been engaged in a disciplinary competition. It would be more

productive from the perspective of developing sophisticated accounts of world politics to

treat those theories as complementary and continuous with each other.[20]

     This said it would be a mistake to completely synthesize the 'real'-ist and

representational accounts of power since the latter, at least, *can* occur independently of

the former. After all whereas the conditions of possibility for coercive material force

---

[20] For a more sustained treatment of what this might look like see the ISR Forum on realist-constructivism.

14

depend upon language-power of some sort the conditions of possibility for representational force are not necessarily indebted to coercive material capabilities. Thus while a model of language-power and 'real'-ist force as necessarily intertwined would do no harm when it came to locating the latter, it would when it came to the former. It would build in a systematic bias against recognizing instances in which representational force operates independently of the coercive effects of material capabilities. The implications would be nontrivial given that representational force is a 'weapon of the weak'. After all, its credibility and efficacy is rooted in the *sociolinguistic relationship* between force-wielder and victim—that is, on what they know and how well they know each other rather than on access to on physical resources. [21] In this way, a model that synthesized 'real'-ist and representational force would reinforce without question the long-standing prejudicial assumption in IR theory that force can only be credibly expressed by the materially strong.

Given the importance, for good accounts of world politics, of considering the role and relationship of varied forms and expressions of power in any given context, this argument for retaining representational and 'real'-ist force as independent theoretic constructs imposes a responsibility on scholars. That responsibility is to engage with each other's models and insights rather than to compete with them. This applies not just to constructivists seeking to understand how language-power constitutes the contemporary

---

[21] The more mutually embedded they are in the same sociolinguistic fields, the more leverage the force-wielder can get over the victim (and the reverse; the less mutually embedded the more effectively the victim can resist). Thus, the greater the degree of communicative exchange between the parties the better acquainted the force-wielder will be with the victim's subjectivity and the more able he will be to zero in on exploitable vulnerabilities that are important to the victim. Similarly the more interdependent the sociolinguistic constitution of the parties, the more credible the force-wielder's capacity to re-narrate the victim's Self. Conversely, the less of either, the easier it will be for the victim to resist.

global political conditions, but also to those prone to think about world politics in terms of 'real'-ist force.

References

Adler, E. and M. N. Barnett, Eds. (1998). Security Communities. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Barnett, M. (1998). Dialogues in Arab Politics. New York, Columbia University Press.

Barnett, M. and R. Duvall (2005). Power in Global Governance. Power in Global Governance. M. Barnett and R. Duvall. Cambridge Cambridge University Press.

Bially Mattern, J. (2001). "The Power Politics of Identity." European Journal of International Relations **7**(4).

Bially Mattern, J. (2005). Ordering International Politics: Identity, Crisis, and Representational Force. New York, Routledge.

Bially Mattern, J. (2008, forthcoming). The Concept of Power in the (Un)Discipline of International Relations. Oxford Handbook of International Relations. C. Reus-Smit and D. Snidal. London, Oxford University Press.

Bloch, S. and P. Reddaway (1977). Psychiatric Terror: How Soviet Psychology is Used to Suppress Dissent. Basic Books, New York.

Bukovansky, M. (2002). Legitimacy and Power Politics: The American and French Revolutions in International Political Culture. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Campbell, D. (1992). Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of Identity. Minneapolis, University of Minnesota Press.

Caruth, C. (1996). Unclaimed Experience, Trauma, Narrative, and History. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Connolly, W. E. (1974). The Terms of Political Discourse. Princeton, Princeton University Press.

Crawford, N. C. (2002). Argument and Change in World Politics. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Cruz, C. (2000). "Identity and persuasion: How nations remember their pasts and make their futures." World Politics **52**(3): 275-+.

Derrida, J. (1978). Violence and Metaphysics: An Essay on the Thought of Emmanuel Levinas. Writing and Difference. Chicago, University of Chicago.

Derrida, J. (1978). Writing and Difference. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Feldman, A. (1991). Formations of Violence: The Narrative of the Body and Political Terror in Northern Ireland. Chicagor, University of Chicago Press.

Foucault, M. (1995). Discipline and punishment: The Birth of the Prison. New York, Vintage Books.

Gelber, K. and M. McDonald (2006). "Ethics and exclusion: representations of sovereignty in Australia's approach to

asylum-seekers." Review of International Studies **32**: 269-289.

Glass, J. M. (1989). <u>Private Terror/Public Life: Psychosis and the Politics of Community</u>. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Krebs, R. and P. T. Jackson (2007). "Twisting Tongues and Twisting Arms: The Power of Political Rhetoric." <u>European Journal of International Relations</u> **13**(1).

Krebs, R. and J. Lobasz (Forthcoming). "'Fixing the Meaning of 9/11: Hegemony, Coercion, and the Road to War in Iraq.' " <u>Security Studies</u>.

Lukes, S. (2005). "Power and the Battle for Hearts and Minds." <u>Millennium Journal of International Studies</u> **33**(3): 477-493.

Lynch, M. (1999). <u>State Interests and Public Spheres: The International Politics of Jordan's Identity</u>. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Mearsheimer, J. (2001). <u>The Tragedy of Great Power Politics</u>. New York, WW Norton.

Mitzen, J. (2005). "Ontological Security in World Politics: State Identity and the Security Dilemma." <u>European Journal of International Relations</u> **12**(3).

Morgenthau, H. J. (1954). <u>Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace</u>. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.

Neumann, I. B. (2002). "Returning practice to the linguistic turn: The case of diplomacy." <u>Millennium</u> **31**(3): 627-651.

Oliverio, A. (1998). <u>The State of Terror</u>. Albany, SUNY Press.

Onuf, N. (1989). <u>World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and International Relations</u>. Columbia, University of South Carolina Press.

Schelling, T. C. (1966). <u>Arms and Influence</u>. New Haven, Yale University Press.

Schmidt, B. (2005). "Competitng Realist Conceptions of Power." <u>Millennium Journal of International Studies</u> **33**(3): 523-549.

Schweller, R. L. (1998). <u>Deadly imbalances : tripolarity and Hitler's strategy of world conquest</u>. New York, Columbia University Press.

Scollon, R. (2001). <u>Mediated Discourse: The Nexus of Practice</u>. London, Routledge.

Wendt, A. (1995). "Constructing International Politics." <u>International Security</u> **20**(1): 71-81.

White, H. (1987). The value of narrativity in the representation of reality. <u>The Content of the Form</u>. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press.

Wohlforth, W. C. (1993). <u>The Elusive Balance: Power and Perceptions during the Cold War</u>. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.

Wrong, D. (1988). <u>Power: its forms and bases</u>. Chicago, University of Chicago Press.